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INTRODUCTION
When the City of Detroit filed for bankruptcy protection in the
summer of 2013, it was the largest municipal bankruptcy filing in
American history.1 Many critics lay blame for the city’s misfortunes
on out-of-control employee pension and retiree health legacy costs.2
Such criticisms were indeed consistent with similar claims concerning
the effect of out-of-control legacy costs in the private sector leading to
high-profile corporate bankruptcies throughout the world.3
Although there is a continuing dispute over whether the Michigan
State Constitution provides protections for the pension benefits of
Detroit city employees in the ongoing bankruptcy case,4 to most
people it is clear that pension and other wage claims of employees

1. See David A. Lieb, Detroit Bankruptcy Tests State Pension Protections,
YAHOO! NEWS (July 24, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/detroit-bankruptcy-tests-statepension-protections-065517091.html. It is estimated that Detroit has 700,000 citizens,
and that there are some 23,000 pension recipients and 9,000 current public
employees. See Editorial, For Detroit Retirees, Michigan’s Pension Promise Must Be
Kept, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.freep.com/article/20130801/
OPINION01/308010019.
2. See, e.g., Richard Summerfield, Legacy Costs Push Communities to the Brink,
FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Oct. 2013), http://www.financierworldwide.com/article.php
?id=11125 (“While no two cases are ever the same, one of the most common themes
running through the majority of insolvent cities and towns is the presence of crippling
legacy costs.”); see also Veronique de Rugy, What Detroit’s Debt Problem Looks
Like, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (July 19, 2013), http://www.nationalreview.com/
corner/353917/what-detroits-debt-problem-looks-veronique-de-rugy (illustrating that
nearly half of Detroit’s debt ($18.5 billion) comes from unfunded pension ($3.5
billion) and retiree health-care obligations ($5.7 billion)).
3. See Fiona Stewart, Benefit Protection: Priority Creditor Rights for Pension
Funds (OECD Working Papers on Ins. & Private Pensions No. 6, 2007), available at
http://www.oecd.org/pensions/insurance/37977393.pdf; see also Andrew B. Dawson,
The Impact of Collective Bargaining Agreements on Corporation Reorganizations 1
(manuscript on file with author) (“Labor unions recently have received a
considerable amount of blame for the economic failures of their employers.”).
4. See Lieb, supra note 1. The Michigan Constitution states: “The accrued
financial benefits of each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its
political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be
diminished or impaired thereby.” MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24.
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against the City are now very much in jeopardy.5 This begs the
following question: what protections, if any, do these employees have
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or under any guarantee or insurance
scheme when it comes to their employment claims against Detroit?
Although the answer to that question is far from clear given the lack
of precedent in this largely underdeveloped area of municipal
bankruptcy and public employee benefits law,6 there is a fear that
there could be substantial cuts to city employees’ and retirees’ benefit
and wage claims.7 Even worse, some city employees in Detroit, like
police officers and fire personnel, will be placed in an even more
precarious position if they lose their pensions as a result of

5. For definitional purposes throughout this Article, “employment claims” in
bankruptcy constitute both employee “pension claims” and “wage claims.” In turn,
“pension claims” refer to any occupational deferred compensation arrangement such
as under a defined benefit pension plan or a defined contribution pension plan,
whereas “wage claims” is broadly defined to include not only unpaid wages, salaries,
and commissions, but other in-kind payments for accrued vacation and holiday pay,
sick leave pay, severance pay, and other contracted-for benefits (including health
insurance, life insurance, long-term disability insurance, and retiree medical benefits).
This definition of wages is consistent with how wages are defined under section 507 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2012).
6. Lieb, supra note 1. Of course, municipal bankruptcies are still a relatively rare
phenomenon in the United States. See Elizabeth K. Kellar, Why Municipal
Bankruptcy is Rare (and Should Be), ICMA (Aug. 29, 2013), http://icma.org/en/icma/
newsroom/highlights/Article/103661/Why_Municipal_Bankruptcy_Is_Rare_and_Sho
uld_Be (“Over the last five years, only thirteen local governments—less than one
percent of all eligible municipalities—have sought bankruptcy protection.”).
7. Some have suggested that retirees may lose as much as eighty-three percent of
their retirement benefits in the Detroit bankruptcy. See Chris Isidore, Detroit Files
for Bankruptcy, CNNMONEY (July 18, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/18/news/
economy/detroit-bankruptcy. In the Stockton, California bankruptcy, it is estimated
that retirees lost anywhere from thirty to seventy percent of their pension and
medical benefits through the restructuring process (though contributions to the
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) were not touched). See
Laura Mahoney, Stockton Poised to Approve Ch. 9 Plan, Ask Bankruptcy Court for
Approval, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (BNA) (Oct. 3, 2013),
http://news.bna.com/pdln/PDLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=36982339&vname=pbd
notallissues&jd=a0e2e0g8b0&split=0. On the other hand, cities like Vallejo,
California, that did not touch their pension obligations to CalPERS as part of past
bankruptcy processes are again struggling to pay pension costs and are in danger of
re-entering the bankruptcy process. See Tim Reid, Two Years After Bankruptcy,
California City Again Mired in Pension Debt, REUTERS, Oct. 1, 2013, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/01/usa-municipality-vallejoidUSL2N0HM05C20131001. Part of the problem with interfering with contributions
to CalPERS is that the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects state
agencies, including pension agencies, from being haled into federal court against their
will by a municipality as part of a Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding. See Press
Release, CalPERS, CalPERS Files Amicus Brief Supporting State Dispute with City
of San Bernardino (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/
newsroom/news/2013/files-brief.xml.
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bankruptcy because they are not eligible to receive government
pension payments under Social Security.8
To put the plight of the Detroit city employees into an
international and comparative context when it comes to considering
how their pension and wage claims should be treated in bankruptcy, it
is instructive to consider how similar employee pension and wage
claims would be treated in corporate insolvencies in other countries.
It is necessary to focus on corporate insolvencies in other countries as
the relevant comparison because in most other countries,
municipalities do not have the same financial independence to borrow
money and take on debt by participating in the municipal bond
market as those in the United States.9 Additionally, exploring the
corporate bankruptcy systems in other countries provides a beneficial
way to consider how to approach municipal bankruptcy situations in
the United States, especially because corporate and municipal
bankruptcies in the United States have a number of features in
common when it comes to employee-creditor claims.10
Indeed, similar to the situation playing out in Detroit, corporate
insolvencies around the world have not only resulted in job losses for
8. See Editorial, supra note 1 (“Among the city’s claimants, retirees are the most
vulnerable. Their payouts are meager—an average of $30,000 a year for police and
fire, $19,000 for other city employees—but absolutely crucial to their survival.”);
Kellar, supra note 6 (“Detroit police and fire personnel are not in the Social Security
system, so their city pension may be their only retirement income.”).
9. The United States municipal bond market has approximately $3.7 trillion in
bonds outstanding, with “annual issuances in excess of $200 billion for the past fifteen
years.” See Christine Sgarlatta Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and

Local Government Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rates, and
Opportunities for Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1458 (2013). On the other
hand, and to take just one European example, municipalities in the United Kingdom
cannot issue their own debt or take out loans in the same way as municipalities in the
United States do. See Email from Rosalind Conner to Paul M. Secunda (Oct. 1, 2013)
(on file with author). The legal entity status of municipalities in the United Kingdom
seems more consistent with how municipalities operate in many other parts of the
world. See Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25 § 17 (provincial municipal
government act prohibiting municipalities in Ontario from going bankrupt).
Additionally, municipalities generally do not have their own pension and employee
benefit plans in most advanced economies, but rather cover public employee
pensions and benefits through national programs. See, e.g., Email from Jean-Philippe
Lhernould to Paul M. Secunda (Oct. 1, 2013) (on file with author) (“[C]ities and local
authorities in France do not run any form of pension/benefit funds.”).
10. See Charles E. Wilson, The Replacement of Lawful Economic Strikers in the
Public Sector in Ohio, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 639, 654 n.111 (1985) (suggesting the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code permits municipal employers to resort to financial reorganization
in bankruptcy under standards and procedures that closely parallel those provided
under Chapter 11 for private employers); Note, Executory Labor Contracts and
Municipal Bankruptcy, 85 YALE L.J. 957, 958 n.7 (1976) (applying Chapter 11
standards to interpret Chapter 9).
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employees, but also in losses of significant pension and wage
benefits.11
In turn, employees, who are considered the most
vulnerable of company creditors in the insolvency process because of
their lack of voice and their lack of ability to diversify their risk,12
have been forced either to wait for significant periods of time to
receive payment while the insolvency process takes its course13 or to
navigate complex insolvency procedures.14
This Article therefore undertakes a comparative analysis of the
treatment of pension and wage claims in insolvency proceedings and
under guarantee schemes in the thirty-four member countries of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
to understand whether the United States’s approach to employee
11. See GORDON JOHNSON, OECD, INSOLVENCY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION:
EMPLOYEE ENTITLEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF EMPLOYER INSOLVENCY 1–2 (2006),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/
38184691.pdf (“Wages generally constitute a significant portion of employees’ wealth,
leaving them with few options to fall back on in the event of their employer’s
default.”).
12. See INT’L INSOLVENCY INST., FIRST DRAFT REPORT BY THE SOCIAL CLAIMS
COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYEE, PENSION
AND
RELATED SOCIAL CLAIMS IN INSOLVENCY (2009), available at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/560/1828.html (discussing lack
of power employees have as creditors).
13. This is mostly true for liquidations. In business reorganizations under Chapter
11, on the other hand, “it is typical for debtors to file a motion on the first day of the
case to seek authority to pay all [wage] amounts that would otherwise be priority
claims in the ordinary course of business.” FRANK VAN DUSEN & TYLER ROGERS,
ABA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT SECTION, ON THE HOOK? INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY ON
WAGE CLAIMS WHEN AN EMPLOYER FILES FOR BANKRUPTCY 1 n.2 (2010), available
at
http://www.apps.americanbar.org/labor/errcomm/mw/Papers/2010/data/papers/
026.pdf. As far as wages owed prior to the bankruptcy filing, employees may also be
assisted by the existence of federal and state wage and hour laws that require
employees to be paid for all time worked on a specified basis while employed and
after a specified time after separation from employment. See generally Fair Labor
Standard Act of 1938 (FLSA) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012)) (providing
that covered employees be compensated on a salary or hourly basis for time worked);
Wisconsin Wage Payment and Collection Law, WIS. STAT. § 109.03(1) (2013)
(requiring wages to be paid on at least a monthly basis). Indeed, as Van Dusen and
Rogers note, “Several state and federal courts have determined that an employer’s
bankruptcy will not excuse a corporate officer’s personal liability for an employer’s
violation of wage laws.” VAN DUSEN & ROGERS, supra, at 1. However, to the extent
that employees have filed state wage claims for unpaid wages, such claims will be
automatically stayed once the bankruptcy petition is filed, and such claims will have
to wait the reorganization or liquidation of the bankruptcy estate with all other
claims. See RICHARD I. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 267 (2013)
(“Bankruptcy Code § 362(a) imposes an automatic stay from the moment of the filing
of any bankruptcy petition.”).
14. This is true mostly with regard to filing claims for pension and other benefits.
See infra Part II.A.1 (describing the process in the United States for employees to
recover on pension claims after employer insolvency).
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claims in bankruptcy (in both the corporate and municipal context) is
consistent with international norms.
After completing the
comparative analysis (which is comprehensively set out in the
Appendix), this Article then highlights common approaches to these
issues, as well as important distinctions, presenting several tables to
summarize the results.
As an initial matter, there is a distinction in most countries
between pre-filing (prior to bankruptcy) employee pension or wage
claims and post-filing claims. Whereas pre-filing claims are subject to
varying degrees of priority treatment (as discussed below), post-filing
claims are generally treated as administrative expenses of the
bankruptcy estate and given priority over most other unsecured
creditor claims.15 With regard to pre-filing employment claims,
outstanding occupational pension contribution claims (whether based
on a defined benefit plan or defined contribution plan scheme)
receive some preferential treatment under most of the studied
countries’ insolvency laws, but are limited to a capped amount for a
specified period of time before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.16
As for claims for unfunded or underfunded occupational pension
liability (generally in the defined benefit context), they are treated as
unsecured claims.17 Wage claims, for their part, generally receive
some preference in bankruptcy in most of the countries studied, but
again only up to a capped amount for a specified period of time
before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.18
In addition to insolvency schemes, most of the OECD countries
have pension and/or wage guarantee schemes to protect employee
claims and to complement the existing insolvency system. To the
extent that employees receive payment for their claims under these
15. Indeed, this is how post-filing wage claims are treated in the United States
under section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2012); see
also id. § 507(a)(1)–(2) (providing administrative priority claims, including wages and
benefits paid to employees after bankruptcy filing, with priority over almost all other
claims, except for first priority claims relating to domestic support obligations that do
not arise in corporate cases). It would be improper to say these post-filing
administrative claims have a super priority under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, as that
terminology is reserved for two such super-priorities—for secured creditor’s failed
adequate protection claims, id. § 507(b), and for debtor-in-possession (DIP) lenders,
but only if the court orders, id. § 364(c)(1).
16. See infra Part III.B, Table III.3.
17. As will be discussed below, the unsecured nature of any employee claims in
the bankruptcy process means it is less likely that such claims will be satisfied. See
infra Part I.E. As will also be described in detail below, pension plans can be broadly
categorized into defined benefit plans or defined contribution plans based on their
funded or unfunded status. See infra Part I.B.
18. See infra Part III.B, tbl.III.3.
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guarantee schemes, the guarantee organizations will often become
subrogated to the rights of the employees (including generally to
whatever priority these employees might have) in the insolvency
proceeding.19 These types of subrogation rights mean that the
guarantee scheme will be acting in the place of employees with more
bargaining power because of its ability to put forward a larger overall
claim. In turn, this dynamic leads to a larger recovery of employee
claims from the insolvent employer and helps ensure the continuing
vitality of the guarantee scheme.20
In categorizing the various approaches OECD countries apply to
employee claims in insolvency, this Article relies to a significant
extent on the country models developed by Gordon Johnson.
Johnson identified four different systems that countries utilize to
address employee entitlements in cases of employer insolvency.21
This Article employs a slightly modified three-system version to
further emphasize similarities in how countries deal with employee
protection concerns raised by employer insolvencies. As described in
this Article, Model One countries provide bankruptcy priority, but
offer little or no insurance or guarantee protections (e.g., Chile and
Mexico). Model Two countries adopt a hybrid approach and provide
both some form of bankruptcy priority and a guarantee fund for
employee claims (e.g., Canada, France, Ireland, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom). These Model Two countries are further divided
into robust and limited sub-models based on the extent of the
bankruptcy priority offered and the extent of the protection offered
by the country’s guarantee schemes. Finally, Model Three countries
provide no bankruptcy priority, but only a guarantee fund approach
(e.g., Finland and Germany).

19. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(1).
20. See infra Part IV.A.6.
21. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 4–6. As described below, the fourth category
was limited to the pro-employee Chinese system, which is not part of this study. Id. at
7–8. All OECD countries provide either a bankruptcy priority, a guarantee scheme,
or both. See infra Part III.B, tbl.III.3. On the other hand, such priorities and
guarantee schemes are generally unheard of in the American state and municipality
bankruptcy context (unlike with the existence of state guaranty associations in the
insurance context). See Policyholder Information, NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE & HEALTH
INS. GUAR. ASS’N, http://www.nolhga.com/policyholderinfo/main.cfm (“The guaranty
system safety net helps keep the promises of the insurance industry, even when
companies fail.”). The lack of state guarantee schemes is probably due to the rarity
of municipal bankruptcy filings over the years. See Jeannette Neumann, U.S. Cities
Grapple with Finances, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702304799404579157780077670894 (“[J]ust 63 cities,
towns and villages, including Detroit, have filed for municipal bankruptcy protection
since 1954.”).
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Of course, even within these country models, there are significant
variations relating to: (1) strength of the creditor priority (e.g.,
absolute priority vs. some lesser priority); (2) capped versus uncapped
claims (as far as how much the priority or guarantee fund covers); (3)
the length of employee payments covered by the claim (e.g., three
months prior to the bankruptcy filing vs. twelve months prior to the
bankruptcy filing); (4) whether pensions, wages, both, or neither are
covered by the insolvency and guarantee provisions; (5) what
constitutes “wages” for purposes of the insolvency and guarantee
schemes; and (6) the manner in which the insolvency and guarantee
schemes operate separately or complement one another through
mechanisms like subrogation.22
All in all, most OECD countries are Model Two countries that
have adopted hybrid systems that combine some form of priority for
both pension and wage claims with some form of guarantee fund to
complement the insolvency system. It is especially important to have
these guarantee funds in place because insolvency processes can last
several years, while the guarantee schemes are more likely to pay
employees their claims within weeks or months.23 Unfortunately, the
United States is a limited Model Two country. It provides only
limited priorities in most bankruptcy proceedings (and no such wage
or pension priorities in Chapter 9 municipal proceedings),24 a
guarantee system under the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC) that is limited to pension plans, and then only to privatesector defined benefit pension plans.25 Neither private-sector defined

22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 4.
24. Pension and wage priorities that apply under section 507(a)(4) and (a)(5) of
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4), (5) (2012), do not apply to Chapter 9
proceedings. See 5 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 90:3 n.5 (3d ed. 2008) (“Examples of some of the
significant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code which do not apply in Chapter 9 cases
include . . . § 507 (other than § 507(a)(1)) (priorities of claims, except for
administrative expenses set forth in § 503(b)).”); see also Joseph Lichterman,
Protecting Detroit Pensions May Violate Bankruptcy Code–Judge, REUTERS, Oct.
21, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/usa-detroitbankruptcy-idUSL1N0IB1HY20131021 (“The federal judge overseeing Detroit’s
bankruptcy filing called the city’s pension funds ‘unsecured creditors’ and stated that
any special protections for them would violate federal bankruptcy law.”).
25. The PBGC is established under Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1461 (2012); see Mark Daniels, Pensions in

Peril: Single Employer Pension Plan Terminations in the Context of Corporate
Bankruptcies, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 25, 32 (1991) (providing analysis and critique of
treatment of pension plan obligations during corporate bankruptcies).
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contribution plans nor public sector pension plans come under a
guarantee scheme in the United States.26
One possible solution to this current state of affairs is to adopt a
legal approach similar to the robust Model Two country schemes
found in many other countries with advanced economies. Indeed,
one approach to employee claims in both municipal and corporate
bankruptcies would be to pass pension and bankruptcy reform laws
similar to what Canada enacted in 2008 as part of its Wage Earner
Protection Program Act (WEPPA).27 Unlike the American system,
WEPPA provides limited absolute priorities for pension
contributions and a broad array of wage claims in insolvency, as well
as a robust wage guarantee scheme.28 As to the policy reasons
supporting this approach, it appears that greater emphasis is placed
on the need to protect the weakness of employee-creditors in the
insolvency process as opposed to focusing on the need to ensure the
existence of cheap, accessible credit for companies and
governments.29
This Article concludes that given the relative vulnerability of
employees and the sophistication of most lenders, the United States
should balance these interests to provide increased protection for
employment claims during insolvency proceedings through giving
heightened priority treatment to their pension and wage claims in
bankruptcy in tandem with a guarantee scheme for both pension and
wages claims.30 As far as arguing for greater priority rights in
26. See Susan Tompor, Pension Safety Net Won’t Help City of Detroit Retirees,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 27, 2013, http://www.freep.com/article/20130627/COL07/
306270021/Detroit-bankruptcy-retirees-PBGC-Susan-Tompor (“For a state or
municipal pension, the taxpayer is typically the backstop.”).
27. See Wage Earner Protection Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 1 (Can.). As
Mr. Goldowitz aptly comments in his Response to this Article, one of the challenges
for such legislation would be jurisdictional, including which committees of Congress
would have primary authority to vet it, and then assuming legislation were enacted,
which executive branch Departments would have primary authority to administer it.
See Israel Goldowitz, Response to Professor Paul Secunda’s Comparative Analysis of

the Treatment of Employment Claims in Insolvency Proceedings and Guarantee
Schemes in OECD Countries, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1027, 1034–36 (2014).
Additionally, by extending the proposed guarantee scheme to municipal insolvencies,
there could be complicated constitutional issues revolving around federalism and
comity concerns. I do not attempt to answer any of these important, but tricky,
questions here.
28. See generally Sylvie Heartfield & David Wink, The New Wage Earner
Protection Program Act: What Does It Mean? (2008) (on file with author)
(describing bankruptcy and guarantee schemes associated with WEPPA).
29. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7.
30. By proposing to expand the current pension guarantee system beyond privatesector defined benefit pension plans, this Article proposes an addition to the
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bankruptcy for both more types of wage claims and for pension
contributions, this proposal parrots portions of the Protecting
Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2013 (H.R.
100), introduced by Representative Conyers in January of 2013.31
With regard to insisting on a federal response to a broad array of
wage claims, including vacation and severance pay, this proposal
relies on findings from the Canadian government that pre-WEPPA
“unpaid wage claims receive[d] only 13 cents on the dollar” and that,
“it [was] estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 workers [had]
unpaid wage claims per year.”32 Although Mr. Israel Goldowitz
suggests in his Response to this Article that wage guarantee schemes
should be less important in any proposed legal reform in this area,33
this Article maintains that evidence from Canada and other countries
that have similar schemes suggest that the institution of a wage
scheme that covers a broad array of wage claims is no less important
than the continuation and expansion of the pension guarantee system
in the United States.

WEPPA, which currently does not include a pension guarantee scheme. Although
Ontario has a Pension Benefit Guarantee Fund (PBGF) established in 1980, there
has not been any attempt to establish such funds in other provinces or in the federal
sphere. On the other hand, Professor Harry Arthurs chaired the Ontario Expert
Pension Commission, which authored a Report on Pension Reform in 2008. See H.W.
ARTHURS, EXPERT COMM’N ON PENSIONS, A FINE BALANCE: SAFE PENSIONS,
AFFORDABLE PLANS, FAIR RULES, (2008), available at http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/
consultations/pension/report/Pensions_Report_Eng_web.pdf. On the section on the
future of the PBGF, it notes arguments that such guarantee funds can create moral
hazard, and were perhaps redundant given Canada’s social safety net. Id. at 119
(“One common allegation is that knowing that the benefits are protected by the
PBGF, hard-pressed sponsors may be tempted to under-fund their plans, and unions
to acquiesce in the risks associated with under-funding, so that money otherwise
earmarked for pension contributions can be diverted to business investments or to
improving other aspects of the compensation package. The PBGF, in this analysis,
creates what is called a ‘moral hazard’—an inducement to engage in overly risky
behaviour [sic] because the normal risks associated with that behaviour [sic] are
mitigated.”); see also id. at 120 (“[F]or some the PBGF represents a ‘belt and
suspenders’ approach to the risks of plan failure—a redundant form of protection.
Workers, they note, are shielded twice from the full impact of the failure of an underfunded plan—once by the PBGF, and a second time by the broader Canadian social
security systems.”).
31. H.R. 100, 113th Cong. §§ 101, 103, 105, 201, 203, (2013), available at
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/100.
Of course, as Mr. Goldowitz
suggests in his Response, the political realities of Washington, D.C. in 2013 (with a
sixteen-day government shutdown just ended at the time of the writing of this paper)
make such a legislative solution unlikely in the near-term. Of course, the luxury of
being a law professor is the ability to disassociate from present-day realities and plant
seeds for ideas that may flourish in different times and places.
32. Heartfield & Wink, supra note 28, at 14-6.
33. See Goldowitz, supra note 27, at 1032–34.
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The comparative analysis in this Article is divided into four parts.
Part I provides a cursory background of pension and bankruptcy law
so that the treatment of employment claims in the insolvency process
is placed in the proper legal context. Part II provides both the
manner in which employment claims are presently treated in
insolvency and in guarantee schemes in the United States and
Canada, while at the same time considering how large international
organizations, including the European Union and the Internal Labor
Organization (ILO), have addressed these issues over the years. Part
II then summarizes the findings of this Article’s thirty-four-country
comparative study on employee claim treatment in insolvency and
guarantee schemes through a series of tables. Part III provides
preliminary conclusions concerning this study’s findings and urges the
United States to adopt legislation similar to the Canadian WEPPA to
provide insolvency and guarantee scheme protection for employee
pension and wage claims in both the municipal and corporate
bankruptcy context.
I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS AND BANKRUPTCY LAW
This Part seeks to achieve six primary objectives in discussing the
treatment of pensions and wage claims during insolvency proceedings.
First, Part I.A starts by classifying different types of pensions and
retirement plans that employees have in most advanced-market
economies, distinguishing among the so-called “pillars” of retirement
savings. Second, with regard to occupational pension plans, with
which this Article is primarily concerned, Part I.B discusses important
distinctions between various occupational pension scheme structures
and between public sector and private sector plans. Third, Part I.C
examines the characteristics of so-called “wage claims.” Fourth, Part
I.D explores how some occupational pension and wage claims are
backed by government-sponsored insurance or guarantee schemes.
Fifth, Part I.E sets forth the basic bankruptcy law framework in most
countries, discussing the different rights of various creditors and the
importance of the priority designation that pension and wage claims
receive during the insolvency process. Sixth, and finally, Part I.F
surveys arguments for and against providing pension and wage claims
with higher priority rights in insolvency proceedings.
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A. Government-Provided Pensions vs. Employer-Provided
Pensions
Pensions, or retirement saving sources, can be roughly broken
down into three pillars: government-provided or state-run pensions
(first pillar); company-provided occupational pensions often also
partially funded by the employee (second pillar); and individuallypurchased pension plans (third pillar).34 These classifications do not
always work well across different countries,35 but they provide a way
to organize the different types of pension provisions provided by
various countries. Many advanced-market countries provide some
combination of all three types of retirement income schemes, but
certainly not all countries do, as will be further elaborated upon
below.
Additionally, even among the various pension pillars, there are
substantial differences in how these pensions are financed and
structured. For instance, in the first pillar, some public social security
schemes use a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financing model based on
employee payroll taxes,36 while other countries finance their public
pension systems out of general tax revenues.37 Moreover, some public
schemes are operated as defined benefit plans where citizens are
promised defined benefits at a certain age based on a specified
formula,38 whereas other countries have additional or separately

34. See WORLD BANK, AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS: POLICIES TO PROTECT
THE OLD AND PROMOTE GROWTH 15 (1994); John A. Turner, Book Review, 48
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 862, 862–63 (1995) (reviewing WORLD BANK, supra)
(distinguishing origination of pillar system of organization).
35. See Gregory N. Filosa, International Pension Reform: Lessons for the United
States, 19 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 133, 139 (2005); Michael K. Stransky, Note,
Mailing It in: European Union Efforts at Pension Reform, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 315, 318
(2001).
36. The United States Social Security System is one such system. See Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397 (2012). See generally Paul M. Secunda,
Explaining the Lack of Non-Public Actors in the USA Social Insurance System, in
NON-PUBLIC ACTORS IN SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 234–41 (Frans Pennings et al. eds., 2013) (giving an overview of the operation
of the U.S. Social Security System, which is a first pillar, defined benefit pension plan
based on PAYG financing mechanism).
37. See JANIS SARRA, RECOGNIZING WORKERS’ ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS: THE
TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE AND PENSION CLAIMS DURING COMPANY INSOLVENCY, A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 62 JURISDICTIONS 25 (2008), available at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/572/5379.html.
38. See Secunda, supra note 36, at 230 & n.3 (“As an initial matter, ‘Social
Security’ in the United States refers primarily to the government-run old age, survival
and disability insurance (OASDI) programme [sic] for older and disabled Americans.
This programme [sic] is funded on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis and takes the form
of a defined benefit pension plan.”).
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established defined contribution arrangements where the state
introduces private retirement accounts into the public social security
system.39
However, because the focus of this Article is on the treatment of
pension and wage claims during company and municipal insolvency
proceedings, its emphasis is primarily on the second pillar of
retirement savings involving occupational pension plans. Put another
way, government-sponsored social security schemes, whether of the
defined benefit or defined contribution variety, or whether financed
via PAYG or based on general tax revenues, do not have “employee
claims” against employers when those employers face liquidations or
reorganizations.40
It is unsurprising that the second pillar
occupational pensions affects employers the most during the
insolvency process. As will be discussed further below, the countries
studied in this Article take a wide variety of approaches to
occupational pensions. Some have little or no experience with
occupational schemes, a sizeable number have set up statutory
occupational schemes which establish the pension fund or insurance
scheme separate and apart from the employer, and still other
countries (like the United States and Canada) have employeroperated occupational pension plans. Each of these second pillar
approaches, in turn, have an impact on how the various countries
studied in this Article have established their insolvency systems to
deal with employee pension and wage claims.
B.

Characteristics of Occupational Pension Plans

All pension plans, regardless of pillar type, can be further broken
down into two primary pension schemes. Under traditional defined
benefit plans (DB plans), the employer invests funds on a periodic
basis on behalf of its employees so that the individual is entitled at
retirement to a guaranteed payment (in a lump sum or annuity form)
based on some set payment formula related to years of service and

39. See Filosa, supra note 35, at 139–40 (noting the failure of the United States to
provide a long-term reform to Social Security); see also Secunda, supra note 36, at
234–41 (same). The next Part probes deeper into the difference between defined
benefit and defined contribution systems in occupational pension plans.
40. Government pension schemes may have other types of claims against
employers (like tax claims), which are beyond the scope of this Article. See SARRA,
supra note 37, at 48 (noting that where entirely state operated pension or social
welfare schemes exist, the employer’s insolvency does not have as substantial an
impact upon employees).
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salary history.41 Generally, employers contribute to these DB plans
by providing minimum, actuarially-based funding on behalf of each
worker and then manage that money, either themselves or through a
third party intermediary, to achieve the necessary return to provide
the promised benefits to employees during retirement.42 Some of
these DB plans are backed by government insurance schemes in case
of company insolvency. In the United States, for example, the PBGC
undertakes this role by providing government insurance for
terminated private-sector DB plans.43
A second kind of occupational pension arrangement has gained
prominence in numerous countries over the past few decades. Under
defined contribution plans (DC plans), the employer and/or employee
make contributions to an employee’s individual retirement account
and then the employee is responsible, through investment vehicles
selected by the employer for the employee to choose from, to manage
that money so that he or she will have enough money to last
throughout retirement.44 In other words, whether an employee has
sufficient funds for retirement under a DC plan depends greatly on
the investment return the employee receives on the funds in his or her
individual pension account.45 These arrangements have been popular
in the private sector for a while now, but are starting to become more
prevalent in the public sector as well,46 especially with newlyemployed workers.47

41. JEFFREY M. HIRSCH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 198–99 (2d
ed. 2013).
42. Id.
43. Id. The PBGC is established under Title IV of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301–
1461 (2012), and its operations are discussed in greater detail infra Part II.A.
44. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 199–200.
45. Id. at 199.
46. Recently, Detroit’s emergency manager has proposed, as part of the Detroit
bankruptcy process, to freeze its DB plans and enroll all employees in defined
contribution arrangements. See Mary Williams Walsh, A Proposal to Freeze
Pensions in Detroit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2013, at B1 (“The proposed pension freeze
for Detroit would halt payments of nonpension benefits to both active workers and
retirees. Nor would current retirees continue to receive yearly cost-of-living
adjustments. Current city workers would be shifted into new defined-contribution
plans, similar to 401(k) plans . . . .”).
47. See PAULA SANFORD & JOSHUA M. FRANZEL, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 6 (2012), available at
http://www.slge.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/The-Evolving-Role-of-DefinedContribution-Plans.pdf (“Many public officials are concerned with the long-term
costs of their current defined benefit programs and will continue to redesign these
plans and consider alternative retirement arrangements. However, most of the
changes implemented to date, including switching to hybrid and core defined
contribution plans, usually affect new employees.”).
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These DC plans, however, are not backed up by government
insurance schemes.48 The other big difference between DB plans and
DC plans is that with the former, the risks of inflation, investment
return, and employee longevity are placed on the employer, while the
employee takes on those risks under the DC plan arrangement.49
From an employer insolvency perspective, DB plans are more
relevant. This is because the two primary types of pension creditor
claims—unfunded pension liabilities and outstanding pension
contributions—are more likely to lead to larger employee insolvency
claims in the DB plan environment, where employer contributions
and funding obligations are at the center of the scheme’s operation.50
On the other hand, with the possible exception of smaller
outstanding pension contributions, DC plans are fully-funded.51
Unfunded pension liability is not an issue in the DC plan context
because once an employer makes a contribution to the pension plan,
its obligation is at an end.52 As far as outstanding employer
contributions in the defined contribution environment, although these
issues arise in the insolvency context, it is less likely to have as large
of an impact because such contributions are undertaken on a periodic
basis and it is less likely that outstanding contributions will make up a
large part of the employee pension claim in insolvency. Nevertheless,
as illustrated in the country-by-country section below, when
discussing priority creditor rights for outstanding employer pension
contributions, the occupational scheme at issue could be of either a
DC plan or a DB plan.53
A last important distinction in the American occupational pension
benefit world, especially for purposes of considering the roots of
municipal bankruptcies caused by legacy costs, is that between public
pension plans administered by states or municipalities and privatesector pension plans. Governmental plans are generally exempt from

48. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 199.
49. Id. at 198–99.
50. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 48 (observing that jurisdictions that rely
primarily on employer-created and funded pension plans suffer from employers who
chronically underfund pension promises when they become financially distressed,
especially where the pension plan is a defined benefit plan).
51. See Amy B. Monahan & Renita K. Thukral, Federal Regulation of State
Pension Plans: The Governmental Plan Exemption Revisited, 28 ABA J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 291, 316 (2013) (“In part because they are always fully funded, the Code and
ERISA regulate defined contribution plans to a lesser degree than defined benefit
plans.”).
52. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 199.
53. See infra Part III.B.
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the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).54
Congress saw state and local taxpayers as the primary backstops for
those plans, and presumably was also motivated by federalism
concerns.55
Because they are exempt from ERISA, municipal pension plans
are not subject to the same degree of regulation as other types of
pension plans. For instance, a pension plan subject to ERISA “must
design, structure, and fund its plan in accordance with federal rules,”
whereas public pension plans “are largely free to structure their
pension plans as they see fit and are not subject to any funding
requirements other than what state law might impose.”56 The lack of
strict funding requirements for municipal pension plans is often
blamed for the significantly underfunded state of many public pension
plans in the United States today.57
More recently, Senator Hatch has introduced new federal
legislation—the SAFE Retirement Act of 2013.58 The SAFE
Retirement Act would enable a new form of governmental plan
under federal law, “with stable, predictable costs that state and local
governments may use to deliver secure pension benefits.”59 By

54. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2012) (general ERISA governmental exemption
provision); id. § 1002(32) (definition of governmental plan); id. § 1321(b)(2)
(exemption of governmental plan from PBGC scheme); see also I.R.C. §§ 401, 414(d)
(2012) (applicable tax code provisions).
55. See Monahan & Thukral, supra note 51, at 297 (citing H.R. 2, 93d Cong. §§
101, 201, 301 (introduced Jan. 3, 1973)).
Ultimately . . . [governmental] plans were exempted, and Congress instead
included a provision in ERISA requiring that governmental plans be
studied in order for Congress to be more fully informed before taking any
action impacting such plans. [29 U.S.C. § 1231]. For many years afterwards,
bills were introduced to bring governmental plans within ERISA’s purview,
but none have been successful.

Id.
56. Monahan & Thukral, supra note 51, at 292.
57. See Roger Lowenstein, Broke Town, U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, at
MM26 (estimating unfunded part of public pension promises to be between $1 trillion
and $3.5 trillion); see also Andrew Barry, Munis on the Mend, BARRON’S (Oct. 14,
2013),
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424053111903891504579121802222118332.h
tml#articleTabs_article%3D1 (“What separates most states with strong pension
funding from those with deep deficits is a willingness to fund their plans consistently
at the actuarially required contribution level.”).
58. SAFE Retirement Act of 2013, S. 1270, 113th Cong. (2013), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1270/text.
59. See Press Release, Orrin Hatch, U.S. Sen., Hatch Unveils Bill to Overhaul
Pension Benefit System, Secure Retirement Savings (July 9, 2013),
http://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/releases?ID=bb7de6e5-a45f-4851b17e-2c9c6dce972b.
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investing in annuity contracts, these plans would “eliminate[s]
pension plan underfunding . . . while delivering lifetime retirement
income to employees . . . with a consumer safety net, only minimal
involvement by the federal government and no federal taxes.”60 As
the writing of this Article, the law has not yet been enacted, and given
current political realities, its chances of being enacted are very slim.
C.

Characteristics of Wages and Other Employee Benefits

In addition to retirement benefits provided through occupational
pension plans, employers also owe their employees various wagebased and other employee benefits upon their insolvency. These
wage-based claims may include: unpaid wages, vacation benefits,
holiday pay, severance pay, termination pay, travel expenses, and
other contracted-for benefits (like health insurance, life insurance,
long-term disability insurance, and retiree medical benefits).61
These types of employee benefits are distinguished from pension
claims in that these claims are due in the present under appropriate
conditions and circumstances, whereas pensions are a type of
deferred compensation due sometime in the future (for instance, at
normal retirement age).62 These other employee benefits, generically
referred to as “wage claims,” sometimes are treated the same in the
insolvency proceedings as pension benefits, but sometimes can be
treated either better or worse depending on a particular country’s
system.63 As with pension benefits, there are also significant
differences in what wage-related and other employee benefits are
even available country-to-country among the OECD members, and to
the extent that such benefits exist, how they are treated in
bankruptcy.64
D. Prevalence of Government Insurance or Guarantee Schemes
A number of the OECD countries studied below either have
pension and/or wage insurance schemes, or guarantee associations
that protect employee occupational benefits and wage-related
benefits in case of employer insolvency. The public policy goal
behind such schemes is to provide a more timely method of payment
of wages and benefits to employees when their employers become

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
SARRA, supra note 37, at 9–11.
See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 199.
See infra Part III.B, tbl.III.3.

Id.
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insolvent.65 Often, it can be years before employees receive some, if
any at all, pension or benefit claims through the bankruptcy process.66
As mentioned above, the PBGC in the United States is a prime
example of a pension guarantee scheme,67 though similar
organizations exist in the United Kingdom68 and the province of
Ontario.69 Also, as with pension benefits, many of the studied OECD
countries have guarantee schemes that will help pay for some
employee wage-based benefits upon insolvency, at least for a
designated period before the insolvency and up to a predetermined
capped amount.70 Canada itself has such a wage-guarantee scheme
under its Wage Earner Protection Program (WEPP).71
Although government insurance schemes and guarantee schemes
act in a complementary fashion to protect pension and other
employee benefits in the face of employer insolvency, they also may
play an important role in the insolvency process itself. Many times
the guarantee organization will take on the pension or wage-related
credit claims of employees.72 This is beneficial because such a
guarantee institution becomes a large creditor with correspondingly
greater ability to have its concerns met during the insolvency
process.73 To the extent that the guarantee association is unable to
secure recovery for employees through the insolvency process,
however, the result may be increased financial instability for the
association and/or higher premium rates for remaining employers (at
least where such schemes are financed through employer
contributions).74

65. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 23–24.
66. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7 (noting that one benefit of insurance funds is
more immediate payout to employees as opposed to the long drawn out process of
making claims during employer liquidation).
67. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012);
see also SARRA, supra note 37, at 61–64 (discussing the role of PBGC in the United
States).
68. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 57.
69. Id. at 57–60.
70. See infra Part III.
71. See Wage Earner Protection Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 1.
72. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 5–6.
73. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 28 (discussing how such funds are better situated
than individual employees due to information, resources, and size of claims being
sought).
74. See id. at 85 (noting that many jurisdictions base the operation of a guarantee
fund upon premiums determined through risk analysis of that industry or business
practice, thus any unrecovered benefits will likely result in higher premiums).
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Overview of Insolvency Proceedings and Priority Creditor
Rights

Although there are significant differences between the insolvency
systems of the different countries studied in this Article, some
important commonalties do exist. As an initial matter, most countries
seem to recognize different types of corporate insolvency
proceedings.75 The two types of proceedings that most countries
recognize are: (1) liquidations in which the company is dissolved and
remaining assets are equitably distributed to creditors,76 and (2)
business reorganizations in which the company seeks to reorganize by
discharging some existing debts and eventually emerging from the
insolvency process.77 In the municipal context in the United States,
cities are not subject to liquidation, but only to restructuring of their
debt.78
Whether the bankruptcy process involves a liquidation or
reorganization process, the objective of the insolvency process is the
fair distribution of the company assets to the various creditors of the
company.79 Once the insolvency proceeding commences, the result is
immediate protection from most forms of legal action against the
company’s assets by creditors through the issuance of an automatic
stay.80 In business reorganizations where management continues to
operate the business, management is referred to as the debtor-inpossession.81 The debtor-in-possession has all the powers of the
trustee, the title given to the individual or individuals that administers
the bankruptcy process.82

75. This Article does not address consumer/employee bankruptcy issues under
Chapter 7-type liquidations.
76. See AARON, supra note 13, at 25.
77. Id. at 33 (discussing the concept of Chapter 11 reorganization as compared to
Chapter 7 liquidation).
78. See KRISTEN DEJONG & BETH DOGHERTY, NUVEEN ASSET MGMT.,
MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: A PRIMER ON CHAPTER 9, at 1, (2013), available at
http://www.nuveen.com/Home/Documents/Viewer.aspx?fileId=48362
(“Unlike
corporations, municipalities are perpetual entities that cannot be liquidated through
bankruptcy.”).
79. AARON, supra note 13, at 608 (discussing traditional goal of bankruptcy to
distribute the assets of insolvent among the general creditors).
80. See id. at 267.
81. See id. at 36 (“The parties involved in a Chapter 11 case are quite different
from those involved in a liquidating Chapter 7. Management continues to operate
the business as a debtor-in-possession. The debtor-in-possession has the powers of a
trustee.”).
82. Id.
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Importantly, many pensions and employee benefits are established
in trust for the sole benefit of employee participants and their
beneficiaries. They are not considered part of the employee’s
bankruptcy estate and are thus not subject to claims by creditors if the
individual participant or beneficiary becomes bankrupt.83 In other
words, such trust-based benefits are inalienable, which is an important
protection for employees if they become insolvent.84 Nevertheless,
such trust-based benefit schemes can still be underfunded and short
employer contributions, mostly in the defined benefit pension
context, and the pension fund or guarantee scheme will need to seek
assets from the insolvent company to make up these funding
deficiencies.85
Creditors of the insolvent employer are notified of the insolvency
filing and may file claims with the trustee for satisfaction of the debts
owed to them by the employer.86 The trustee will liquidate some or
all of the assets of the company in as expeditious a manner as
practicable by paying off the claims of creditors according to a
predetermined hierarchy of claims.87 Creditor claims that are given
preference over other creditor claims are said to enjoy a “priority”
and are satisfied first among the various claims.88 The concept of
priority is important because of the insolvent employer’s limited
assets.89 Only those creditors who have the highest priorities are
likely to have any of their claims against the company satisfied.90 The
lower the priority of one’s claim, the more likely the creditor will
receive little or nothing from the remaining company assets.91

83. See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1992) (holding that all
ERISA qualified pension plans are excluded from the bankruptcy estate regardless of
state law).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2012) (ERISA anti-alienation provision); id. § 401
(qualified plan anti-alienation provision).
85. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7. Absent the guarantee scheme, the
employee or retiree would have to claim the underfunded amount through the
insolvency process. However, the guarantee scheme becomes subrogated to the
claims of the employees and retirees in bankruptcy once it makes payments to them.
See infra notes 307–08 and accompanying text.
86. See AARON, supra note 13, at 28. Chapter 11 reorganizations operate slightly
differently with regard to notice to creditors in that a committee is formed from the
largest creditors in order to supervise the debtor-in-possession as appointed by the
United States Trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2012).
87. See AARON, supra note 13, at 29, 35.
88. Id. at 429.
89. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 5 (detailing the difficulties that employees
have in securing claims from employers’ assets even when having priority).
90. See AARON, supra note 13, at 429.
91. Id.
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Secured creditors are those who enjoy priority in the event of
company default only as it relates to the collateral in which they hold
a perfected security interest.92 Unsecured creditors (or ordinary
creditors), on the other hand, are those who have claims not secured
by such collateral and who are paid from the general assets of the
company.93 In addition to secured and unsecured creditors, there are
many times super-priority (or absolute) claims and preferred (or
privileged) claims.94 Super-priority claims get paid first among
unsecured creditor claims and can even outrank secured claims in
some countries.95 Preferred claims, which are still unsecured claims,
lie somewhere between secured claims and general unsecured
claims.96
Generically speaking, at least assuming that there are unsecured
assets available for distribution, creditor claims are satisfied in
insolvency in this order: (1) super-priority (absolute priority) claims;
(2) secured claims; (3) preferred claims; and (4) unsecured claims.
Again, the higher a creditor ranks in the hierarchy, the more likely his
claim will be satisfied. Thus, if a pension or wage claim is given a
relatively low priority among an employer’s creditors, there is every
chance that the employee will not receive any pension or wage
payments for these claims.97 Thus, legislation that establishes the
priority rights of pension and other employee benefit claims is critical
in determining whether these employee claims will be satisfied when
an employer becomes insolvent.98
92. See id. at 405–06.
93. See Elizabeth M. Williams, Bankruptcy, Business Reorganization, in THE A–
Z ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOOD CONTROVERSIES AND THE LAW 44 (2011) (“Only after
priority creditors are paid will the general unsecured creditors be paid. When the
liquidation of the assets results in insufficient funds to pay the general unsecured
creditors, they may not receive anything in a bankruptcy.”).
94. See AARON, supra note 13, at 454.
95. See id. at 293 (discussing the impact of super priority and its placement even
above all other administrative expenses); see also infra note 298 and accompanying
text.
96. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 83–84. Preferred claims enjoy different levels of
priority protection depending upon the individual country’s insolvency legislation. Id.
97. See AARON, supra note 13, at 429.
98. See Williams, supra note 93, at 44. In the context of Chapter 11
reorganizations, the consensual confirmation of plan standards require a plan
proponent to commit to pay in full priority claims, though “payment in full” might
occur over time and thus with interest. Whether priority claims must be paid in cash
and in full on confirmation depends on the type of priority claims involved. See 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9) (2012). Even with a priority in place for employee claims,
employers may still undertake actions in bankruptcy (such as free and clear sales
under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code), which may allow the employer to evade
paying the priority claim. See Daniel Keating, Some Lessons for Congress to Ponder
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In addition to issues surrounding the type of priority wage and
benefit claims received in insolvency, there are also important issues
surrounding distinctions between municipal and corporate
bankruptcy proceedings in the United States. Insolvencies involving
corporate restructurings come under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, while municipal bankruptcies fall under Chapter 9.
As already mentioned, municipalities cannot be forcibly liquidated.99
Additionally, states have to pass legislation providing that they assent
to their municipalities seeking bankruptcy protection under Chapter
9.100 Moreover, even if a state has given such assent,101 there is a very
time-consuming eligibility process where the federal bankruptcy court
determines whether a municipality can actually go through the
Chapter 9 process.102 Even if assent and eligibility are present, there
are necessarily different considerations at play during a municipal
bankruptcy. There are issues of continuing to provide essential public

About the Labor-Bankruptcy Intersection 9–10 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (describing “the ability of a debtor-in-possession to realize its goingconcern value through a section 363 sale of assets free and clear of any claims or
interests in the assets,” and noting that although “the bankruptcy-specific priorities
will attach to the proceeds of the sale . . . . the proceeds of the section 363 sale [may
be] mostly encumbered by the claims of secured creditors”).
99. See DEJONG & DOGHERTY, supra note 78; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 904
(2012) (prohibiting involuntary bankruptcies of municipalities). Municipalities,
however, can still sell off property and a municipality’s secured creditors can
foreclose against their collateral. See id. § 1123(b)(4) (applicable to Chapter 9
proceedings); see also In re Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 484 B.R. 427, 462–63 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 2012) (“A Chapter 9 debtor . . . retains not just full title over its property, it also
keeps the same degree of control over it in a bankruptcy case.”) (citing 11 U.S.C. §
904 (2012)); W. CLARK WATSON ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, MUNICIPAL
BANKRUPTCY: A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC FINANCE ATTORNEYS 61–62, 75–76, 87 (2011),
available at http://www.nabl.org/uploads/cms/documents/municipal_bankruptcy_a_
guide_for_public_finance_attorneys.pdf. States, on the other hand, are not currently
eligible for bankruptcy under Chapter 9. Id. at 39–40 (noting that 11 U.S.C. § 109
does not list states as entities permitted to seek bankruptcy protection). However,
“Congress has recently held public hearings to consider the possibility of making
states eligible as debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. at 103.
100. See 15 MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 39:76 (3d ed. 2013); see also
RANDYE SOREF ET AL., BUSINESS WORKOUTS MANUAL § 35:5 (2013–2014 ed. 2013)
(discussing Chapter 9 bankruptcy provisions’ recognition of state sovereignty in local
affairs per the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
101. See Daniel J. Freyberg, Comment, Municipal Bankruptcy and Express State

Authorization to Be a Chapter 9 Debtor: Current State Approaches to Municipal
Insolvency—and What Will States Do Now?, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1001, 1008–16
(1997) (providing a list of individual state bankruptcy positions).
102. See generally Eric W. Lam, Municipal Bankruptcy: The Problem with
Chapter 9 Eligibility—A Proposal to Amend 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1988), 22 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 625 (1990).
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services (like police, fire, sanitation, and utilities),103 and there are
issues concerning municipalities’ ability to generate additional
revenue through tax levies (as opposed to becoming more profitable
through corporate reorganization).104 Of course, municipalities do
have bondholder creditors and other lenders just like private
companies.105
The other similarity, which is the focus of this Article, is that both
private companies and municipalities have employees who have
pension and wage pension claims when their employers seek
bankruptcy protections. As discussed below,106 while wage and
pension claims receive a priority in Chapter 11, they do not receive a
priority under Chapter 9.107 Unfortunately, this distinction between
the treatment of wage and pension claims in corporate versus
municipal bankruptcies does not have a ready comparison in other
countries, as municipal bankruptcies either cannot occur or are very
rare.108
F.

Arguments for and Against Insolvency Priorities for
Employee Claims

Those who favor priority treatment for employee pension and
wage claims argue that such an approach is necessitated by both
market failures and the lack of risk diversification available for most
employee claimants.109 The market failure argument is that although
employees act as creditors of their employers when they enter into
these pension, wage, and other employee benefit arrangements, they
essentially do not understand the tradeoff they are making.110 Indeed,
most employees do not have the necessary sophistication or
information to understand the nature of their pension schemes and/or
are unable or incapable of undertaking the type of credit analysis

103. See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 483–89
(1993) (discussing the extent of a municipality’s residual obligations in bankruptcy).
104. See Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1035, 1104–06 (1997) (evaluating the effectiveness of tax increases arising out of
municipal bankruptcy).
105. See id. at 1046 (discussing the status of municipal bondholders in Chapter 9
bankruptcy proceedings); see also McConnell & Picker, supra note 103, at 429
(comparing creditor claims in private versus public bankruptcies).
106. See infra Part II.A.
107. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
109. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 6; see also JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 2.
110. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 51.
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other creditors undertake before lending money to a company.111 As
Jannis Sarra has observed:
Employees are some of the most vulnerable creditors when firms
experience financial distress. Unlike sophisticated creditors who can
take steps to register security to protect their credit position and
have easier access to information to manage their credit exposure,
employees often suffer loss of wages and benefits owed in addition
to losing their jobs on a firm’s insolvency.112

In short, “[employees] rely on payment of their wages for their
livelihood and unlike other creditors, they do not agree to extend
credit to their employer when they sign a contract of employment.”113
The diversification argument suggests that even more
knowledgeable employees are not able to diversify the risks they face
with these benefit arrangements the way most creditors are able to do
so through their multiple investments.114 As Fiona Stewart has
commented, “Workers with an occupational pension receive their
current and future income from one source, and their pension may be
the only substantial financial asset they own.”115 This is not so with
other financial creditors. Only employee creditors “are especially
exposed to credit risk, particularly if their pension scheme is
mandatory, they have life-time employment with one firm or if the
pension is funded by book reserves.”116
On the other side of the debate, some argue that pension and other
employee benefit claims should not receive any special treatment
during insolvency proceedings and are general unsecured claims.
This group points to disruption of the capital markets and the
investment climate of the country,117 and the fact that sophisticated
employers will use other bankruptcy mechanisms to evade paying

111. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 2.
112. See JANNIS SARRA, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE
CLAIMS AND COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS IN CANADIAN INSOLVENCY LAW 1 (2006),
available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/60/4072.html.
113. Heartfield & Wink, supra note 28, at 14-5.
114. See Mark Daniels, Pensions in Peril: Single Employer Pension Plan
Terminations in the Context of Corporate Bankruptcies, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 25, 109
(1991); see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Employees, Pensions, and Governance in
Chapter 11, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1478 (2004) (discussing employees’ tendency to
invest in their own firm over diversifying their portfolio).
115. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 5.
116. Id. Book reserves are a type of direct employer pension promise described
further below. See infra note 268 and accompanying text.
117. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 7–8.
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such priorities, leaving employees with unsecured claims against sale
proceeds largely encumbered by secured claims.118
With regard to harming the investing climate of the country, the
argument is that by increasing the priority status of employee claims,
one increases the credit risk for other unsecured creditors by making
capital more expensive for companies to obtain.119 Super- or absolute
priority rights for employee claims over secured claims, which
currently do not exist in the United States and rarely exist in other
studied countries, could have an even larger impact if the cost of
borrowing increases because secured creditors cannot rely on the
collateral given in exchange for their lending.120 Indeed, the World
Bank and the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) both argue for a flattened hierarchy of creditor
classes consisting of only secured and unsecured claims. That way, the
legitimate expectations of creditors can be vindicated and there can
be greater predictability in commercial relations through fewer
deviations from general priority ranking rules.121 Some of the
argument here appears to be directly related to recent examples of
large underfunded pension schemes in the defined benefit context
and how such situations have impacted the credit rating of such
companies.122
This Article tends to concur with those who believe vulnerable and
unsophisticated employee creditors deserve increased bankruptcy

118. See Keating, supra note 98, at 13 (“GM and Chrysler cases were not the first
examples of debtors-in-possession that bypassed a traditional Chapter 11 plan
process in favor of a section 363 sale as a way to circumvent the effects that a large
springing priority of retiree medical benefits [under section 1114] would otherwise
have had on their ability to reorganize.”); see also id. (“The retirees’ section 1114
unsecured claims to their benefits would have to be asserted against the proceeds of
the section 363 sale, but those proceeds were largely encumbered by the claims of
secured creditors.”).
119. Id. at 8. With regard to secured creditors, this would only be a problem to the
extent the secured creditors’ collateral was not sufficiently valuable to repay the
outstanding debt in full. See AARON, supra note 13, at 39 (“If the secured party is
undercollateralized, the result is a secured claim to the extent of the value and an
unsecured claim to the balance which would constitute a deficiency.”).
120. See AARON, supra note 13, at 39; see also SARRA, supra note 112, at 7.
121. See WORLD BANK, supra note 34, at 4 (discussing the need for an efficient,
transparent, and reliable credit system based on distinguishing between secured
claims and unsecured claims); see also U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW,
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW 275 (2005), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722.ebook.pdf (“[I]nsolvency
law should minimize the priorities accorded to unsecured claims.”).
122. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 9 (noting the impact of underfunded pension
schemes on such automotive companies as GM and Ford, as well as German business
groups).
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protection through heightened creditor priorities, even given the costs
and risks outlined above. The impact of such additional priorities for
employee claims in insolvency, however, is somewhat blunted in
countries where there has been a dramatic shift from DB plans to DC
plans (like in the United States).123 In these countries, concerns about
the impact of underfunded pension schemes on the credit rights of
other company creditors might be dwindling in importance, simply
because unfunded pension liability is no longer as big of an issue or is
dealt with outside of the company.124 Also, there would appear to be
less impact on capital and credit markets in giving priorities to
pension claims in countries that have underdeveloped occupational
pensions markets, since whatever claims stem from these plans in
such countries are likely to be relatively small. In short, the priority
decision, especially with respect to pension claims, has the biggest
impact in countries dependent on defined benefit occupational
pension plans.125
The United States is in a somewhat unique position in this regard
because although corporate occupational pension plans are
increasingly DC plans, most public pension plans are still of the DB
plan variety.126 Consequently, it is important to keep in mind that the
awarding of heightened priorities in the municipal context may have a
different type of impact on the bankruptcy process than if similar
measures were taken in the corporate context.
II. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY PROFILE OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
CLAIM TREATMENT IN INSOLVENCY
This Part is dedicated to the study of how the OECD countries
currently approach the treatment of employment claims during
insolvency and under guarantee schemes. As mentioned above,
although the emphasis here is primarily on private-sector pension and
wage claims during insolvencies, many of the same lessons learned are
applicable to the municipal bankruptcy context in the United States.
The actual country-by-country profile of the thirty-two OECD
countries, besides the United States and Canada, is provided in the

123. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 198 (discussing the trend and
justifications for employer movement towards defined contribution plans over
defined benefit plans).
124. See also SARRA, supra note 37, at 48 (noting that some countries “have
‘superfunds,’ which are industry wide pension or superannuation funds, which are not
as affected by the insolvency of one company in the sector”).
125. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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Appendix at the back of this Article.127 What follows in this Part is
first a consideration of the US and Canadian systems (as they have
similar occupational employee benefit systems which take different
approaches to employee claims in insolvency), addressed in Parts II.A
and II.B. The purpose is to provide a baseline by which the US and
Canadian approach can be compared and contrasted to approaches
taken by other OECD countries.
Second, after considering the current state of US and Canadian
law, Part II.C considers issues specific to European Union (EU)
countries under an EU Directive concerning the treatment of pension
and wage claims during insolvencies and an International Labour
Organization (ILO) Convention considering similar issues. Third,
and finally, a series of tables summarize the findings of this
comparative employee benefits and bankruptcy law study.
A. Current Treatment of Pensions and Wage Claims in
Insolvency in the United States

1.

Pensions

As an initial matter, under the United State Supreme Court
decision Patterson v. Shumate,128 all ERISA (private sector) qualified
pension plans are excluded from the bankruptcy estate regardless of
state law.129 Similarly, Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section
401(a)(13)130 and ERISA section 206(d)131 both have identical antialienation provisions, which provide that a company’s other creditors
cannot reach all qualified pension benefit plan assets.132
Under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which
deals primarily with corporate reorganizations, outstanding employer

127. Within the Appendix, the country profile sections are divided between
pensions and other employee benefit (wage) claims in bankruptcy. Both the pension
and other employee benefit sections are further broken down into first, a
consideration of how employee claims are ranked, or given priority, among the
various creditors, and second, whether any guarantee scheme exists to provide
protection to those employee claims. Finally, each country section notes whether the
guarantee scheme is subrogated to the rights of employees in insolvency.
128. 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
129. Id. at 762–63.
130. I.R.C. § 401 (2012).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (2012).
132. Compare I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A) (“A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust
under this section unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that benefits
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.”), with 29 U.S.C. §
1056(d)(1) (“Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan
may not be assigned or alienated.”).
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contribution to DB plans and DC plans receive a priority.133 This rule
has become more relevant for DC plans (such as 401(k) salary
deferral contribution plans), because most employers in the United
States do not have defined benefit plans anymore.134 Combined with
wages, these pension claims receive their preferred status up to a
capped amount ($12,475 as of April 1, 2013).135 The employee is
entitled to the priority for these amounts due within the 180 days
prior to the bankruptcy petition.136 The pension priority (the fifth
priority with other employee benefits under Section 507(a)(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code)137 is only available if the $12,475 cap is not used up
by the wage claim (the fourth priority under Section 507(a)(4) of the
Bankruptcy Code).138 In such cases, claims beyond the cap are
unsecured.139 No priority status exists for unfunded or underfunded
pension liability.140

133. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)–(5) (2012) (assigning “unsecured claims for
contributions to an employer benefit plan” fifth priority).
134. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 198. Or if they have such plans, many of
them are frozen and will eventually be terminated through a statutory-sanctioned
process known under Title IV of ERISA as a “standard termination.” See 29 C.F.R. §
4041.21 (2013). This is distinguishable from a distress termination, which can result in
either a voluntary or involuntary termination of a defined pension benefit by the
PBGC. See 29 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); Distress Terminations, PBGC.GOV,
http://www.pbgc.gov/prac/terminations/distress-terminations.html (last visited Mar. 9,
2014).
135. See Bob Eisenbach, Going Up: Bankruptcy Dollar Amounts Will Increase on
April 1, 2013, IN THE (RED): THE BUS. BANKR. BLOG (Feb. 26, 2013),
http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2013/02/articles/business-bankruptcy-issues/going-upbankruptcy-dollar-amounts-will-increase-on-april-1-2013.
136. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)–(5) (2012); see AARON, supra note 13, at 444.
137. § 507(a)(5).
138. § 507(a)(4); see AARON, supra note 13, at 444 (pension priority only available
if wage claims do not reach cap).
139. AARON, supra note 13, at 444; see Skeel, supra note 114, at 1471 (“Other than
this limited priority, however, individual employees are not given special treatment.
They are lumped with the company’s other general creditors, and are thus entitled
only to ‘bankruptcy dollars’—that is, a pro rata share of what they are owed.”).
140. See Michael Peskin, Pension Funds and Corporate Enterprise Risk
Management, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF QUANTITATIVE ASSET MANAGEMENT
426 (Bernd Scherer & Kenneth Winston eds., 2012) (“Since unfunded pension
liabilities are unsecured debts of the corporation and are similar to an unsecured
bond, they should be priced at the corporation’s unsecured borrowing cost.”). As
opposed to pension contributions, “unfunded pension liabilities are those that are
paid out to company retirees on an ongoing basis, for so long as they live, after they
have ceased to work for the company, and the amounts are based on complex
actuarial calculations.” See OFFICE OF WAYNE MARSTON, MP, BACKGROUNDER:
AMENDING
CANADA’S
BANKRUPTCY
LAWS
(2011),
available
at
http://www.usw.ca/admin/union/soar-news/files/Background-Bill-C-331-PensionProtection-Act.pdf.
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Regarding Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy proceedings, there is
not much experience for how employee claims are treated (though in
a number of recent municipal bankruptcies, especially in California,
pensions have not been cut).141 What does appear clear is that the
wage and pension priorities of Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code do
not apply in Chapter 9.142 Thus, most people believe that unfunded
municipal pension liabilities are unsecured.143 Finally, it is unclear
how collective bargaining contracts should be treated, as far as
whether they can be discharged under Section 1113, or whether
retiree medical benefit obligations can be discharged under Section
1114, although most commentators and courts appear to agree that
another standard applies in municipal bankruptcies to these
scenarios.144
For defined benefit plans, the PBGC pays benefits in the event of
the insolvency of an employer who sponsors a DB plan.145 DC plans
are not subject to PBGC protections and are not guaranteed.146 The
PBGC is funded through annual premiums of $30 per employee, plus
0.9% of the unfunded liability if a plan is under-funded.147 The PBGC

141. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., JAMES E. SPIOTTO, CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, UNFUNDED PENSION
OBLIGATIONS: IS CHAPTER 9 THE ULTIMATE REMEDY? IS THERE A BETTER
RESOLUTION MECHANISM? 6, (2011), available at www.sec.gov/spotlight/
municipalsecurities/statements072911/spiotto-slides2.pdf (“Pension obligations for
municipal workers do not have priority in bankruptcy and no protection for deferred
compensation.”).
144. At least one court has found that Section 1113 does not apply, and the old,
employer-friendly law of labor contract discharge under NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), applies instead. See In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72,
77–78 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009) (“Unexpired collective bargaining agreements are
executory contracts subject to rejection under section 365. Congress incorporated
section 365 into chapter 9 without restricting or limiting its application to collective
bargaining agreements . . . . Section 1113 is not applicable in chapter 9 cases, and a
chapter 9 debtor is not required to comply with it in order to reject an executory
collective bargaining agreement.”); see also WATSON ET AL., supra note 99, at 81 (“It
is important to note that Section 901 does not by its terms import Section 1113 with
the special rules on rejection of collective bargaining agreements into Chapter 9.”).
145. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 289.
146. See id.
147. See 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(A)(i)–(E)(ii) (2012). Additionally, ERISA
provides that controlled group members—eighty-percent commonly owned
businesses—are jointly and severally liable for pension contributions, PBGC
premiums, and pension underfunding on termination. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1307(e),
1362(a) (2012). ERISA also provides that a former controlled group member
remains liable if it disposes of its interest with intent to evade or avoid liability. See
29 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (2012).
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pays employees a guaranteed amount up to statutory cap.148 The
maximum guarantee is capped at almost $57,500 in 2013 per member
and it is paid out in the form of a single-life annuity.149 The maximum
is lower for members retiring at earlier ages.150 Some employees may
have also received benefits in excess of the normal statutory
guarantee where the employee has been in pay status as a retiree for
three years.151 Under Section 1344(a) of ERISA, these types of
retiree claims take precedence over reimbursing the PBGC for its
insurance expenditures.152
After the PBGC pays claims to participants in defined benefit
claims when such plans are underfunded, the PBGC is subrogated to
the rights of the employee in bankruptcy.153 The PBGC places its
claims into the bankruptcy for the amount it believes the plan is
underfunded.154 The PBGC’s claim for underfunding can give rise to
a lien to the extent of thirty percent of the net worth of the
company.155 Although the PBGC has argued to the contrary in the
past,156 courts generally hold that the PBGC does not have a priority
claim and is an unsecured creditor when it comes to minimum
contributions owed to the plan by the employer.157

148. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 62.
149. See 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3) (2012). For 2013, the maximum guarantee for a
life annuity with no survivor benefits was $57,477.24 yearly ($4,789.77 monthly) at
age 65; $45,407.04 yearly ($3,783.92 monthly) at age 62; and $25,864.80 yearly
($2,155.40 monthly) at age 55. PBGC Maximum Insurance Benefit Increases for
2013, PBGC.GOV (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.pbgc.gov/news/press/releases/pr1235.html.
150. See PBGC Maximum Insurance Benefit Increases for 2013, supra note 149.
151. 29 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012) (establishing the order of priority among participant
and beneficiaries in the case of the termination of a single-employer plan); see
Priority
Categories,
PBGC.GOV,
http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/other/pg/prioritycategories.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (designating “[p]articipants who retired, or
could have retired, 3 years or more before plan termination” as third priority,
following voluntary employee contributions and mandatory employee contributions).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3)(A).
153. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 62 (noting PBGC will assume “all of the claims
under the pension plan members’ agreement with the insolvent plan sponsor”).
154. See Laura Rosenberg, Understanding PBGC’s Role in Bankruptcy: Dealing
with the 800-Pound Gorilla, TURNAROUND MGMT. ASS’N (Aug. 1, 2006),
http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=6429.
155. 29 U.S.C. § 1368 (2012). It is rare, but debtor companies may have solvent
subsidiaries, and their net worth counts for this purpose. Id.
156. See ISRAEL GOLDOWITZ & MARC S. PFEUFFER, PENSION BENEFIT
GUARANTEE CORPORATION LITIGATION OUTLINE 24 (2010), available at
http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/PBGCLitigationOutline2010.pdf.
157. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 115 B.R. 760, 787 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1990)
(proposed decision), adopted, 130 B.R. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated by consent of
the parties, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21409 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1993) (ruling that the
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The one exception where the PBGC has a priority is for rare
instances where ERISA Section 4068 affords the PBGC a lien for
employer-missed contributions if those missed contributions are
above $1 million dollars.158 In such cases, a priority is granted for
amounts that exceed the $1 million dollars in missing contributions.159

2.

Other Employee Benefits

As mentioned above, unpaid wages (including vacation pay,
severance pay,160 and sick leave pay) and pension contribution claims
are treated as priority claims, up to a combined capped amount
($12,475 in 2013).161 The employee is entitled to the priority for the
180 days prior to the bankruptcy petition.162 Wages have the so-called
fourth priority, and other employee benefits (including pensions)
have the fifth priority among all the employer’s creditors.163 Pensions
only receive the fifth priority if the $12,475 cap is not used up by the
wage claims as part of the fourth priority.164 Beyond this capped
amount (and beyond the 180 days prior to the bankruptcy petition
being filed), excess pension and wage-related claims are unsecured.165
Priority claims for wages and other benefits must be asserted by each
employee on their own for a specific claim to his/her unpaid wages,
contracted-for medical plan contributions, and other post-employee
benefits.166
PBGC’s claim for minimum contributions arose from the service of the debtor’s
employees pre-petition, and there was no resulting post-petition benefit to the estate
and that the PBGC’s claim was not entitled to priority status as administrative
expense). Although Chateaugay was vacated, a number of courts have cited it as
precedent for the assertion that minimum contribution claims lack any priority. See
Jonathan Lewis & Vivek Melwani, Treatment of Pension Plans When an Employer Is
in Bankruptcy, BENDER’S LAB. & EMP. BULL., Apr. 2006, at 163, 168 (“As a result of
Chateaugay, the PBGC no longer claims that the entire amount of its unfunded
benefit liabilities claim is entitled to administrative priority.”).
158. 29 U.S.C. § 1368; I.R.C. § 430(k) (2012).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 1368; I.R.C. § 430(k).
160. A well-known Second Circuit case still followed by some courts held that postpetition severance pay may result in an administrative priority claim. See StrausDuparquet, Inc. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 386 F.2d 649, 651
(2d Cir. 1967); see also Matson v. Alarcon, 651 F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2011) (reaching
a similar conclusion for pre-petition severance payments under Section 507(a)(4)).
161. See AARON, supra note 13, at 444.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Skeel, supra note 114, at 1471 (“For individual employees who are not
covered by a collective bargaining agreement, Chapter 11 looks quite different. Not
only are there few restrictions on the company’s ability to lay off employees, but
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The PBGC has no role with regard to wage claims, and there is no
wage guarantee fund in the United States if an employer becomes
insolvent167 (except for a more general unemployment compensation
scheme, run by the individual states, that applies to all employees who
become unemployed through no fault of their own and provide
prospective wage payments as opposed to already-earned wages).168
There is also a statutory scheme, the Work Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act (WARN),169 which provides sixty days of
notice and/or severance pay for employees working for employers
with 100 or more workers who close their businesses170 (the law is
riddled with exceptions, however, so WARN does not always provide
benefits in these instances).171
B.

Canada’s Current Treatment of Pensions and Wage Claims in
Insolvency

1.

Pensions

Canada’s insolvency system stems from two statutes: the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA)172 and the Companies’
Creditor Arrangement Act (CCAA).173 While the BIA sets out the
general bankruptcy framework for commercial and consumer

employees are not even guaranteed that they will receive the full amount the
company owed them as of bankruptcy.”). Unions, on the other hand, will seek to
bring claims for active members under collective bargaining agreements, although it
is unclear whether unions have a formal role to play in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy
process. See generally Dawson, supra note 3. It is even less clear what formal role
public unions have in municipal liabilities. Detroit’s public employee unions,
however, are playing a high-profile role in seeking to ensure the employee benefits of
its members through challenges to the validity of the Chapter 9 bankruptcy process.
See Joseph Lichtman & Bernie Woodall, Detroit Union Files Challenge to City’s
Bankruptcy Petition, REUTERS, Aug. 19, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/08/19/us-usa-detroit-idUSBRE97I0WC20130819
(“The
American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Council 25 said
Detroit . . . has not proven it is insolvent and has not negotiated in good faith with its
creditors . . . . [T]he union said it was also challenging the constitutionality of Chapter
9 of the federal bankruptcy code . . . arguing that it encroaches on states’ rights.”).
167. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 61–62 (noting PBGC’s coverage is limited to
defined benefit pension plans and does not extend to other unvested benefits).
168. For a general explanation of the unemployment compensation system in the
United States, see generally HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 133–91.
169. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109 (2012).
170. See § 2102.
171. See § 2103 (detailing specific exemptions from WARN Act).
172. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.
173. Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.
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bankruptcies (involving both liquidations and restructurings),174 the
CCAA focuses on the process of corporate reorganizations.175
Whether a Canadian company proceeds under the BIA or CCAA
depends to some degree on the amount of debt the company has, with
only companies with debts in excess of $5M eligible for
reorganization under the CCAA.176
In Canada, the federal and provincial governments both regulate
occupational pension plans to some degree.177 Federal jurisdiction
exists for the banking, transportation, and telecommunications
industries, all industries that have an inter-provincial orientation,178
and their pension plans come under the Pension Benefits Standards
Act 1985 (PBSA).179 Only ten percent of all occupational pension
plan assets are part of the federal system.180 All other pension plans
are regulated by provincial legislation.181
Pension obligations are now specifically addressed in the priorityranking scheme in bankruptcy proceedings after enactment of the
Wage Earner Protection Program Act (WEPPA) in 2008.182 Under
this scheme, the BIA now grants a super-priority in bankruptcies for
outstanding current pension contributions, ranking behind the
employee wage priority discussed below, but otherwise with the same
type of priority.183 This super-priority for pension contributions
extends to all assets, not just current assets, and is unlimited.184 More
specifically, this priority includes: (1) pension contribution amounts
deducted from an employee’s pay;185 (2) amounts required from the
employer under a defined contribution provision;186 and (3) “normal
cost” amounts (the amounts required to be paid in a given year to

174. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 11.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Pension Benefits Standards Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 32, § 4 (2d Supp.).
179. Id.
180. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 11.
181. See id. Examples of provincial pension legislation includes two pieces of
Ontario legislation discussed in some detail in Paul M. Secunda, Lessons from the
Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions for U.S. Policymakers, 28 ABA J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 87, 92 (2012).
182. See Wage Earner Protection Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 1.
183. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 54; Stewart, supra note 3, at 11.
184. See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, at 81.5; see also
MILLER THOMSON, LLP, BUSINESS LAWS OF CANADA § 25:80 (2013).
185. See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, at 81.5; see also
SARRA, supra note 37, at 54; Stewart, supra note 3, at 11–12.
186. See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, at 81.5.
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fund benefits).187
This priority applies to both federally and
provincially-regulated pensions.188
Unfunded pension liabilities
remain unsecured.189
On the other hand, occupational pensions are established in trust
for the sole benefit of pension plan participants and their
beneficiaries, and exist separate and apart from other company
assets.190 As such, the occupational pension plan assets are excluded
from the bankruptcy estate and not subject to the claim of other
creditors.191 Yet, as with a similar scheme in the United States, this
does not mean that such pension plans do not have unfunded pension
liability or have missing employer pension contributions.192
Unlike the United States, Canada still has mostly defined benefit
occupational pension schemes,193 meaning that pension underfunding
and employer outstanding contributions can potentially play a large
role in the insolvency process. On the other hand, with the exception
of Ontario, no other Canadian province has established a guarantee
scheme to protect occupational pension plan benefits in the face of
employer insolvency.194
Even the Ontario Pension Benefits
Guarantee Fund (PBGF) offers only very limited protection for
occupational pension benefits up to a comparatively low fixed
statutory cap.195 It applies only to single employer plans (as opposed
to multiemployer plans)196 and individual coverage is limited to a
monthly maximum of CAD $1000 plus a proportion of benefits
owed.197

187. Id.
188. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 12.
189. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 54; Stewart, supra note 3, at 11.
190. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 48–49.
191. Id. at 49.
192. Id.
193. See Jay Cooper, Canadian Pension Plans Take the Risk-Shedding Route,
PROF. PENSIONS (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.professionalpensions.com/globalpensions/feature/2040750/canadian-pension-plans-risk-sheddingroute#ixzz1xMP1c6oU (“Towers Watson senior consultant, Janet Rabovsky
estimated that 94% of all pension assets in Canada are still in defined benefit
plans.”). The current funding status of these Canadian DB plans is excellent:
“Canada’s corporate plans had an average funded ratio of 88% at the end of the third
quarter of 2010, compared to 82% for US companies, 85% for the United Kingdom
and 66% for Continental Europe.” Id.
194. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 115.
195. See FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMISSION OF ONTARIO, PENSION BENEFITS
GUARANTEE FUND (PBGF), https://www.fsco.gov.on.ca/EN/PENSIONS/PBGF/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
196. Id.
197. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 12.
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Other Employee Benefits

Canada categorizes employee benefits claims and treats them
differently as far as the priority they receive. The 2008 amendments
to the BIA provide an employee of a bankrupt employer with a
limited super-priority claim against the employer’s current assets for
unpaid wages and vacation pay (but not for severance or termination
pay).198 It is limited because the priority applies only to current
assets—cash, accounts receivable, and inventory.199 This charge will
secure unpaid wages and vacation pay for the six-month period prior
to bankruptcy, up to a maximum of CAD $2000 per employee.200
Prior to these amendments, wages and vacation pay were
subordinate in priority to secured creditors’ claims.201 Under this
previous regime, it was estimated that unpaid wage claims received
only thirteen cents on the dollar, and were only made at the
conclusion of the bankruptcy process which could take up to three
years to complete.202 With the new limited priority, the hope is that
up to fifty cents on the dollar will be recoverable, though no definitive
figures are available since the scheme went into effect.203
In addition to priority rights, there is also a wage guarantee scheme
funded from general tax revenues (estimated to cost a maximum of
CAD $50 million per year).204 The Minister of Labor is responsible
for the Wage Earner Payment Program (WEPP) and Service Canada
is the delivery agent.205 Under the WEPP, an employee whose
employer has become bankrupt on or after July 7, 2008, is entitled to
receive payments from the federal program on account of any
outstanding wages that were earned in the six months immediately
prior to bankruptcy in an amount not to exceed the greater of CAD
$3646 (as of 2013), or equal to four times the maximum weekly

198. Id. at 45.
199. Id.
200. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, at 81.3.
201. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 45.
202. See Heartfield & Wink, supra note 28, at 14-6.
203. Id. at 14-17 (“[I]t is estimated that the [Canadian] Government will recover up
to 50 cents on the dollar with the new limited super-priority.”).
204. Id. at 14-16; see Wage Earner Protection Program: What Does It Mean for
HOYES
&
MICHALOS,
Employees
of
Bankrupt
Companies?,
http://www.hoyes.com/bill-c-12-wage-earner-protection-pogram.htm (last visited Feb.
9, 2014).
205. See Heartfield & Wink, supra note 28, at 14-8.
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insurable earnings under the Employment Insurance Act.206 This
government wage fund pays for unpaid wages, vacations, severance,
and termination pay, and is estimated to satisfy ninety-seven percent
of wage claims in full.207 To the extent that wage payments are made
to employees, the WEPP is subrogated to any claims for wages an
employee may have against the bankrupt employer and with the
benefit of the same priority that the employee would have had.208
One last interesting observation concerning the Canadian
treatment of employment claims in insolvency: although termination
and severance payments receive little protection in the bankruptcy
process, they receive better and similar protection to other wagerelated benefits under the wage guarantee scheme.
C.

Treatment of Employee Claims in Insolvency Under EU and
ILO Law

This section highlights that out of the thirty-four OECD countries
discussed in this report, twenty-one countries are also members of the
European Union.209 This is important because Directive 2008/94/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008
concerns the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of
their employer and is binding on all EU Members.210 This directive
sets a minimum standard in all EU countries (through a transposition
by a national law or a decree), but it does not prevent higher
protection for employee claims in these situations.211 It also requires
Member States to set up an institution to guarantee some or all of
these employee claims.212

206. See Wage Earner’s Protection Program, CANADA’S ECON. ACTION PLAN,
http://actionplan.gc.ca/en/initiative/wage-earner-protection-program-0 (last visited
Mar. 9, 2014).
207. See Heartfield & Wink, supra note 28, at 14-6.
208. See Allan Nackan, Lenders Beware—New Canadian Legislation Puts
Employee Wages First, ACCUVAL (Sept. 2008), http://www.accuval.net/insights/
featuredarticle/detail.php?ID=22.
209. Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Norway and
Switzerland, although European OECD countries, are not EU Countries. List of
Member States of the EU, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/abouteu/countries/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
210. See generally Council Directive 2008/94, 2008 O.J. (L 283) 36 (EC) (“On the
Protection of Employees in the Event of the Insolvency of Their Employer”).
211. Id.
212. Id.
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Additionally, the ILO has a convention that concerns the
protection of workers claims during an employer’s insolvency. Only
nine OECD countries are signatories to any part of ILO Convention
C173: Protection of Workers Claims (Employer’s Insolvency)
Convention, 1992.213
This Part is divided into three sections. The first two sections focus
on the EU Directive and cases interpreting that Directive, while the
last section focuses on the ILO Convention.

1.

Discussion of EU Directive and Scope

The EU Directive on the protection of employees in the event of
the employer’s insolvency (2008/94/EC) is the main piece of EU
legislation in this area.214 Complementary EU legislation has focused
on increasing the funding levels of pensions so that the insolvency
issue does not arise in the first place (particularly the Solvency II
Directive and the IORPs Directive).215 The 2008/94/EC directive is
actually a restatement of a directive from 1980 (1980/987/EEC),216
which requires “protection” of employees and their benefits on the
employer’s insolvency.217
By its terms, Directive 2008/94/EC states that EU Member States
should establish a body that guarantees payment of the outstanding
employee claims when their employer becomes insolvent.218
Payments are guaranteed for pension and wage claims. Article 1(1)
of the Directive, in this regard, covers all, “employees’ claims arising
from contracts of employment or employment relationships and
existing against employers who are in a state of insolvency.”219

213. See C173—Protection of Workers’ Claims (Employer’s Insolvency)
Convention, 1992 (No. 173), INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312318 (last visited
Mar. 9, 2014) [hereinafter ILO Convention] (showing that only nine OECD countries
have ratified this convention: Australia, Austria, Finland, Mexico, Portugal (as of
2012 but it is not in force), Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Switzerland).
214. See Council Directive 2008/94, 2008 O.J. (L 283) 36 (EC); see also SARRA,
supra note 37, at 30, 150 (referring to the directive as the EU policy on the matter of
protecting employee rights through insolvency).
215. See Council Directive 2009/138, 2009 O.J. (L 335) 1 (EC) (“On the Taking-up
and Pursuit of the Business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II)”); Council
Directive 2003/41, 2003 O.J. (L 235) 10 (EC) (“On the Activities and Supervision of
Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision”).
216. Compare Council Directive 2008/94, 2008 O.J. (L 283) 36 (EC), with Council
Directive 80/987, 1980 O.J. (L 283) (EC).
217. Council Directive 80/987, 2008 O.J. (L 283) 36 (EC), art. 3(1).
218. Council Directive 2008/94, 2008 O.J. (L 283) 36 (EC), pmbl.
219. Id. art. 1(1).
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In most EU countries, this protection is offered by the provision of
a guarantee fund or scheme (like the United Kingdom’s Pension
Protection Fund (PPF)).220 These institutions provide pensions, or
other types of wage-related benefits, for those whose employer
becomes insolvent.221 Such guarantees are usually limited to a certain
period of time before the employer becomes insolvent and up to a
statutory cap on amounts to be paid (generally indexed from one year
to another to take account of inflation).222

2.

EU Court of Justice Case Law Interpretations of Employer
Insolvency Directive

In a recent EU Court of Justice case (involving Ireland), Hogan v.
Minister of Social and Family Affairs,223 the court found that
Directive 2008/94/EC applied to occupational pension schemes and
set quantitatively the minimum level of protection for employees
when their employer becomes insolvent.224 More specifically, this
Directive was “interpreted as meaning that it applies to the
entitlement of former employees to old-age benefits under a
supplementary pension scheme set up by their employer,”225 and that
employees must “receive in excess of 49% of the value of their
accrued old-age pension benefits under their occupational pension
scheme.”226 Because Ireland’s scheme did not meet this standard, it
was found to be in serious breach of its Member State obligations.227
The decision in Hogan was based in part on a previous European
Court of Justice Decision, Robins v. Secretary of State for Work &
Pensions.228 In that case, the ECJ held that where the employer is

220. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 55, 60 (noting how the majority of countries
have such guarantee funds or schemes and providing analysis of the UK model with
PPF).
221. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7.
222. Id. at 7, 8 (discussing the methodology for guarantee schemes as well as the
viability of providing a cap or limit to the payout structure to help limit costs of fund
for viability purposes).
223. Case C-398/11, Hogan v. Minister of Soc. & Family Affairs, Apr. 25, 2013,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62011CJ0398&lang1=en&type=NOT&anc
re=.
224. See id. ¶¶ 27, 44–46 (determining that Directive 2008/94 must be applied to
such occupational pension schemes and establishing that a minimum level of
protection is necessary to protect employees’ rights).
225. Id. ¶ 27.
226. Id. ¶ 53.
227. Id.
228. See Case C-278/05, Robins v. Sec’y of State for Work & Pensions, 2007 E.C.R.
I-01053.
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insolvent and the assets of the supplementary pension scheme are
insufficient, accrued pension rights need not necessarily be funded by
Member States themselves or be funded in full.229 The words of
Article 8 of the Directive give Member States some latitude as to the
means to be adopted for purposes of protection of employees’
occupational pensions whose employers have become insolvent.230
This means that Member States may impose “an obligation on
employers to insure or provide for the setting up of a guarantee
institution in respect of which it will lay down the detailed rules for
funding, rather than providing for funding by the public
authorities.”231 Importantly however, “[w]ith regard to the degree of
protection required by the Directive,” this decision also requires that,
“the measures necessary to protect employees in the event of their
employer’s insolvency are to be adopted ‘while taking account of the
need for balanced economic and social developments in the
Community.’”232
In addition to protecting employee rights to occupational pensions
under Articles 8, 3 and 4 of Directive 2008/94/EC concern the
minimum guarantee of outstanding claims relating to pay.233 In
Francovich v. Italian Republic, under the 1980 predecessor Directive,
the ECJ considered claims for pay by an Italian citizen against his
insolvent company.234 Article 3 requires that guarantee institutions be
established to pay employee outstanding claims relating to pay for the
period prior to a given date.235 Directive 2008/94/EC allows Member
States to choose one of three dates relating to insolvency or the
discontinuance of the employment relationship.236 It also gives
Member States the option of limiting the liability of the guarantee
institution.237
Under Article 4, if the Member State has chosen the period from
when the insolvency commenced, the guarantee institution must
ensure payment of outstanding claims relating to pay for at least the
last three months of the contract of employment occurring within a
period of six months preceding the date of the employer’s
229. Id. ¶ 46.
230. Id. ¶ 36.
231. Id. ¶ 37.
232. Id. ¶ 38.
233. See Joined Cases C-6 & C-9/90, Francovich s v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R.
I-5403, ¶ 15.
234. Id. ¶ 6.
235. Id. ¶ 15 (discussing the interpretation of directive).
236. Id.
237. Id. ¶ 21.
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insolvency.238 There was no issue that Francovich was entitled to
unpaid wages on the insolvency of his employer under Directive
2008/94/EC.239 The only issue was whether he could bring a claim
against Italy, which had failed to implement a wage guarantee fund at
that point.240 The ECJ concluded that Italy was required to make
good the loss and damage caused to Francovich by the country’s
failure to transpose Directive 80/987/EEC into its national laws.241

3.

ILO Convention 173: Protection of Workers’ Claims
(Employer’s Insolvency), 1992

Some of the same European countries subject to Directive 2008/94
have also ratified Convention 173 of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) that also addresses the protection of workers
claims when their employer becomes insolvent.242 This convention
updated a previous Protection of Wages Convention from 1949 (and
in particular, Article 11 of that Convention, which concerns the
treatment of employee claims during an employer insolvency).243
Article 3 of Convention 173 states that, “A Member which ratifies
this Convention shall accept either the obligations of Part II,
providing for the protection of workers’ claims by means of a
privilege, or the obligations of Part III, providing for the protection of
workers’ claims by a guarantee institution, or the obligations of both
Parts.”244 Thus, the Convention envisions that employee claims in
employer insolvency will either be protected through some priority
status in bankruptcy, a state-sponsored guarantee scheme, or both.245
With regard to providing the workers’ claim a privilege or priority,
Articles 5 and 6 explain the scope of this priority. Article 5 states that
such a claim “shall be protected by a privilege so that they [the
employee] are paid out of the assets of the insolvent employer before
non-privileged creditors can be paid their share.”246 In other words,
for covered claims, employees are given a preference over other
creditors. Article 6 states that this priority at a minimum must cover:
(1) claims for wages for at least three months prior to the insolvency,

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at ¶ 16; see also Council Directive 1980/987, 1980 O.J. (L283) 23 (EC).
Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, supra note 232, at ¶ 2.
Id. at ¶ 7(1).
Id. at ¶ 46.
See ILO Convention, supra note 213.
Id. pmbl.
Id. art. 3(1).
See id.
Id. art. 5.
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(2) claims for holiday pay, (3) claims for other types of paid absence,
and (4) claims for severance pay.247
Interestingly, outstanding
pension contributions do not appear to be covered and the
Convention largely focuses on wage-related claims in bankruptcy.
Also of interest, where the claim is protected by a guarantee scheme,
the wage claim may be given less of a priority in the insolvency
proceeding than it would otherwise receive.248
With regard to provisions concerning guarantee institutions or
schemes, Article 9 of Convention 173 provides that, “[t]he payment of
workers’ claims against their employer arising out of their
employment shall be guaranteed through a guarantee institution
when payment cannot be made by the employer because of
insolvency.”249 Again, this protection is limited to wage-related
claims. Article 12 delimits the type of wages guaranteed: (1) “the
workers’ claims for wages relating to a prescribed period, which shall
not be less than eight weeks, prior to the insolvency;” (2) “workers’
claims for holiday pay; “(3) “workers’ claims for amounts due in
respect of other types of paid absence;” and (4) “severance pay due to
workers upon termination of their employment.”250 These wage
guarantee schemes do not appear to require pension contributions to
be protected.
Although ILO Convention C173 entered into force on June 8,
1995, only twenty-one countries have ratified it.251 Of the countries
studied in this report: (1) Australia has accepted only the priority
scheme; (2) Austria has accepted only the guarantee scheme; (3)
Finland has accepted only the guarantee scheme; (4) Mexico has
accepted only the priority scheme; (5) Portugal has accepted both the
priority and guarantee scheme (though the ratification is currently (as
of November 2012) not in force); (6) Slovakia has accepted only the
priority scheme; (7) Slovenia has accepted only the guarantee scheme;
(8) Spain has accepted, with some exceptions, both the priority and
guarantee schemes; and (9) Switzerland has accepted both the
priority and guarantee schemes.252 Thus, only a little more than one
quarter of OECD countries have ratified any part of this ILO
Convention, and it appears the Convention has had a relatively minor

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
III).

Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 8(2).
Id. art. 9.
Id. art. 12.
See ILO Convention, supra note 213.
Id. (with the priority scheme being Part II and guarantee scheme being Part
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impact on increasing the protection for employee claims for wages
during a company insolvency.
Importantly, some of the largest OECD economies (including the
United States, Canada, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom)
have not ratified the Convention in its almost twenty years of
existence. One possibility, at least as far as EU countries are
concerned, is that the adoption of the EU Directive on the protection
of workers in the case of employer insolvency has led to countries to
believe that they do not need to also ratify ILO Convention 173.253
For instance, whereas the EU Directive addresses both wage-related
claims and occupational pensions, the ILO Convention only addresses
wage-related ones.254 On the other hand, some have argued that the
Convention provides protections beyond what the EU Directive
provides and should be separately ratified by more countries.255
III. PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS OF OECD COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT CLAIM TREATMENT IN INSOLVENCY
AND G UARANTEE S CHEMES
This Part is divided into two major subparts. Part III.A seeks to
identify trends among the OECD countries as far as treatment of
pension and wage claims in insolvency, whether as part of the
insolvency process and/or as part of a guarantee fund or scheme. Part
III.B, drawing upon the Appendix of OECD country treatment of
employment claims in insolvency, seeks to use tables created by the
author to categorize the treatment of these employee claims in
insolvency to show how the United States and Canada’s approach to
these issues aligns with other OECD countries.
A. Trends in Treatment of Pensions and Employee Benefits
Claims In Insolvency Proceedings Across OECD Countries
In discussing trends in the treatment of pension and employee
benefit claims in insolvency proceedings among OECD Countries, a
couple of findings are clear. Most OECD countries (and this might
be because a majority of OECD countries are EU countries covered
by the employee insolvency Directive) have a system that provides

253. See BRANDUSA BARTOLOMEI, EMPLOYEES’ CLAIMS IN THE EVENT OF
EMPLOYER INSOLVENCY IN ROMANIA: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS 35 (Cristina Mihes & Verena Schmidt eds., 2011).
254. Compare Council Directive 2008/94, 2008 O.J. (L283) 36 (EC), with ILO
Convention, supra note 213.
255. See BARTOLOMEI, supra note 253, at 35.
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some priorities to pensions and wages in bankruptcy256 and also
provides guarantee schemes for pensions and/or wages in employer
insolvency scenarios (though more commonly just wage
guarantees).257 The devil is in the details, and distinctions between
country treatments of employment claims in insolvency often relate to
the way various benefit systems are established or structured. This
sub-Part is further broken down into seven preliminary findings based
on the OECD analysis, each of which is discussed in turn.

1.

State-Run Pension Schemes vs. Statutory Pensions vs. EmployerOperated Pensions

This section primarily discusses different approaches adopted by
countries to the provisions of pensions and how the choice of
approach impacts employees when their companies become insolvent.
This Section concludes by also considering different approaches to
the provision of other employee benefits and how those choices
impact employees during employer insolvency.

a.

Pensions

With regard to pension benefits, there is an important distinction
between countries with regard to the provision of occupational
pension benefits. First, a number of countries have little or no
occupational pension scheme, relying instead on state-run social
security schemes or voluntary, employee-based contributory
schemes.258 The seven countries in this first category include: Chile,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, and Turkey.259
Countries that rely primarily on non-occupational pension systems
have little need for priorities in insolvency for employee claims or for
pension guarantee schemes, as employer insolvency has little impact

256. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, supra note 121, at 272 (“In a
majority of States, workers’ claims (including claims for wages, leave or holiday pay,
allowances for other paid absence and severance pay) constitute a class of priority
claims in insolvency.”)
257. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 5–6.
258. See, e.g., Kayra Üçer et al., Employment and Employee Benefits in Turkey:
Overview, PRACTICAL L., http://uk.practicallaw.com/8-383-1562?service=pensions#
a172331 (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (noting that any pension contributions are made
solely through standard social security contributions rather than an occupational
pension scheme); Social Insurance System in Slovakia, SOCIÁLNA POISTOVNA,
http://www.socpoist.sk/social-insurance-system-in-slovakia/24533s (last visited Mar. 9,
2014) (providing overview of Slovakia’s purely social insurance system-based pension
scheme).
259. See infra Appendix.
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on the provision of pensions.260 Not surprisingly, there are few
pension priorities in insolvency and no pension guarantee schemes in
these countries.261
Second, a large group of mostly EU countries follows a statutorybased occupational pension model, under which the pension fund is
established as separate and independent from the company.262
Employers make contributions to these pension funds (or insurance
companies) in most cases, but that is the extent of their funding
obligation.263 The twenty countries that fall into this second category
include: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia,
Spain, and Switzerland.264 Similar to the first category discussed
above, there is little impact on these companies when the employer
becomes insolvent, except perhaps for outstanding pension
contributions due these external pension funds.265 As a result,
bankruptcy priorities only at most concern outstanding contributions
(not unfunded pension liability) and there are few pension guarantee
schemes.266 Indeed, pensions are only guaranteed to the extent they
are treated like wages.267
Third, a smaller group of countries, of which the United States and
Canada are a part, have employer-operated occupational pension
plans based either on a book reserve model (like Germany and
Austria) or defined benefit plan funding model (though a number of
260. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 48.
261. Id. at 84.
262. See, e.g., FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, PENSIONS AND
INSOLVENCIES ACROSS EUROPE 6, 8, 11, 15 (2010), available at
http://www.rln.lv/lv/pdf/PensionsAndInsolvency.pdf (providing examples of countries
that focus upon a statutory based occupational pension model that is separate and
independent from businesses).
263. Id. at 6 (providing an example through Finland, an EU country, of having
mandatory employer contributions to the statutory system with the option—but not
the requirement—of additional pension arrangements).
264. See infra Appendix.
265. See ROSALIND CONNOR, INTERNATIONAL PENSION GUIDE 16 (2013) (noting
that when there is a separate pension funding scheme, employer’s insolvency is not as
significant of a concern for defined contribution plans due to shelter from creditor
claims against the employer contributions, whereas defined benefits plans bring the
risk of underfunding).
266. See, e.g., infra Appendix.
267. See, e.g., infra Appendix nos. 3 (noting that in Belgium outstanding pension
claims are treated through the country’s wage guarantee fund), 6 (noting that pension
contributions are treated as a type of wage claim in Denmark), 13 (noting that in
Iceland outstanding pension contributions are treated as wages and protected under
the country’s wage guarantee fund).
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these countries are witnessing a dramatic shift to defined contribution
plan schemes like the United States).268 In a number of these
countries (like the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom),
such pension assets are held in trust or ring-fenced so that they are
not subject to other creditor claims.269 Nevertheless, in these schemes
an employer’s insolvency has the biggest impact on employee pension
claims because of employer funding responsibilities.270 Not only do
pension contributions have to be addressed, but there also might exist
unfunded or underfunded pension liability on employer insolvency.271
There are seven countries in this third category: Austria, Canada,
Germany, Ireland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.272 These countries tend to have both priorities for pension
claims (with Germany being a notable counter-example)273 within the
insolvency processes, as well as some form of pension guarantee
scheme (at least for pensions that are funded on a defined benefit
basis).274
It should be pointed out that these three categories of pension
plans (illustrated in Table III.1) are not as well defined as they first
appear. A number of countries straddle the lines between two
different pension categories. For instance, both Austria and Sweden
use a combination of externally funded pension funds and direct
pension promises based on the book reserve method.275 Similarly,

268. A book reserve is a direct pension commitment made by the company that is
funded through allocations on a company’s balance sheet, as opposed to funded
through external insurance schemes or pension funds. See MIKA VIDLUND ET AL.,
FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, THE STRUCTURE OF PENSION PROVISION AND THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 17–20, (2012)
available
at
http://www.etk.fi/en/gateway/PTARGS_0_2712_459_770_3439_43/
http%3B/content.etk.fi%3B7087/publishedcontent/publish/etkfi/en/julkaisut/reviews/
the_structure_of_pension_provision_and_the_significance_of_occupational_pensions
_in_different_countries_7.pdf (providing an overview of both the U.S. and German
examples of employer-funded pension systems).
269. Id. at 31 tbl.5 (noting both the U.S. and U.K. systems’ reliance upon trusts as
vehicles for occupational pensions); see also James M. Lukenda & Kimberly A.
Wittrock, Underfunded Pension Plans: A Looming Crisis for Corporate America?, 22
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 22 (2003).
270. VIDLUND ET AL., supra note 268 at 15.
271. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 50 (noting the increased risk for defined benefit
contribution plans due to risks of underfunding, or, in the example of the United
States, the failure of the company to diversify stock for those plans leading to even
greater risk).
272. See infra Table III.1.
273. See FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 262, at 1, 9, 19, 21
(providing examples of these countries’ utilization of this hybrid scheme).
274. See id.
275. See infra Appendix.
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Mexico has some externally funded pensions, but most employees
appear to rely solely on the state-run pension system.276 And other
examples abound. Nevertheless, viewing countries’ pension plans
through this lens explains why there is either more or less insolvency
and guarantee fund protection for employee pension claims in some
countries versus others. It can be said with some confidence that
most countries in this study have statutory models with external
pension funds established separate and apart from the employer, and
this has an impact on how insolvency priorities and guarantee
schemes (to the extent that they exist) operate in those countries.
Where external pension funds exist, employees are less exposed to
pension losses when their employers become insolvent and
consequently, there exists less need for bankruptcy priorities and
guarantee schemes.277

b.

Other Employee Benefits

Wage-related benefits, unlike pensions, are not usually funded
and/or sponsored by employers. Thus, similar distinctions between
statutory and employer-operated benefit schemes tend to matter
much less.278 The United States is one example of a country, however,
that primarily relies on employer-sponsored welfare plans279 to
provide a number of wage-related benefits, such as health insurance,
long-term disability insurance, life insurance, and retiree health
benefits.280

276. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 5.
277. See supra notes 270–72 and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., Wage Earner Protection Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 1 (Can.)
(providing examples of international, organizational, and country-sponsored wagerelated benefit systems); Council Directive 2008/94, 2008 O.J. (L283) 36 (EC); ILO
Convention, supra note 213.
279. As far as the provision of health insurance in the United States, 53.5% have
employer-sponsored health insurance, 19.5% of Americans are uninsured, 17.6% are
covered by Medicaid, 6.4% have individual coverage, and 3.0% have Medicare. See
CHAPIN WHITE & JAMES D. RECHOVSKY, GREAT RECESSION ACCELERATED LONGTERM DECLINE OF EMPLOYER HEALTH COVERAGE 2 (2012), available at
http://www.nihcr.org/Employer_Coverage.pdf; see also Secunda, supra note 36, at
230–31 (“With the exception of those who are poor and chronically ill that are
eligible for the federal Medicaid programme [sic] or those who are 65 or older or
disabled that are eligible for the federal Medicare programme [sic], most Americans
receive their health coverage through private employer-provided health plans.”).
280. HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 205. The number of employers providing
retiree health benefits, however, continues to shrink at a significant rate. See Susan
E. Cancelosi, The Bell is Tolling: Retiree Health Benefits Post-Health Reform, 19
ELDER L.J. 49, 51 (2011) (“Despite their importance to covered individuals, retiree
health benefits have sharply declined over the past two decades. Struggling to handle
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The Uncomfortable Place of Employee Creditors in the
Insolvency System

The literature makes much about providing employee pension and
wage claims some form of priority in the insolvency system.281
Scholars fear that unless the pension or wage claims receive a superpriority or preferred priority, no recovery will be made.282 Certainly
there is truth to this observation, and technically the provision of such
priority should permit employees to recover a good portion of their
claims during the insolvency process (although perhaps not in the
timeliest of manners).283
As a practical matter, whether talking about pension or wage
claims, the problems associated with employees recovering sums from
their employers through priorities in the insolvency process are
related to insufficient information and lack of voice.284 This is true
even where unions represent employees. Indeed, unions often do not
have defined roles within the insolvency process as far as claimfiling.285 Employees are less likely, given the amount of money
involved, the complexity of the process, and their lack of knowledge,
to take advantage of whatever priority they receive for their
employment claims.286 Not only that, but even if employees do
manage to negotiate the process, file a timely claim, and receive a
fairly large portion of what they are owed, they will likely not receive
it for many years given how long it takes the bankruptcy process to be
completed.287 Thus, if the aim of the social protection system is to
protect already-earned employees’ pension, wages, and other
rapidly escalating health care costs and preserve active employee insurance,
employers often have chosen to terminate retiree coverage.”).
281. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 11; SARRA, supra note 37; Stewart, supra
note 3.
282. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 10; SARRA, supra note 37, at 9 (both
describing precarious position employees are in during employer insolvency and
emphasizing need to provide increased or specialized recovery methods).
283. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 4–5.
284. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 2.
285. See Dawson, supra note 3 at 28 (“There are certainly reasons to doubt that,
practically, union representation translates to employee participation in bankruptcy
governance, even when the union is a member of the creditors’ committee.
Employees, even if represented on the committee, may have their particular interests
overridden by the conflicting interests of other creditors.”).
286. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7.
287. See id. (noting the long, drawn-out nature of liquidation in bankruptcy where
even employees who have priority rights will still be subject to drawn out wait for
their claim to be realized, as opposed to guarantee schemes where there can be
immediate payment while the guarantor—who is better situated to handle the time
delay—is subrogated to insolvency claim).
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employee benefits when their employer becomes insolvent in a more
timely and efficient manner, the granting of a priority alone may not
be the best method for doing so.
This circumstance is why the existence of guarantee funds, both for
pensions and wages, is so important for providing employees the
social protection they need when their employer becomes insolvent.
Employees would appear to receive much better protection through
the ability to file claims with pension and wage guarantee funds,
without the worry of having to negotiate the insolvency process and
compete for limited funds with better-financed and better-informed
company creditors.288 Although the payments available under such
guarantee funds are limited to certain amounts for specified time
periods prior to the insolvency filing,289 they do provide a timelier and
surer method for protecting the already-earned pension and wage
claims of employees.290

3.

Growing Prominence of Guarantee Funds

Given the reality of insolvency systems in most countries, perhaps
the growing use of guarantee schemes to provide some protection for
pensions, wages, and other employee benefits when an employer
becomes insolvent is unsurprising. Although EU countries where
some form of guarantee institution is mandated by law have largely
driven this development, other countries have similar systems—with
much variation in coverage.

288. See Heartfield & Wink, supra note 28, at 14-5 (“Workers are amongst the
most vulnerable parties in business bankruptcies and receiverships, because they do
not have the financial means at their disposal to forego payment of their wages. They
rely on payment of their wages for their livelihood and unlike other creditors, they do
not agree to extend credit to their employer when they sign a contract of
employment.”); see also JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 2 (“Unlike creditors who can
factor such defaults into their pricing or lending rates, employees typically are left
with no recourses . . . . Regular trade creditors . . . have access to financial and
economic data of the debtor and can . . . set their terms of trade to reflect their
assumed risk.”).
289. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)–(5) (2012) (U.S. limitation upon claims to
within 180 days of insolvency through PBGC); Council Directive 2008/94, 2008 O.J.
(L283) 36 (EC), art. 3 (noting the member countries ability to designate the
applicable period for claims under the guarantee funds); ILO Convention, supra note
213, art. 12 (providing specific limitations upon guarantee schemes payment to eight
weeks prior to an employer’s insolvency); Italy: Wage guarantee fund, solidarity
agreements, bilateral bodies and wage guarantee fund in derogation, EUROFOUND,
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/ITALY/WAGESGUARANTEEFUNDCIG
-IT.htm (last updated Aug. 14, 2009) (Italy providing up to eighty percent of lost pay
under Cass Intergrazione Guadagni (CIG) fund).
290. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7.
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For instance, most countries with guarantee funds (although the
United States is a big exception to the rule) provide some protection
for wage claims, and most countries define wages broadly to include
vacation pay, holiday pay, severance pay, termination pay, and even
travelling expenses.291 Such claims are usually capped and limited to a
certain period before the employer filed for insolvency.292
On the other hand, pension guarantee funds tend to be few and far
between. This may be because the majority of countries studied
either have no occupational pensions or have statutory systems where
pension assets are kept separate and apart from the employer.293 In
such cases, there is less impact on the employee when insolvency is
declared and less need for a pension guarantee fund.294 This state of
affairs may also be related to whether a country primarily relies on
DB plans, where the employer has the responsibility to ensure that
the pension is not underfunded, as opposed to countries that rely
primarily or exclusively on DC plans, where the employer is only
responsible for a contribution or withholding employee contributions
and has no obligation beyond that.295 The amount at stake in the DC
plan context may not be considered significant enough to require the
institution of a guarantee fund since the outstanding employer
contributions due will likely not be a significant percentage of the
pension amounts the employee is due, given that contributions in
defined contribution schemes are meted out in fairly frequent
increments.296 On the other hand, pension guarantee schemes are
more necessary in the DB plan context where the employer is
responsible for contributions and the continual funding of the plan to
pay out benefits to employees upon retirement and thereafter.297 It is
probably not surprising, then, that countries and provinces that have
pension guarantee funds (like the United States, United Kingdom,
and Ontario) limit their coverage to DB plans and do not cover DC
plans.298
291. See infra Appendix.
292. See e.g., Nackan, supra note 208 (discussing the impact of the Canadian Wage
Earner Protection Program (WEPP) as well as its limitation of approximately a $3000
guarantee).
293. See generally supra Part III.A.
294. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 48.
295. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 201–02.
296. See id. at 203. On the other hand, to say that defined contribution plans are
always fully-funded and do not require a guarantee scheme does not take into
account that employer contributions to the fund may be outstanding at the time of
the bankruptcy.
297. See VIDLUND ET AL., supra note 268, at 35.
298. See supra Parts II.A (United States), II.B (Canada); infra Appendix.
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Distinction Between Priorities Given Different Pension Claims

Although countries that rely on DC plans do not make this
distinction, countries that still hold the bulk of occupational pension
assets in DB plans do continue to make a distinction between the
priority in insolvency given to outstanding pension contributions as
opposed to unfunded or underfunded pension liabilities.299 As a
general matter, outstanding pension contributions (whether for DB
plans or DC plans) are given a preference in bankruptcy in the
studied countries.300 The preference can be in the form of a superpriority that outranks most secured claims (Canada) or it can be a
preference that merely outranks some other unsecured creditors
(United States).301 Such priorities can be without caps and for
unlimited duration,302 but are more likely to be for a certain capped
amount and for certain periods of time before the insolvency filing.303
Any amounts beyond the cap limit or beyond the protected time
period are treated as unsecured claims.304
Unfunded, or underfunded, pension liabilities, mostly in the DB
plan context, are generally unsecured debts in the insolvency process
(this is true in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada).305
The lack of preference for such claims seems to be based on the
notion that these are less like wage claims that usually receive

299. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 49.
300. Id. at 51; see U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, supra note 121, at 272.
301. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, supra note 121, at 272 (“In a number
of cases those [workers’] claims rank higher than most other priority claims,
specifically tax and social security claims, and in a few cases, as noted above, above
secured claims.”).
302. See, e.g., infra Appendix nos.
303. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7 (describing necessity of making capped or
specified time restrictions when establishing employee benefit claims systems to keep
cost burdens within operational range).
304. For an example, consider the United States’ treatment of pre-petition wage
and pension claims that exceed statutory cap amount. See supra notes 137–39 and
accompanying text.
305. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5) (2012); supra notes 194–97 and accompanying
text (Canada); infra Appendix. There also might be less political will to address
unfunded pension liabilities in insolvency that resulted from companies running up
millions (even billions) of dollars in future liabilities without anyone having felt the
pain at the time they were promised. See Keating, supra note 98, at 26 (“It was easy
enough for employers to offer generous defined-benefit pension plans and retiree
health benefits back in the days when pension plans did not have to be pre-funded
and when retiree medical benefits obligations did not even need to be shown on an
employer’s balance sheet. In those days, the ability to make these type of promises to
employees in lieu of higher current wages was like an unlimited unsecured line of
credit for employers, if not a de facto Ponzi scheme on the backs of the workers to
whom the future benefits were promised.”).
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priority.306 It also could be based on the fact that the size of unfunded
liability claims has a more dramatic impact on the claims of other
creditors and on capital markets more generally.307

5.

Distinctions Between the Scope of Protection for Wage-Related
Benefit Claims

All OECD countries that provide priorities and/or guarantee fund
protection for wage claims do so for unpaid wages (at least up to a
certain capped amount for a certain period of time before the
insolvency filings).308 Countries differ on what constitutes wages for
purposes of these payments. Some countries have broad definitions
of wages and include vacation pay, holiday pay, severance pay,
termination pay, and travel expenses (again limited to certain
amounts and time periods).309
Other countries have narrow
definitions and may either define wages to include only unpaid wages
or only include unpaid wages and vacation pay (but exclude
severance and termination pay).310
Interestingly, sometimes countries characterize outstanding
pension contributions as a type of wage.311 Where pensions are
treated like wages, such pension claims get the advantage of whatever
wage claim priority exists within the insolvency process, as well as
being treated as part of the wage guarantee fund.312 In such countries,
there is no need for a separate pension guarantee fund.

6.

Subrogation Rights of Guarantee Funds

When wage or pension guarantee funds pay benefits to employees
of insolvent employers, employees are not also permitted to continue
to pursue their insolvency claim at the same time (as that would
provide them a double-recovery or windfall).313 Instead, in most
countries, the guarantee fund becomes subrogated to the claims of the

306. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 2.
307. Id. at 8–9.
308. See, e.g., infra Appendix.
309. See, e.g., infra Appendix (noting that Japan, Luxembourg. Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom recognize vacation pay as preferential). But see infra Appendix
no. 20 (noting Mexico’s refusal to recognize vacation pay as a wage claim).
310. With regard to its priorities for wages in bankruptcy, Canada is a prime
example that excludes termination pay and severance pay from the definition of
“wages.” See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., infra Appendix.
312. See, e.g., infra Appendix.
313. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7.
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employees and stands in their place during the insolvency
proceeding.314
This subrogation dynamic shows two significant points. First,
usually, but not always, the guarantee institution receives the same
priority that the employee would have received if they had pursued
the claim in insolvency themselves.315 There are some notable
exceptions (e.g., Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland) where the fund
must proceed as an unsecured creditor even where individual
employees would have some priority.316 Perhaps the lack of priority
given to the fund in subrogation is in recognition that the employee
claim has become less important once the employees have received
some payment through the guarantee scheme.
Second, the guarantee fund is likely to have more success in
recouping the employment claim in insolvency than individual
employees, both because of its institutional knowledge of insolvency
procedure and because of the much larger relative size of its claim (by
bringing the claims owed to all employees it has become subrogated
to as a whole) in relation to the size of the claim of other creditors.317
Thus, the use of the guarantee fund not only makes it more likely that
employees will receive their pension and wage claims on a timely
basis, but also makes it more likely that the insolvent employer will
satisfy some of these claims by reimbursing the guarantee fund for its
payments to employees (this is especially true if the guarantee fund
assumes a preferred claim in the insolvency process).318 Of course, to
help fund the guarantee scheme’s operations, it is important that the
guarantee scheme recoup pension and wage monies through the
bankruptcy process.319

314. See id; see also, e.g., Wage Earner Protection Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s.
36(1) (Can.) (noting the right of the Canadian government to be subrogated to any
rights of employee for amounts distributed by Wage Earner Protection Program).
315. See, e.g., infra Appendix no. 8 (noting that in Finland “[u]nder this pay
security system, the state is subrogated to the claims of the employees in insolvency
with the same priority”).
316. See infra Appendix.
317. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 28 (discussing how such funds are better situated
than individual employees due to information, resources, and the size of claims being
sought).
318. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7.
319. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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Overall Treatment in Insolvency of Pension vs. Wage Claims and
Country Models

As early as 2006, Gordon Johnson identified four different systems
and variations on models utilized by different countries to address
employee entitlements in cases of employer solvency.320 I borrow
from that approach and use a slightly modified three-model version in
this Article to emphasize similarities in the overall treatment of
employee pension and other wage claims within the OECD
countries.321
Model One Countries provide bankruptcy priority but little or no
insurance or guarantee protections.322 The four Model One countries
are: Chile, Mexico, New Zealand, and Turkey.
Model Two Countries adopt a hybrid approach and provide both
some form of bankruptcy priority and at least one type of guarantee
fund for employee claims.323 Here, to focus on a significant difference
in approaches among this large group of countries, I introduce a
further dichotomy between Robust Model Two Countries and
Limited Model Two Countries. The basic difference is that Robust
Model Two Countries have priorities and guarantees for both pension
and wage claims, while Limited Model Two Countries generally have
priorities and guarantees either for wage claims alone or are
otherwise missing priorities or guarantee schemes.
The eleven Robust Model Two Countries include: Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The Limited Model Two
approach is the one adopted by most OECD countries (15) and
includes: Australia, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and the United States.

320. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 4–6.
321. More specifically, I expand what Johnson refers to as “Model three” countries
to recognize various hybrid systems, and eliminate his “Model one: Pro-employee
approach,” as it refers to an insurance system utilized by China, a country not studied
in this paper. See id. Of course, there are an infinite number of ways to sort countries
in different categories based on how they treat employment claims in insolvency or in
guarantee schemes. To give just one other example, Professor Sarra describes seven
different types of priorities or preferences for wages and related claims. See SARRA,
supra note 37, at 15.
322. Johnson refers to these countries as his “Model two” countries. See JOHNSON,
supra note 11, at 5.
323. Under Johnson’s system, these countries are labeled “Model three” countries.
Id. at 5–6
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Finally, Model Three Countries provide no bankruptcy priority at
all, but only guarantee systems.324 The four Model Three Countries
are: Austria, Estonia, Finland, and Germany.
Of course, even among these four enumerated models, there are
significant overlaps and variations relating to: (1) strength of the
creditor priority (e.g., super-priority vs. some lesser form of priority);
(2) capped versus uncapped claims (as far as monetarily how much
the priority or guarantee fund covers); (3) the length of payment
covered by the claim prior to the insolvency filing (post-filing claims
are generally given super-priority in most countries and are not
considered separately here); (4) what constitutes “wages” for
purposes of insolvency and guarantee schemes (including some
countries treating pension contributions as wages); and (5) the
manner in which subrogation operates to place the guarantee
institution in the place of the employee in the insolvency process (and
then with or without the same priority). The tables in the next section
summarize these differences.
B.

Tables on OECD Country Treatment of Pensions and Wages
in Insolvency and Under Guarantee Schemes

There are five tables in total summarizing the results of this
comparative study. Throughout the tables, Canada and the United
States are highlighted so their treatment of employee pension and
wage claims during insolvency can be readily compared to other
countries in the tables.
Table 1 divides the countries based on whether they have little or
no occupational pension system, an externally funded occupational
pension system, or an employer-based pension system. Table 2 sets
out the various models that OECD countries have adopted as far as
their overall treatment of pension and wage claims in insolvency (i.e.,
Model One Countries, Robust Model Two Countries, Limited Model
Two Countries, and Model Three Countries). Table 3 sets out in
detail the variations that countries have adopted in their treatment of
employee pension and wage claims (including their approach to
subrogation). Table 4 organizes the countries by the type of
preferences pension and wage claims receive during the insolvency
process. Table 5 organizes the countries by the nature of the
guarantee fund they have for pension and/or wage claims in the event
of employer insolvency.

324. These are “Model four” countries under Johnson’s scheme. Id. at 6.

922

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

All in all, as illustrated through these Tables, most OECD
countries, including the United States and Canada, are Model Two
Countries, which have adopted, at least to some degree, hybrid
systems that combine an insolvency priority for at least some
employee claims in tandem with some form of guarantee fund to
cover employee pension and/or wage-related payments as soon as
possible after the insolvency has occurred. As noted above, however,
even among Model Two countries, there are substantial and
important differences between the nature of bankruptcy protection
and the availability of guarantee schemes.
Differences between Canada and the United States in this regard
provide a ready example. Canada provides super-priorities for
pension contribution and some wage claims in insolvency in tandem
with a national wage guarantee scheme (WEPPA).325 On the other
hand, the United States provides a much less robust preference in
bankruptcy for employee claims (with some priority over unsecured
claims for a period time for wages and pension contributions before
the bankruptcy petition is filed and up to a combined capped
amount), a limited pension guarantee scheme (under the PBGC for
DB plans only), no national wage guarantee scheme (unless one
counts the partial protection provided by unemployment
compensation, which does not cover already-earned and owing wage
and pension claims), and statutes like WARN (which applies to mass
layoffs and plant closing by employers with 100 or more employees
and provides sixty-day notices to covered employees).326

325. See supra Part III.B.
326. See supra Part III.A.

2014]

INSOLVENCY IN OECD COUNTRIES

923

TABLE III.1: SUMMARY OF OECD COUNTRIES’ TREATMENT
OF P ENSION C LAIMS D URING I NSOLVENCY B Y T YPE OF PENSION
PLAN327
Category

Category One
Little or No Occupational
Pension System

Category Two
Statutory, External Pension
Funds

Category Three
Employer-Operated or Book
Reserve Model

OECD Countries
(34 Total)
Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, and
Turkey (7)
Australia, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Iceland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland (20)
Austria, Canada, Germany,
Ireland, Sweden, United
Kingdom, United States (7)

327. The following Tables are compiled from information contained in the
Appendix, infra.
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TABLE III.2: SUMMARY OF OECD COUNTRIES’ TREATMENT
OF W AGE AND P ENSION C LAIMS D URING I NSOLVENCY BY
COUNTRY MODEL
Country Model Number
OECD Countries
(34 Total)

Country Model One
(Bankruptcy Priority, Little or
No Guarantee)

Country Model Two (Robust)
(Hybrid, Bankruptcy Priority and
Guarantee for Both Pension and
Wages)

Country Model Two (Limited)
(Hybrid, Bankruptcy Priority and
Guarantee for Either Pension or
Wages)

Chile, Mexico, New Zealand,
Turkey (4)
Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom (11)
Australia, Czech Republic,
France, Greece, Hungary, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United
States (15)

Country Model Three
(No or Limited Bankruptcy
Priority, But Some Form of
Guarantee)

Austria, Estonia, Finland,
Germany (4)
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TABLE III.3: VARIATIONS AMONG OECD COUNTRIES IN
TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND WAGE CLAIMS AFTER
EMPLOYER INSOLVENCY
Country
1. Canada

Insolvency
Pension
Super-priority:
contributions
(unlimited in
amount on all
assets); unsecured:
unfunded liability

Insolvency
Wages
Superpriority;
wages and
vacation, not
severance or
termination
pay
Preferred for
wages,
vacation,
severance, and
termination
pay

Guarantee
Pensions
Ontario
only—
PBGF—
limited
coverage

Yes, up to
amount
owed, but
limited to 24
months for
book
reserve
Some
pension
guarantee

2. Australia

Preferred for
contributions
(unlimited in time
and duration)

3. Austria

No preference, but
employees
preferential creditors
for 50% of benefits
accrued (so like
being held in trust)

Limited
preference,
only
outranking
unsecured
creditors

4. Belgium

Preference for
contributions limited
to moveable assets

5. Chile

Few occupational
pensions
No occupational
pensions

Preference for
wages limited
to moveable
assets; capped
Preferred up to
fixed amount
Super-priority
on 30% of
employer
assets, capped
Preferred—6
months—broad
wage definition

6. Czech
Republic

7. Denmark

Preferred for
contributions

None

Guarantee
Wages
WEPP—
wages for 6
months, up
to 4X max
weekly
insurable
earnings
GEERS—3
months
wages; 16
weeks
wages,
vacation,
severance,
termination
Yes,
including
broad wage
definition

Subrogate
Yes, with
same
priority

Yes, with
same
priority

Yes, with
same lack
of
preference

Yes, with
same
priority

None

Closure
Fund for
certain wage
payments
None

None

Yes, capped

Yes, but
not
preferred

Protected as
wage

Yes, capped

Yes, but
without
privilege

N/A
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8. Estonia

Primarily state-run,
no preferences for
occupational plans

No preference

No, only for
state-run
pensions

9. Finland

No preference

No preference

Yes, capped

10. France

Unpaid contribution
to statutory
scheme—privileged

None

AGS, broad
definition of
wages,
capped

11.Germany

No preference

Super-priority
under labor
code for 60
days; regular
priority under
civil code for 6
months
No preference

PSVaG,
capped

12. Greece

Unsecured for
occupational
pensions

Yes, third
priority for
most wages, 2
years pre-filing

None

13. Hungary

Few occupational
pensions; mostly
state-run pensions

None

14. Iceland

Priority for
outstanding pension
contributions—
limited to last 18
months

Priority, not
capped;
severance to 6
months; limited
wages
Superpriority—
wages,
termination
and vacation
all capped at 18
months

IAF, wages
up to 3
months
Yes, 3
months
wages; no
termination
pay
100%
unpaid
wages, up to
6 months for
severance
Yes, wages
&
termination
pay up to 3
months

Treated as
wages and
protected
under wage
fund,
capped

No, only
covered
under
unemploym
ent scheme
Yes, capped

N/A

Yes and
without
preference
Yes, with
same
priorities

Yes & w/o
preference
Yes, with
same
priority or
lack of
priority
Yes, with
same
priorities

Could not
find
pertinent
data
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15. Ireland

3rd priority for
pension
contributions; no
priority for unfunded
pension liabilities

16. Israel

Preference limited to
twice average salary

17. Italy

Preference on
moveable property

18. Japan

Different pensions
treated differently;
EPF (public/private
hybrid pension)
some priority

19. Republic
of Korea

927

3rd priority—
wages 4
months
capped;
holiday,
severance,
termination
(no limit)
Yes, first
priority, but
after secured
creditors,
before floating
interest
secured
creditors
Priority on
moveable
priority applies
to most wages
Priority up to 3
months prefiling

Yes, up to
12 months
pre-filing

Yes, with
broad
definition of
wages

Yes, with
same
priority

Treated like
wages:
limited to
2X average
salary

Yes, wage
definition
broad,
capped and
12 months
pre-filing

Yes, with
same
priority

Yes, for
missed
contribs.

Yes, up to 3
months prefiling

Yes, with
same
priority

PFA
guarantees
only EPF
pensions

No preference

Super-priority
for wage and
retirement
allowance up
to 3 months

Yes, at
least as far
as wage
guarantee;
not clear
on PFA
Yes, with
the same
priority

20.
Luxembourg

No preference

21. Mexico

No preferences

Super-priority
for broad wage
definition, up
to 6 months,
and capped
Super-priority
for wages,
capped, 2 years
pre-filing

Deposit
insurance
for fund
insolvency
but no
employee
scheme
None

Yes, wages,
retirement
allowances
up to 6
months,
capped
Yes, wages
and
retirement
allowances
up to 3
months
capped
Yes, same as
wage
priority—6
months and
capped
None

None

Yes, with
same
priority for
wages
N/A
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22.
Netherlands

Preference for
contributions

Treated as
estate debts
with superpriority

None, but
unemploym
ent pays for
12 months

23. New
Zealand

Contributions to
Kiwisaver preferred
without cap

None

24. Norway

Super-priority for
contributions up to 6
months

Preferred for
most wages, 4
months prefile, capped
Super-priority
up to 6 months
for most wages

25. Poland

Priority for pension
contributions

26. Portugal

Priority for pension
contributions

27. Slovakia

Occupational
pensions illegal

28. Slovenia

No preference

29. Spain

No preference

Priority for
most wages—
not limited in
amount or time
Priority for
wages,
termination
pay, and injury
pay
Preferred up to
3 months—
ranked after
secured claims
Super-priority
on most wages
as cost of
bankruptcy, 3
months
without limit
on amount
Super-priority
for most wages,
30 days prefiling, capped

[Vol. XLI
UWV—
wages for 13
weeks,
holidays for
12 months
None

Yes, with
same
priorities

2X basic
amount;
combined
wages &
pensions
Most wages
up to 3
months,
capped
Yes, 4
months for
most wages,
capped

Yes, with
same
priority

None

Most wages
for 3 months

Yes, with
same
priority

None

Most wages
for 3
months,
capped

Yes, with
same
priority

None

Most wages
for 120 days,
severance
up to 12
months,
capped

Yes, with
same
priority

2X basic
amount;
combined
wages &
pensions
None

None

N/A

Yes, with
same
priority
Yes, with
same
priority
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30. Sweden

Preference for
contributions; 6
months limit for
direct pension
promises under book
reserve model

Preference for
wages and
holiday pay

FPG—
limited to
white collar;
other
treated like
wages

31.
Switzerland

Priority for pension
fund, not employee

Most wages for
6 months, not
capped

Yes, capped

32. Turkey

No occupational
pensions, but
contributions to
voluntary pensions
preferred, 1 year
Preference for
outstanding
contributions, one
year back (both DB
and DC plans and
NEST); unsecured:
unfunded pensions,
including FSDs

Preference for
one year prefiling

None

Preference for
most wages, 4
months back,
capped

PPF—DB
plans only

Preference for both
DB and DC plans
up to 90 days back
with combined cap
with wages

Preference for
wages up to 90
days back with
combined cap
with pensions
(though wages
outrank
pensions)

PBGC: DB
plans only;
capped

33. United
Kingdom

34. United
States

929
Most wages,
including
pensions, up
to 3 months;
holiday pay
for current
& past year
Yes, past 4
months,
capped

Only within
unemploym
ent fund—3
months
wages only
NIF: 8
weeks
wages; 6
weeks
holiday; 12
weeks
severance;
30 weeks
termination
pay; capped
None,
except
more
general
unemploym
ent scheme
and WARN
notice
scheme

No priority
on wages,
but may be
secured
creditor
under FPG
scheme
Yes, but no
priority for
pension
claims,
only wages
Could not
find
pertinent
data
Yes, PPF
unsecured
creditor for
pensions;
NIF with
same
priority for
wages

Yes,
PBGC
subrogate
d but
without
any
priority in
most cases
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TABLE III.4: PREFERENCE TYPE IN INSOLVENCY FOR PENSION
AND W AGE C LAIMS B Y C OUNTRY
Claim

Treatment
Super-priority
Capped Superpriority

Wages

Unsecured

Countries
Netherlands, Slovenia
Canada, Czech Republic, France,
Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Luxembourg, Norway, Mexico, Spain
Austria, Australia, Hungary, Italy,
Israel, Poland, Portugal, Sweden
Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Greece,
Ireland, New Zealand, Slovakia,
Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States
Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany

Super-priority

Canada, Japan (only EPF)

Capped Superpriority
Preferred

Norway

Preferred
Capped Preferred

Pension—Outstanding
contribution

Capped Preferred

Unsecured

Pension—Unfunded
Liability

Pension

Australia, Denmark, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland,
Portugal, Switzerland
Belgium, Iceland, Israel, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States
Austria, Czech Republic, Chile,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Republic of Korea,
Japan (non-EPF), Luxembourg,
Mexico, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain

Super-priority

None

Capped Superpriority
Preferred
Capped Preferred

None
Japan
Norway, United States
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Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Republic of Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom
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TABLE III.5: NATURE OF GUARANTEE FUND FOR PENSION
AND W AGE C LAIMS IN E VENT OF E MPLOYER I NSOLVENCY
AMONG OECD COUNTRIES
Guarantee Schemes
Pension Guarantee Scheme

Type of Payment
Unfunded Pension
Liabilities
Pension
Contributions
Capped Pension
Contributions

Paid Through
Unemployment
Compensation
System
Treated as Wage
Under Wage
Guarantee
No Scheme

Wage Guarantee Scheme
“Broad” means covers unpaid
wages and at least three other
categories of wage claims
(vacation, holiday, severance,
termination, travel, etc.)

Broad Wage Claims
Capped Broad Wage
Claims

“Narrow” means covers unpaid
wages and less than three other
categories of wage claims

Narrow Wage
Claims
Capped Narrow
Wage Claims

Countries
Canada (Ontario only), Japan (EPF
only), United Kingdom (PPF only),
United States (PBGC)
Belgium, Italy, Sweden (FPG only)
Austria, Canada (Ontario only),
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland,
Switzerland, United Kingdom (PPF),
United States (PBGC)
Netherlands

Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Norway,
Sweden (non-FPG)
Australia, Chile, Czech Republic,
France, Greece, Hungary, Japan
(non-EPF), Republic of Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand,
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Turkey
Ireland, Italy, Slovakia, Sweden
Australia, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain,
Switzerland, United Kingdom
Greece, Hungary, Iceland

Belgium, Norway
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Compensation
Scheme Substitute
No Scheme
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Austria, Estonia, Turkey, United
States
Chile, Mexico, New Zealand

CONCLUSION
In light of current realities surrounding the economic difficulties
that many employers face in the global economy, both in the private
and public sector, and the fact that many employers find themselves
in perilous financial conditions in large part because of the past wage
and pension promises they have made to their labor forces, it is
important to consider how these employment claims should be legally
treated when their employers become insolvent. This consideration is
especially important given that employees are so dependent on the
payment of these claims for their future economic well-being.
This comparative study of the international treatment of pension
and wage claims in insolvency proceedings by the thirty-four
members of the OECD shows that most countries provide some form
of preference or priority in insolvency proceedings for both pension
and wage claims (though most exclude unfunded pension liability and
certain types of wages from this priority). The strength of this
preference can vary, as can the limits on amounts recoverable and the
periods of time before the insolvency proceeding in which claims can
be advanced. Although such priority treatment would indicate a
measure of protection for employee claims, empirical and anecdotal
evidence suggest that individual employees may have a hard time
negotiating the insolvency process and filing successful claims given
their relative lack of knowledge and their inability to wait out the
long insolvency process.
Most countries studied also have a guarantee fund in place to pay
some portion of employee claims on employer insolvency.328 Not only
does this system provide an easier method for employees to recoup
their pension and wage claims, but it places the guarantee fund in the
place of employees during the insolvency process, making it more
likely that insolvent employers will designate part of their remaining
assets to employee claims through reimbursement of these guarantee
funds. This hybrid approach (Country Model Two) of bankruptcy
priorities and guarantee funds working in tandem seems to be
becoming the dominant approach to the international treatment of
wage and pension claims during employer insolvency. Yet, significant
328. See supra Part III.B, tbl.III.5.
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variation still exists in how robust or limited these guarantee schemes
are based primarily on the type of pension system the country has and
whether the country has a wage guarantee system at all.329 For
instance, countries with little or no history of occupational pensions,
or countries with statutory schemes that set up external pension
funds, are much less likely to have, or need, pension guarantee
schemes. On the wage guarantee side of the equation, a number of
countries, like the United States, appear to still prefer running
whatever system they have through their unemployment
compensation system, which does not cover already-earned and
owing pension or wage claims.330
This development of insolvency priorities working in tandem with
guarantee schemes should be applauded as protecting involuntary
and vulnerable employee creditors. Although some may argue that
this arrangement is inconsistent with the development of predictable
and affordable credit markets, the comparative vulnerability and lack
of sophistication of employee creditors make a balancing of relevant
interests come out squarely on the employee side of the balance. The
risk should be shifted to the state and the employers, who are better
able to bear such risk.
One possible way to provide greater protection for public sector or
private sector employees when their employers become insolvent is
illustrated by the application of the Canadian Wage Earner
Protection Program Act (WEPPA) of 2008 in tandem with Canadian
bankruptcy law. This hybrid approach provides robust protection for
most employment claims during employer insolvency in a way that
the American system currently does not. More specifically, this type
of system permits impacted employees to receive more timely
payments from the guarantee fund and then subrogates the guarantee
fund in the place of the employees in the bankruptcy process. Indeed,
one of the primary conclusions from the comparative study completed
in this Article is that Canada’s current treatment of pension and
employee benefit claims in insolvency proceedings is well within the
mainstream of how most other OECD countries treat similar claims
in insolvency, while the United States is trailing other advance
economies in providing protection to pension and other wage claims
(including retiree health insurance claims) when their employer
becomes insolvent. In the United States, this is true in both the public
and private sector.

329. See supra Part III.B, tbl.III.3.
330. See supra Part III.B, tbl.III.3.
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Based on these findings, the United States Congress should
undertake a study of the Canadian bankruptcy laws and Wage Earner
Protection Plan Act to start the process of providing the necessary
legal and social protection to employee creditors during municipal
and corporate bankruptcies. To jump-start that process, I outline
below potential legislation for the American Congress to consider.
In my mind, such legislation would have four main provisions
concerning: (1) pension priorities; (2) wage priorities; (3) a pension
guarantee scheme; and (4) a wage guarantee scheme. As far as
pension and wage priorities, the law would enact a limited superpriority for unpaid wage claims and employer pension contributions,
ahead of secured creditors with regard to current assets (cash,
accounts receivable and inventory), up to a limit of $2000 per claim
(consistent with WEPPA).331 With regard to the pension guarantee
scheme, I would expand the PBGC to also cover pension
contributions and public pension plans, and base this expanded scope
upon the best insurance practices, all of this being done in a
government revenue neutral way. For the wage guarantee scheme, it
would require the establishment of another body like the PBGC that
works at arm’s length with a number of executive departments, most
importantly, the Department of Labor. The wage scheme would
provide for the payment of unpaid wages, earned vacation pay, and
other wage payments owed to employees whose employers became
insolvent.332 The payments, based on what WEPPA currently
provides, would grant payments up to a maximum of $3000 per
individual. The wage scheme would be financed through employer
contributions based on a uniform premium and an assessment based
on the risk that they (the employers) could become insolvent based

331. I agree that providing a priority for underfunded pension plans or unfunded
retiree health benefits would cause too great of a moral hazard problem given the
ability of employers to promise these benefits in the present without much thought to
the future. A pension guarantee, however, could be established in accordance with
best practices established by the OECD: (1) benefit coverage should be limited so
that potential beneficiaries share some of the risk; (2) pricing or levies should be riskbased; (3) the guarantee fund should have in place accurate and consistent funding
rules and should operate under prudent asset–liability management; and (4) the
system must have adequate powers to avoid moral hazard. See ARTHURS, supra note
30, at 121. One way to reduce the chances of moral hazard in such a scheme would
be to require that payment of unfunded benefits agreed to within five years prior to
the plan sponsor’s insolvency be postponed until all other benefits under the plan are
satisfied. See id. at 122.
332. WEPPA does not cover severance payments, see Wage Earners Protection
Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 2(1) (Can.), but such payments should be covered
under the proposed legislation as long as these payments were not entered into as a
way to game the insolvency process for certain employees.
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on their financial health. This outline of what such a law would look
like is admittedly very rough, but provides a starting point for more
serious discussions about such legislation.
This approach would have the advantage of providing timely
payments of already earned pension and wage claims to employees,
while at the same time establishing an effective legal mechanism
through which employee claims could be combined and brought as a
single claim by the guarantee institution. This guarantee scheme
could be revenue neutral based on the scheme’s ability to be
subrogated, with the same heightened priority, to the pension and
wage claims of employees in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Additionally, revenue neutrality could be based on the scheme being
“built up through a process of sophisticated risk-assessment and paid
for by sponsors who have every reason to expect that in the normal
course, their contributions will be adequate to the task at hand.”333
In sum, my proposed scheme would provide heightened priorities
to both pension contribution claims in the defined benefit and defined
contribution context and to a broad range of wage claims in both
corporate and municipal bankruptcies. Along with these bankruptcy
priorities, a federal pension and wage guarantee fund (covering both
public and private employees) would be established to immediately
settle worker claims for covered pension and wage benefits up front.
Such a scheme would be funded by both insurance premiums placed
on employers based on both risk assessments and the scheme’s ability
to be subrogated to the rights of the employees in the bankruptcy
process. Although there will certainly be critics of this guarantee
fund approach as placing greater cost burdens on employers, the
argument here is that the risk of insolvency should be placed through
an insurance fund on employers prior to an insolvency rather than on
employees and other general creditors afterward an insolvency has
already occurred.

333. See ARTHURS, supra note 30, at 124. More specifically, I recommend a
guarantee scheme governed by the financing principles Arthurs recommends in his
Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions report: (1) the Fund should be selffinancing; (2) it should not receive government grants or subsidies in order to meet its
obligations; (3) it should be allowed to borrow funds from the government on a
commercial basis, for defined purposes and at defined times; and (4) the terms on
which the Fund itself should be deemed insolvent, and the effects of such insolvency,
should be clearly set out. Id.
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APPENDIX
Analysis of OECD Countries’ Treatment of Pensions and
Employment Benefit Claims in Insolvency and Guarantee
Schemes
(Canada and the United States Excluded)
The following thirty-two OECD country sections (with the
exception of the United States and Canada, which were explored in
the main body of the Article) discuss the treatment of pension, wage,
and other employee benefit claims when employers become insolvent.
In addition to considering whether such claims receive a priority or
preference under the country’s bankruptcy provisions, the country
sections also consider whether guarantee schemes exist for pension
and/or wage claims.
With regard to the priority analysis below, unless otherwise
indicated, the information below is limited to pre-filing claims. This is
because most post-filing pension and wage claims are given top
priority status in most countries as administrative claims of the
bankruptcy estate.334
This report also assumes that although
insolvency processes work differently in some countries, employee
contracts are terminated instantly in the event of employer
liquidation. The report also uses the terms “preference” and
“privilege” interchangeably to describe a claim in insolvency, which
outranks unsecured claims.
Finally, a necessary disclaimer. Because of the complexity of the
subject matter, and its rapidly changing nature, some sources relied
upon for this analysis may contradict one another. Where possible, I
have attempted to provide the most current understanding of the law
concerning treatment of employee claims in insolvency, but
inevitably, some discrepancies remain (especially as a result of the
unavailability of English translations of law or legal commentary).

334. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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1. Australia335

Pensions
In Australia, the term “superannuation” refers to savings
specifically dedicated to the provision of financial support in
retirement. The term is preferred to “pension” for historical reasons
(largely because of the long-standing preference for lump-sum
benefits rather than annuity income streams).
Under the
Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992, a minimum of
9.25% (as of July 1, 2013) of an employee’s gross wage is deducted
and remitted to an approved superannuation fund. The minimum
obligation required by employers is set to increase to twelve percent
gradually, stepping annually from 2013 to 2020. If an employer fails
to provide the amount, then a tax is levied on the employer to cover
the shortfall and this is known as the “superannuation guarantee
charge.”
With regard to liquidating companies, section 556(1) of the
Corporations Act of 2001 provides a hierarchy of claims that are
prioritized over other unsecured claims. The highest-ranking class of
claims relate to the administration and process expenses surrounding
the insolvency. Next, there are four classes of employee claims set
out in section 556(1)(e)–(h): (1) wages, superannuation contributions
and superannuation guarantee charges; (2) injury compensation; (3)
amounts due for leaves of absence; and (4) retrenchment payments
(severance). Retrenchment payments are defined in section 556(2) to
be amounts payable by virtue of termination of the employment, or in
other words, a type of termination or severance payment.
In examining the order of priorities under the Corporations Act,
wages, superannuation contributions, and superannuation guarantee

335. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Corporations Act 2001, ss 556, 560, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172;
Superannuation
Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992, available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/
Details/C2013C00394; SARRA, supra note 37; Stewart, supra note 3; Industry Canada,
International Comparison of Priority Status of Employee Claims (2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author); General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy
Scheme (GEERS), AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF EMP., http://employment.gov.au/
general-employee-entitlements-and-redundancy-scheme-geers (last visited Mar. 9,
2014); Australia: Protection of Rights, INT’L SOC. SECURITY ASS’N,
http://www.issa.int/country-details?countryId=AU&regionId=ASI&filtered=false
(follow “Pensions (mandatory)” hyperlink; then select “Protection of Rights”) (last
updated Jan. 1, 2013).
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charges outrank injury compensation, which outranks leave of
absence pay, which outranks retrenchment payments.
In sum, outstanding pension contributions and charges are
provided preferred status for all unpaid amounts, meaning that
employees enjoy priority over ordinary unsecured creditors with no
monetary or time limits.
There is no government-provided benefit guarantee for pensions,
which is not unusual for countries that have adopted the occupational
defined contribution plan model.

Other Employee Benefits
As discussed above, wage claims, including those for workers’
compensation, leaves of absence, and retrenchment (severance), are
preferred in insolvency proceedings over unsecured creditors for all
unpaid amounts under the Corporations Act.
Although no guarantee fund exists for pensions, a government
fund, called the General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy
Scheme (GEERS), pays up to three months unpaid wages and up to
sixteen weeks for vacation pay, retrenchment (severance) pay, and
termination pay. It is administered by the Federal Department of
Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR) and is funded
through general tax revenues.
The State is subrogated to the claims of employees in Australia to
the extent those claims have been satisfied by the GEERS scheme. In
such circumstances, the effect of section 560 of the Corporations Act
is that DEWR has the same right of priority of payment in respect of
the money advanced as the person who received the payment would
have had if the payment had not been made.
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2. Austria336

Pensions
Pensions are not granted any preference under Austrian insolvency
law.
However, Austria allows employees to be “preferential
creditors” for fifty percent or more of benefits accrued, which means
that the assets are essentially held in trust and are not accessible to
other creditors. Additionally, occupational pension contribution
claims are treated as wage claims and protected by the wage
guarantee scheme described below.
Nevertheless, Austria does have a pension guarantee scheme for
different types of pensions under its Insolvency Remuneration Fund
(Insolvenz-Entgelt-Fonds). The Insolvency Remuneration Fund will
pay employer contributions to the pension fund or insurance
arrangement and then the Fund can seek to recover this amount from
the employer. On the other hand, the Insolvency Remuneration
Fund will provide limited protection in relation to direct pension
promises (book reserves) by employers. It will pay twenty-four
monthly pension payments directly to the employees. The Fund will
then have direct recourse through access to the employer’s protected
securities, which are the assets that the employer holds on a
segregated basis as a reserve against its pension obligations.

Other Employee Benefits
Austria does have limited wage priorities with respect to employee
wage claims that have arisen prior to the opening of bankruptcy
proceedings over the assets of the employer. These claims only
outrank unsecured creditors.
Austria has a wage protection fund called the “InsolvenzAusfallgeld-Fonds” (IAF). The IAF is funded primarily through
annual unemployment insurance contribution premiums.
The
following claims resulting from an employment relationship are
protected by the IAF: (1) wage claims, include claims for unpaid

336. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: CONNOR, supra note 265; EUROPEAN FOUND. FOR
THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS, RESTRUCTURING IN
BANKRUPTCY: RECENT NATIONAL CASE EXAMPLES (2009), available at
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/docs/erm/tn0908026s/tn0908026s.pdf
[hereinafter
EUROPEAN FOUND.]; FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 262;
SARRA, supra note 37; Industry Canada, supra note 335.
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wages, termination payments, vacation payments, and corporate
pension contribution claims; and (2) damage claims, which include
claims for compensation if the employment relationship was
unlawfully terminated. The IAF is subrogated to the insolvency
claims of employees at the same priority level.
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3. Belgium337

Pensions
In Belgium, occupational pensions are generally set up though an
insurance contract, or through a pension fund. With regard to
pension funds, the latter is a separate legal entity different from the
employer set up in the form of an Organization for Financing
Pensions (OFP). As such, with the exception of outstanding pension
contributions, there are generally no pension-related claims in
insolvency because these benefits are not provided through employer
assets.
The main protection against employer insolvency in Belgium is
through the external financing requirement for occupational
pensions. This makes it less likely that employer insolvency will be
detrimental to an employee’s occupational pension entitlements. If
an employer has not actually funded a pension plan to a sufficient
level, an employee’s pension entitlement will be reduced and the state
Closure Fund (the state wage guarantee fund discussed below) may
intervene.
To the extent that a pension plan is underfunded, an employee’s
pension entitlements under the plan may be reduced. Employees can
make a claim against an insolvent company to recover any loss
suffered as a consequence of the underfunding. These employee
claims, including claims in relation to the funding of a pension
scheme, have priority in insolvency proceedings. However, this
priority relates only to an employer’s “movable assets” (such as stock,
inventory, and cash accounts).

Other Employee Benefits
There is a priority right for employees’ wage claims on the movable
goods of the bankrupt company. These priority wage-related claims
include: (1) pre-filing wages, indemnities and benefits (including
vacation and severance pay), up to EUR 7500 (as of 2008); (2)

337. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: EUROPEAN FOUNDATION, supra note 336;
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, supra note 262; SARRA, supra note 37;
Industry Canada, supra note 335; Fonds tot Vergoeding van de in Geval van Sluiting
EUROFUND,
van
de
Onderneming
Ontslagen
Werknemers,
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/BELGIUM/REDUNDANCYPAYMENTSF
UND-BE.htm (last updated Aug. 14, 2009).
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termination pay up to EUR 7500 (as of 2008 and adjusted every two
years); and (3) old-age indemnities for workers sixty years and older.
Excluded from benefits cap are the indemnity because of termination,
the indemnity because of an abusive dismissal, and the indemnity
because of a dismissal of a protected employee. Wage claims
excluded from the priority rights include: holiday pay (which has a
lesser priority than other wage claims, but still ranked above other
unsecured creditors), the additional indemnity for occupational
diseases or employment accidents, and indemnities that are paid in
surplus to the social security payments.
Additionally, there exists a government wage fund (Closure Fund),

Fonds tot vergoeding van de in geval van sluiting van de
ondernemingen ontslagen werknemers—Fonds pour l’indemnisation
des travailleurs licenciés en cas de fermeture d’enterprise, which
makes certain payments to workers whose place of work has closed.
Under the Closure Fund, if the employer is unable to make wage
payments within fifteen days of an insolvency filing, the Fund
commences payment to the employees. The Fund also pays wages for
blue-collar employees up to a year before and after the employer
closes, and for white-collar workers up to eighteen months before and
after the closure. It is funded through employer and government
contributions. To the extent that the Fund makes payment to
employees, the state is subrogated to the claims of the employees in
the insolvency proceeding with the same priority that the employee
would have had.
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4. CHILE338

Pensions
Occupational pensions, for the most part, do not exist in Chile.
Instead, Chile is a prominent example of the introduction of private
accounts into a public social security system. This privatized social
security system has mandatory private individual accounts funded
primarily by employee contributions (of at least ten percent),
administered by large fund management companies. These fund
management companies are, in turn, independent from the employer
and the government (at least in theory). Consequently, when an
employer goes bankrupt in Chile, there are not general employee
occupational pension claims against the company.
As of 2008, Chile has experimented with occupational pension
plans of the defined contribution salary-deferral variety. However,
there are very few such plans in the country as of 2013 and no
experience with employers who use these plans becoming insolvent.
At the present time, the only obligations that employers might
have to employees as far as pension claims in bankruptcy concern
employer insurance payments required for the disability and
survivorship aspects of the pension program. Employers are also
responsible for deducting employee contributions from their pay and
sending these contributions to the first pillar pension fund companies.
To the extent that the company owes these pension insurance
payments or has failed to make the required contributions to the
pension fund companies, the Chilean bankruptcy system does provide
for a super-priority for these amounts during the insolvency process.
But again, these are not employee claims in the traditional sense, but
rather government claims for employer contributions to the social
security program.
Chile does not have a pension payment guarantee fund or
guaranteed insurance for pension claims during insolvency, which is
unsurprising given the lack of occupational pensions and defined
benefit pension plans.

338. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: CÓD. TRAB., art. 61 (Spanish only); CÓD. CIV. 2472
(Spanish only); Section 148 of Chile’s Bankruptcy Act (Spanish only); SARRA, supra
note 37; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Email from Pablo Arellano Ortiz, Profesor
de Derecho del Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Austral Univ. of Chile, to Paul M.
Secunda, Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (July 12, 2013) (on file with
author).
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Other Employee Benefits
Unpaid wages, severance-type payments, and other wage-related
claims in Chile are given preferred treatment up to a capped amount
during the insolvency process. Pursuant to Chile’s Civil Code
(Section 2472, as amended), first class preferred credits consist of: (1)
employees’ remuneration, wages, and family allowances; (2) social
security contributions of employees withheld from such
remunerations and wages; and (3) severance pay accrued in favor of
employees as of the date of the claim, up to a maximum of 3 months
wages per year and up to ten years (approximately $11,330 USD as of
July 2013) per employee. Employees are unsecured creditors for any
amounts in excess of this total. Vacation pay claims also have a
preference in insolvency without restriction.
These first class preferred credits may be paid with the proceeds of
the bankruptcy estate without any need for the holders of such credits
to file their claims in the bankruptcy proceedings (Section 148 of
Chile’s Bankruptcy Act).
As far as other employee benefits, the bankruptcy system does not
appear to recognize additional preferences for other wage-related
claims. Such claims for lost employee benefits as a result of employer
insolvency are instead handled through a private-public joint
employment insurance/unemployment compensation arrangement.
Chile does not have a government guarantee scheme for wagerelated employee claims after an employer’s insolvency.
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5. Czech Republic339

Pensions
The Czech Republic does not have an occupational pension
system. There are some elements, however, of occupational social
security within the individual pension system (i.e., the employer may
contribute to the individual pension of one’s own employees). Not
even the recently introduced system of pension savings (Zákon č.
426/2011 Sb.) is a true occupational pension system, as it is up to the
insured to decide whether to use up to three percent of the obligatory
first pillar pension contributions for this new system. Individuals may
then also add a further two percent of salary from their own money.
Under this system, the employer has no legally established obligation
to pay any further contributions for one’s own employees.
As far as a first pillar pension system, if pension contributions to
the social security scheme are not paid by the employer due to its
insolvency, the Czech Social Security Administration becomes one of
the creditors within the bankruptcy process regulated by the Zákon č.
182/2006 Sb., Bankruptcy and Settlement (Insolvency Procedure).
This is not an employee claim, but a government claim, so is beyond
the scope of this report.
Because occupational pensions largely do not exist in the Czech
Republic, there is also no pension guarantee scheme in the Czech
Republic.

Other Employee Benefits
If insolvency of an employer occurs, the wage of the employees is
protected by Zákon č. 118/2000 Sb., on protection of employees with
339. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Zákon č. 426/2011 Sb. (System of Pension Savings),
available at http://portal.gov.cz/app/zakony/zakon.jsp?page=0&nr=426~2F2011&
rpp=15#seznam (no English version available); Zákon č. 182/2006 Sb. (Insolvency
Procedure), available at http://portal.gov.cz/app/zakony/zakon.jsp?page=0&nr=182~
2F2006&rpp=15#seznam (no English version available); Zákon č. 118/2000 Sb.
(Protection of Employees by Insolvency of Employer), available at
http://www.mpsv.cz/ppropo.php?ID=z118_2000o (no English version available);
CONNOR, supra note 265; EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; Industry Canada,
supra note 335; Email from Kristina Koldinska, Professor of Law, Charles Univ.,
Czech Republic, to Paul M. Secunda, Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch.
(Aug. 2, 2013) (on file with author); Email from Kristina Koldinska, Professor of
Law, Charles Univ., Czech Republic, to Paul M. Secunda, Professor of Law,
Marquette University Law School (June 26, 2013) (on file with author).
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employer insolvency. Employees only have a restricted absolute
priority, in that they are paid preferentially only for a percentage of
wage-related claims owed to them. Specifically, secured creditors are
paid preferentially out of seventy percent of the insolvent employers’
assets, and then thirty percent of the estate must be set aside for
employee claims on a super-priority basis against the insolvent
employer.
Additionally, a part of the wage owed to employees can be paid by
the Czech Labour Office as part of a wage guarantee arrangement.
This payment is capped as three months of pay and severance pay is
limited to three times the average amount paid. The Czech Labour
Office then takes the place of the employee as a creditor in the
insolvency proceeding.
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6. Denmark 340

Pensions
Many people in Denmark are covered by a company pension or a
collective pension scheme as a part of their employment contract.
Collective pension schemes are also very common in the public
sector, where workers pay 17.1% of their salary before tax to a
pension savings scheme. The employer pays two-thirds of this
pension contribution, whereas the final third is deducted from the
employee’s pay. In the private sector, companies usually offer a
pension scheme to which the company pays a contribution of about
ten percent of the employees’ salaries, and employees contribute
about five percent of their salaries. These pension schemes are run by
an external pension fund, which is a separate legal entity from the
employer. Thus, when an employer becomes insolvent, as with other
countries with external pension funds, the most important issue
becomes whether the employer still has outstanding contributions
owing to the pension fund.
Ranking of unsecured creditors in Denmark is governed by
sections 93 to 98 of the Danish Bankruptcy Act (Bekendtgørelse af
Konkursloven). Employees with pension and salary claims are
ranked after secured and certain other preferential creditors.
Employee claims are considered privileged in that they outrank
general unsecured claims.
Pension contributions are treated as a type of wage in Denmark, so
the wage protection fund, described below, also protects pension
contributions.

Other Employee Benefits
According to section 95 of The Danish Bankruptcy Act, wage
claims, just like pension claims, have a preferential status in case of
bankruptcy. Section 95 provides priorities for: (1) Claims for
wages/salaries, which has fallen due within the period from six months
prior to the date of insolvency notice; (2) Claims for compensation as
340. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Danish Bankruptcy Act §§ 93–98 (Bekendtgørelse
af
Konkursloven)
(summarized
at
www.practicallaw.com/2-502-0073);
Lovbekendtgørelse 2005-10-28 nr. 1043 om Lønmodtagernes Garantifond (no
English version available); EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; SARRA, supra note
37; Industry Canada, supra note 335.
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a result of discontinuation of the employment relationship (severance
pay); (3) Claims for compensation for dismissal or termination of the
employment relationship that have occurred within the last six
months prior to the date of insolvency notice; and (4) Claims for
holiday pay. The bankruptcy court may refuse to give priority where
such a priority would not seem reasonably justified under the terms of
payment and employment.
There is also a wage protection fund, Lønmodtagernes Garantifond
(the Employees’ Guarantee Fund) for wage claims (including pension
contributions as noted above). The Guarantee Fund was established
in 1972 and is employer-funded. The law creating and governing the
Fund is called the Lovbekendtgørelse 2005-10-28 nr. 1043 om
Lønmodtagernes Garantifond. There is a cap on the amount that can
be paid out from the Guarantee Fund of approximately EUR 15,000.
The Fund is subrogated to the claims of employees in insolvency, but
without the same preference that employees would have had.
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7. Estonia 341

Pensions
Estonia primarily has a state-run pension system. To the extent
there exists occupational pension schemes (fairly uncommon), they
exist as defined benefit plans and are run by management companies
separate and apart from employers. An employer’s insolvency thus
does not affect an employee’s right to receive pension benefits under
the Estonian pension system because the right to receive a pension is
generally not related to the employer. As a result, pension
contributions do not have any priority in insolvency proceedings.
A pension guarantee fund does exist for the state-run pension
scheme and compensates members of these pension funds to a
specified level when their employer goes bankrupt. The Guarantee
Fund compensates in full for losses up to EUR 10,000 and covers
ninety percent of any losses exceeding EUR 10,000.

Other Employee Benefits
Estonia does not provide a priority for wages during the insolvency
process. Although Estonia does not have a wage guarantee scheme, it
handles some of the same issues that arise as far as loss of wages and
related benefits upon insolvency under its Unemployment Insurance
Act. Under the Act, wages, vacation pay, severance pay, and
termination pay are all protected up to a certain specified amount.
Under section 44 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, on insolvency
of an employer, the state becomes in bankruptcy proceedings the
creditor regarding unemployment insurance premiums not received
from the employer. The amounts collected during bankruptcy are
then transferred to the account of the unemployment fund in order to
pay employees’ wage-related claims.

341. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Unemployment Insurance Act § 44 (Est.), available
at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/518112013008/consolide; EUROPEAN FOUND.,
supra note 336; FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 262; SARRA,
supra note 37.
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8. Finland342

Pensions
Bankruptcy and other insolvency problems of an employer affect
an employee’s right to wages or occupational pension to only a small
degree in Finland. Already earned wages and pensions are protected
by the Finnish Constitution (Section 15 on the Protection of
Property).
In regard to pensions, the occupational pension scheme is
mandatory and covers the entire labor force. The administration of
this scheme is decentralized to various authorized old-age pension
providers. In regard to private sector employees, the management of
pensions is divided between authorized private pension insurance
companies (sixty-nine percent of all the insured in 2012), company
pension funds (one percent of all the insured in 2012) and industrywide pension funds (one percent of all the insured in 2012). The
management of pensions of public sector employees is, in turn, with a
public pension institution called Keva (twenty-eight percent of all the
insured in 2012).
If a private sector employer goes bankrupt, it does not affect
employees’ right to pensions because the operations of all pension
providers are separate from employers. Not even a bankruptcy of a
pension provider would affect the employees’ right to already earned
pensions because of their joint responsibility. According to section
181 of the Employees’ Pensions Act (395/2006), if a pension remains
fully or partially unsecured due to the bankruptcy of a pension
provider, other pension providers are jointly liable for these benefits
in proportion to the earnings insured with the relevant pension
provider.

342. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: FINLAND CONSTITUTION ch. 1, § 15, available at
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/fi00000_.html; Employees’ Pensions Act (395/2006) §
181, available at http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2006/20060395; Pay Security
Act (866/1998), available at http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1998/19980866;
EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP,
supra note 262; SARRA, supra note 37; VIDLUND ET AL., supra note 268; Industry
Canada, supra note 335; Finnish Pension Security, FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS,
http://www.etk.fi/en/service/the_pension_system/1399/the_pension_system
(last
visited Mar. 9, 2014); Email from Toomas Kotkas, Professor of Law, Univ. of E.
Finland, to Paul M. Secunda, Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (Aug. 1,
2013) (on file with author); Email from Toomas Kotkas, Professor of Law, Univ. of
E. Finland, to Paul M. Secunda, Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (June
24, 2013) (on file with author).
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In addition to the mandatory pension schemes, there are voluntary
private pension schemes paid by employers. These pension insurance
policies are sold by private insurances companies, and are
increasingly of the DC plan variety. Because the mandatory pension
system places no income ceilings for the accumulation of pensions,
the voluntary private pension schemes are undeveloped and still form
only about five percent of the total pension expenditure in Finland.
The voluntary private pension schemes are a kind of “bonus pension”
used by employers to recruit new employees.
If an employer who has taken a voluntary pension policy for its
employees goes bankrupt, an insured employee is either entitled to a
paid-up policy or can continue the pension policy as a private policy
by paying the premiums. So, even with these bonus pension schemes,
an employer’s bankruptcy has only a limited effect on the voluntary
pension.
To the extent that there are outstanding pension
contribution claims under these schemes, they are unsecured. The
pension insurance companies (and not the employees), however, are
responsible for lodging claims for these unpaid pension contributions
and therefore bear the risk of the bankruptcy estate not being able to
make the payments.
Endowment insurance, voluntary pension insurance, and capital
redemption contract do not have statutory guarantee funds in the
same way as banks have the deposit guarantee fund to cover savings
deposits.
Rather, the financial interests of policyholders are
safeguarded by various means, such as by monitoring the financial
status of life insurance companies. The provisions of the Insurance
Companies Act safeguard the customers’ interests in cases of an
insurance company’s winding up or bankruptcy. These provisions
relate, for example, to the transfer of insurance portfolio to another
company and the priority of the claims on the insurer.
It would appear that the State is subrogated to the pension claims
of employees in any subsequent insolvency proceeding, but similarly
without preferences.

Other Employee Benefits
Finland does not grant a preference to employee wage claims
during insolvency. Holiday pay, severance pay, and termination pay
claims are also unsecured.
However, if an employer goes bankrupt or cannot pay the wages or
any other employment related claims, the employees’ claims are
secured through the Pay Security Act (866/1998), which sets up a
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wage guarantee fund. The government will pay as pay security any
unpaid claims up to a ceiling of EUR 15,200 per employee (section 9
of the Act). The average monthly wage in Finland in 2012 was EUR
3100.
Under this pay security system, the state is subrogated to the claims
of the employees in insolvency with the same priority.

954

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

9. FRANCE343

Pensions
This is not a central topic in France, because most pensions and
other “social security” benefits are provided by statutory schemes.
Therefore, risks related to insolvency are marginal and concern a very
limited part of the overall pensions granted. Private occupational
pension plans, provided by employers, are not developed in France.
There is no equivalent state guarantee for pension benefits as there
is for wages as described below. Nevertheless, some occupation
pension schemes are offered to the employees, either by the effect of
collective agreements or by a unilateral contract by the employer.
Except in some exceptional cases, those schemes are externalized,
which means that they are managed by private insurers.
The legal configuration is usually a triangular one: the pension
scheme is set by a collective agreement or a unilateral decision of the
employer that commits the employers towards his employees; the
contributions and the benefits are managed under a “group insurance
contract” signed between the employer and an insurance company.
The French statutory law contains some provisions about the duties
of the employers and of the insurers to make sure that the benefits
will be paid.
In case the employer’s insolvency in these situations, French courts
admit that the benefits which are due to the employees will be paid—
to a certain extent—by the AGS (the compulsory system of insurance
covering the wages in cases of insolvency described below). But the
courts do not require the AGS to cover the contributions that have
not been paid to the insurer by the employer in case of insolvency.
Unpaid contributions to the statutory schemes have a privileged
status in insolvency. By contrast, unpaid contributions to external
pension funds are not privileged.

343. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: SARRA, supra note 37; Industry Canada, supra note
335; Garantie des Salaires Après Redressement ou Liquidation Judiciaire SERVICEPUBLIC.FR, http://vosdroits.service-public.fr/particuliers/F2337.xhtml (last updated
Jan. 1, 2014) (French version only); Email from Jean-Philippe Lhernould to Paul M.
Secunda (June 11, 2013) (on file with author); Email from Philippe Martin, Professor
of Economics, SciencesPo, to Paul M. Secunda (June 27, 2013) (on file with author);
Email from Philippe Martin, Professor of Economics, SciencesPo, to Paul M.
Secunda (June 17, 2013) (on file with author).
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Other Employee Benefits
As far as how wage claims are treated during insolvency
proceedings, both the French Civil Code and Labor Code have
applicable provisions. Under the priority (privilège) instituted by the
Civil Code, employees can apply it against the employer, even if no
bankruptcy proceedings have been started. This priority covers the
last six unpaid months (wages, severance pay, and damages for unfair
dismissal). The Labor Code institutes a “super-priority” (superprivilège), whereby employees’ wages claims are paid before even tax
claims. This priority only covers the last sixty days before a
bankruptcy case is opened, up to EUR 6172. This scheme under the
Labor Code also includes some termination pay (notice period in case
of permanent contracts; severance pay in case of fixed term contract).
The scheme also covers vacation pay up to a special cap (thirty days’
wages).
The Assurance Garantie des Salaires (AGS), the French wage
guarantee scheme, covers a wide range of wages claims, including
termination pay, severance pay, damages for unfair dismissal and
other claims that can be related to the contract of employment (for
instance some benefits due to the employees under a private plan
contracted by the employer), either due to the employees before the
bankruptcy proceeding is opened and during the bankruptcy
procedure. The AGS insures wage claims up to 74,064 EUR and it is
subrogated to the employees’ rights in the insolvency proceeding, and
it can avail itself of both the Civil Code “privilège” and of the Labor
Code “superprivilège.”
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10. Germany 344

Pensions
Pension claims receive no priority or preferences under the
German Bankruptcy Code. Germany has adopted a flattened
hierarchy of creditors where they are only either secured or
unsecured creditors, and there are no exceptions for special groups
like employees.
The Insolvency Code of 1994 abolished all
preferences.
A statutory insolvency insurance system administered by a mutual
insurance association called the Pension Guarantee Fund (PensionsSicherungs-Verein Versicherungsverein aG-PSVaG) (PSVaG) that
protects current and future beneficiaries in the event of employer
insolvency. The PSVaG is financed via annual insurance premiums
paid by employers who provide occupational retirement provisions.
In 2006, the financing mechanism of the PSVaG was changed from a
partially funded contribution model to a system of full capital
coverage. The insolvency insurance covers pensions in payment and
vested rights. The PSVaG is not required to pay monthly pensions in
excess of EUR 7875 (figure for 2012). Certain rights (such as benefit
increases granted in the two years immediately prior to insolvency)
are excluded from the insolvency insurance coverage if it is
considered that the aim of granting those rights was to pass the cost to
the PSVaG. Insolvenzgeld (insolvency payments) are not paid by
government, but by the Federal Labour Agency, financed by
contributions and managed in a tripartite system of self-government.
The PSVaG replaces all beneficiaries as creditors of the employer
and becomes a major creditor. In return, any securities or funds that
are linked to the protected pension obligations are transferred to the
PSVaG by virtue of law.

344. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Sozialgesetzbuch [Social Code], Mar. 24, 1997
[SGB], §§ 165–172, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/sgb_3;
Insolvenzordnung [Insolvency Statute], Oct. 5, 1994 [BGBl], available at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/inso; Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Betrieblichen
Altersversorgung [BETRIEBSRENTENGESETZ—BetrAVG] [Occupational Pensions
Law], Dec. 19, 1974 [BGBl], §§ 7–15, available at http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/betravg; CONNOR, supra note 265; EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336;
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 262; SARRA, supra note 37;
Stewart, supra note 3; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Email from Felix Welti,
Professor, Univ. of Kassel, Germany, to Paul M. Secunda, Professor of Law,
Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (June 16, 2013) (on file with author).
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Occupational pension insolvency is regulated by sections 7–15 of
the Gesetz zur Verbesserung der betrieblichen Altersversorgung.
Occupational pensions are protected because employers are obliged
to have insurance in case of insolvency.

Other Employee Benefits
As with pensions, there are no preferences or priorities granted for
wage claims (vacation, severance, or termination pay).
There is a wage guarantee government fund called the InsolvenzAusfallgeld-Fonds. The government wage guarantee fund, sourced
by employer premiums, pays last three month of wages. Having paid
the “insolvency money,” the Federal Labour Agency is subrogated to
the claims of employees, but without any preference (just like the
employee claims).
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11. Greece345

Pensions
Only state-run pension claims in relation to the Social Security
Foundation (the largest of the public and semi-public pension funds
in existence) have priority. Such claims rank sixth in priority
according to Article 154 of Law 3588/2007 (the Insolvency Code). As
with wages discussed below, these claims are limited to amounts
arising within the two years before insolvency. All other pension
claims, including those owed to occupational pension funds, are
unsecured.
Greece does not have a pension payment guarantee fund or
guaranteed insurance for pension claims during insolvency.

Other Employee Benefits
According to Article 154 of Law 3588/2007, employee wage claims
(including severance, termination, and vacation pay) are ranked third
among preferred creditors in Greece. Wage claims arising in the two
years prior to commencement of proceedings, including vacation,
severance and termination pay, are preferred. However, claims for
compensation due to termination of employment relations are not
subject to any durational restriction.
Greece has established the Fund for the Protection of Employees
from Employer’s Non-Reliability for the protection of wage claims.
The Fund is financed by compulsory contributions made by
employers (0.15% on employees’ wages) and state funds, and is selffunded by proceeds from investments of Fund-owned assets. The
Fund provides for a maximum benefit of three months wages payable
for the six-month period before insolvency. Claims deriving from
termination of the employment contract are excluded. The State is
subrogated to the same claims that employees have in insolvency
proceedings.

345. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Nomos (2007:3588) [Insolvency Code], 2007, art.
154 (no English version available); EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; SARRA, supra
note 37; Industry Canada, supra note 335.
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12. Hungary 346

Pensions
Pension claims are not generally given priority in Hungary because
there are no private pensions. There is only one common pension
system, which is partly state-owned, and the pension funds are fully
state guaranteed.
At the start of the insolvency procedure, the assets belonging to the
pension fund must be transferred immediately to the liquidator.
These assets must be handled separately, and can be used to fulfill
other liabilities only after fulfilling obligations in respect of members
and survivors.
Membership in the Hungarian Pension Guarantee Fund (GF) is
mandatory for all pension funds. The GF is a statutory body financed
by mandatory quarterly contributions from all pension funds in the
range from 0% to 0.4% of the contributions paid by the pension fund
members.
The GF is responsible for the protection of the accumulated
benefits in the case of liquidation of a pension fund. The guarantee to
beneficiaries covers their total benefit amount, while the guarantee to
contributing members is limited to the capital accumulated before the
start of the liquidation process.

Other Employee Benefits
Employee wage claims have a limited priority over other
insolvency claims under the law of Act LXVI of 1994 on the Wage
Guarantee Fund (1994. évi LXVI. törvény a Bérgarancia Alapról).
The preference, which outranks only unsecured claims, extends to
wages and the severance pay of employees who have given notice by
the time of liquidation. There is no restriction on the wages that can
be claimed, but severance pay is limited to six months’ wages. There
is no priority for vacation pay, termination pay, or traveling and other
expenses.

346. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: 1994. évi LXVI. törvény a Bérgarancia Alapról
(Act LXVI of 1994 on the Wage Guarantee Fund) (no English version available);
CONNOR, supra note 265; EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; SARRA, supra note 37;
Industry Canada, supra note 335.
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Additionally, a government wage guarantee fund (F város
Kormányhivatala Munkaügyi) pays unpaid wages. The fund covers
100% of wages, as well severance pay equivalent to six months’
wages. Employees receive compensation out of the fund if the
liquidator is unable to pay for the employees’ claims by the time of
liquidation. The State is subrogated to the claims of employees in
insolvency with the same priority as employees. The fund is funded
both by employer taxes and government contributions.
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13. Iceland 347

Pensions
Iceland’s pension scheme is based on two laws: Act No. 129 on
Mandatory Pension Insurance and the Activities of Pension Funds,
1997, and Act No. 78 on Occupational Retirement Funds, 2007.
Iceland’s occupational pension is mandatory with all employees
having twelve percent of their wages contributed to funds run by
pension managing companies, with eight percent of this contribution
coming from the employer. These mandatory occupational pension
funds are the dominant feature of the Icelandic pension system and
mostly exist in the DC plan form.
Because the pension funds exist separate and apart from the
employer, the employer’s insolvency only impacts the pension fund to
the extent that there are outstanding employer pension contributions
owed to the fund by the employer. Article 112 of the Icelandic
Bankruptcy Act of 1991 provides that pension contributions receive a
priority during insolvency proceedings for the eighteen months
immediately preceding the reference date (the insolvency filing). In
any event, because pension contributions are paid monthly, most
often there are no significant pension contributions to be paid to a
pension fund when a corporation goes bankrupt.
Although Iceland does not have a separate pension guarantee fund
or scheme, outstanding pension contributions are treated as wages
and protected under the Wage Guarantee Fund Act described below.
Pension funds’ claims for pension premiums that have fallen due
during the liability period are covered by this scheme. Liability is
restricted to the twelve percent minimum contribution.

347. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Act Respecting Occupational Retirement Funds of
2007, available at http://eng.fjarmalaraduneyti.is/media/laws_regulations/Act_no_78_
available
at
2007.pdf;
Wage
Guarantee
Fund
Act
of
2003,
http://eng.velferdarraduneyti.is/acts-of-Parliament/nr/3698; Pension Act of 1997,
available at http://eng.fjarmalaraduneyti.is/legislation/nr/817; Act on Bankruptcy of
1991, art. 12, available at http://eng.innanrikisraduneyti.is/laws-and-regulations/
english/nr/6570; MARIANNA JONASDOTTIR, THE ICELANDIC PENSION SYSTEM,
ICELANDIC MINISTRY OF FINANCE (2007), available at http://eng.fjarmalaraduneyti.is/
media/Lifeyrismal/The_Icelandic_Pension_System_032007.pdf; OECD, Pension
Country Profile: Iceland, in OECD PRIVATE PENSIONS OUTLOOK 2008, at 210 (2009),
available at, http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/42566195.pdf; Industry
Canada, supra note 335; Email from Olaf Margeirsson, Ph.D. Candidate, Univ. of
Exeter, United Kingdom, to Paul M. Secunda, Professor of Law, Marquette Univ.
Law Sch. (July 19, 2013) (on file with author).
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Other Employee Benefits
Like pension contributions, various wage claims receive a top
priority under Article 112 of the Bankruptcy Act. The priority
covers: (1) claims for wages that have become due during the
eighteen months immediately preceding the reference date; (2) claims
for compensation for termination of an employment agreement
during the same eighteen month period; and (3) claims for vacation
payments or vacation wages earned during the eighteen month
period.
Iceland does have a wage guarantee fund. The Wage Earners’
Guarantee Fund (Tryggingarsjóður launa), which was established by
the Wage Guarantee Fund Act, No. 88/2003, guarantees salaried
employees wages where the employer goes bankrupt. Specifically,
the following wage claims are guaranteed: (1) claims by employees for
wages for their last three months of employment in the service of the
employer; (2) claims for compensation for lost wages for up to three
months due to the termination of an employment contract; and (3)
claims for holiday pay.
The Fund’s liability is dependent on the condition that the
employee wage claims has been recognized as priority claims under
Article 112 of the Bankruptcy Act. It is unclear whether the fund is
subrogated to the claims of employees in insolvency.
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14. Ireland348

Pensions
Section 285 of the Irish Companies Act of 1963 provides priority
status (the third priority after fixed charges and administrative fees)
to any payments due by the company pursuant to a scheme to provide
superannuation benefits.
Therefore, outstanding pension
contributions are granted a preferred status. On the other hand,
unfunded pension liabilities are unsecured.
Under the Insolvency Payment Scheme, if an employer is insolvent
and contributions remain unpaid, the Protection of Employees
(Employers’ Insolvency) Act of 1984 provides for the payment of
unpaid contributions to a pension plan by a statutory fund
administered by the Department of Enterprise, Trade, and
Employment. The amount that can be claimed from this statutory
fund is the unpaid employer contributions and employee
contributions not paid into the scheme for the twelve months
preceding the insolvency or the deficit in the plan, whichever is the
lesser amount.
Where the Insolvency Payment Scheme makes a payment for
unpaid pension contributions, the government is subrogated to the
rights of the employees as a preferential creditor.

Other Employee Benefits
Wage-related claims receive the same priority as unpaid pension
contributions. Specifically, the following claims receive a preference:
(1) wages and salaries for the employees in the four months before
the relevant date, subject to a maximum of EUR 3174; (2) all accrued
holiday pay with no money or time limit; (3) all compensation
payable to an employee on termination of employment where the
statutory minimum notice of termination has not been given; (4)
348. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency)
Act, 1984 (Act No. 21/1984), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1984/en/
act/pub/0021/index.html; Companies Act, 1963 (Act No. 33/1963), § 285, available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1963/en/act/pub/0033/sec0285.html;
EUROPEAN
FOUND., supra note 336; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Stewart, supra note 3;

Employer Representative Guide to the Insolvency Payments Scheme, Protection of
Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Acts 1984 to 2006, IRISH DEP’T SOC.
PROTECTION (Oct. 2011), http://www.welfare.ie/en/Pages/Employer-RepresentativeGuide-to-the-Insolvency-Payments-Sch.aspx.
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statutory redundancy lump-sums; and (5) compensation awarded by
the Employment Appeals Tribunal in respect to unfair dismissals.
The same Insolvency Payment Scheme provides for the payment of
certain outstanding entitlements relating to the pay of an employee
where employment has been terminated because of an employer’s
insolvency. Payments are made from the Social Insurance Fund. The
Scheme covers unpaid wages, holiday pay, pay in lieu of statutory
notice, and a range of other entitlements that might be owed to
employees by the employer. These include awards made under
employment rights legislation covering such issues as unfair dismissal,
discrimination, working time, and minimum wage.
Where the Insolvency Payment Scheme makes a payment for
wage-related claims, the government is subrogated to the rights of the
employees as a preferential creditor.
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15. Israel 349

Pensions
According to section 184 of the National Insurance Law, and
according to the Company Ordinance and the Bankruptcy Act,
pension fund payments are given preferential treatment during
insolvency proceedings in Israel. The preference is limited to twice
the average salary.
Insolvency of the employer, however, tends not to be relevant
because the pension assets are held by pension funds separate and
apart from the employer. Nonetheless, in some cases of insolvency of
these pension funds, the employer has not set aside adequate funds
for a long period of time. In such cases, the law imposes strict
obligations on the pension fund to notify the employee and to sue the
employer. The pension fund might be responsible itself for the
payments if it does not recoup the missing funds.
The National Insurance Law established the National Insurance
Institute (NII), which is a national fund for social claims. According
to section 184 of the National Insurance Law, pensions, like wages,
are also protected by a guarantee scheme. Under this scheme, in case
of an employee whose employer did not deposit in the pension fund
the employer’s funds or deduct the appropriate funds from the
employee’s salary, the National Insurance Institute will pay these
funds to the employee’s pension fund. The National Insurance
Institute will transfer to the pension fund the amount of the debt plus
indexation differentials (e.g. cost of living adjustments) from the day
the debt was made to the day of the actual payment, up to the
maximum amount set by the law, which is twice the average base
salary, NIS 16,974 (as of January 1, 2013). The NII is then subrogated

349. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Wage Protection Law 5718-1958, arts. 19–19A,
http://www.moital.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/763192A1-4853-490C-AC7D08E98CC382C3/0/16.pdf; Bankruptcy Ordinance 5740-1980, art. 78 (Hebrew version
only); Companies Ordinance, art. 354 (Hebrew version only); National Insurance
Law, § 184 (Hebrew version only); Severance Pay Law of 1963, §§ 4, 17 (Hebrew
version only); Lilach Lurie, Can Unions Promote Employability? Senior Workers in
Israel’s Collective Agreements, 42 INDUS. L.J. 249 (2013); OECD, REVIEW OF
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND PROGRESS IN LABOUR MARKET AND SOCIAL POLICY IN
ISRAEL: SLOW PROGRESS TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE SOCIETY (2013); SARRA,
supra note 37; Email from Lilach Lurie, Professor of Law, Bar-Ilan Univ., to Paul M.
Secunda, Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (June 25, 2013) (on file with
author).
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to the employee’s claim in insolvency, having the same priority as
employees.

Other Employee Benefits
In the event of insolvency, Article 354(A)(1)(A) of the Companies
Ordinance places employee wages as the first priority among other
guaranteed creditors of the company. Additionally, according to
section 4 of the Severance Pay Law of 1963, an employee whose
employment is terminated due to an event of liquidation is entitled to
severance payment as if he or she was dismissed by the company.
Section 27 of the Severance Law adds that such severance pay shall
be deemed as wages payable in precedence to all other debts.
Under the Israeli Wage Protection Law of 1958, Article 19, an
employee whose employer went bankrupt or whose company
underwent liquidation is entitled to receive a benefit from the NII
that includes payments, owed by the employer, up to the maximum
amount set by the law, for wages (including vacation pay) and
severance pay. The payment, for a maximum period of twelve
months, may not be less than the minimum wage to which the
employee is entitled under the Minimum Wage Law.
In the event of insolvency, if payment is made by the liquidator
under the Severance Law, the amount of severance pay and wages
cannot in the aggregate exceed 150% of the cap. However, if
payment is made by the NII (meaning that the liquidator does not
have the ability to make these payments) then the resulting super
priority is limited to ten times the average salary in the market. The
NII is then subrogated to the claims of employees in insolvency with
the same priority.
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16. Italy 350

Pensions
Pension funds in Italy are typically independent legal entities or
pools of assets separate from the sponsoring employer. Pension fund
assets are not, therefore, involved in insolvency proceedings normally.
Regardless, Article 2116 of the Italian Civil Code guarantees that
the employee will receive their pension payments. Therefore
employees will not lose their pension or have a reduced pension
because their employer breached its obligation to pay contributions.
The risk of an employer breaching its obligations does not fall on the
employees.
Moreover, under article 2751, the claim of the employees for
damages suffered in relation to the failure by the employer to remit
social contributions, including pension contributions, has a general
privilege on movable property of the employer. This claim ranks
after the expenses of the insolvency that rank first, but at the same
level with wages and claims for unlawful dismissal.
As far as guarantee schemes for pension contributions, it appears
there is a right to claim pension contributions due in the event of
insolvency. More specifically, Article 5 of Legislative Decree No. 80
of 27 January 1992 grants the worker the right to resort to a special
guarantee fund set up by the National Social Welfare Institution if,
due to insolvency, the employer fails to pay the contributions either in
part or in whole. The Institution is then subrogated to the rights of
employees in insolvency.

Other Employee Benefits
Pursuant to Article 2751 of the Italian Civil Code, a general
privilege on movable property is granted to claims relating to

350. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Articles 2116 and 2751 of the Italian Civil Code
(Italian version only); Decreto Legislativo 5 dicembre 2005 n. 252, available at
http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/deleghe/05252dl.htm; Decreto Legislativo 27
gennaio 1992, n. 80, art. 5 available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?
urn:nir:stato:decreto:1992;80!vig=; EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; FRESHFIELDS
BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 262; SARRA, supra note 37; Industry
Canada, supra note 335; Email from Pietro Manzella, Postdoctoral Research Fellow
at the Marco Biagi Dep’t of Economics, the Univ. of Modena and Reggio Emilia,
Italy, to Paul M. Secunda, Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (June 25,
2013) (on file with author).
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remuneration due, at the time of the opening of the insolvency
procedure, in any form, to employees. Thus, a priority is given to
unpaid wages, vacation, severance and termination pay, and other
employment expenses (like traveling) that are subject only to costs of
administering the insolvency. Neither the length of employment nor
the amounts due affect the enforcement of the claim.
Italy has a wage protection fund, the Fondo di garanzia, which is
managed by the INPS, the Italian National Authority for Social
Security Contributions. This government fund pays–within fifteen
days–the whole severance pay, wages, and benefits owed for the last
three months before insolvency. The fund is sourced through
employer premiums. After the payments, the Fondo di garanzia is
subrogated to the claims of employees towards the employer with the
same priority.
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17. Japan 351

Pensions
Pension claims in insolvency are treated differently in Japan based
on the specific type of pension scheme at issue. An occupational
pension plan of the defined benefit variety gets little protection in the
bankruptcy process and pension claims are unsecured. On the other
hand, pension funds that are set up separate and apart from the
employer do not generally become impacted by employer insolvency,
except when the employer has failed to make the necessary
contributions on behalf of employees to the pension fund. In that
case, the claim that the pension fund or employees have is also
unsecured.
Another type of pension scheme in Japan is the employee pension
fund (EPF) structure, which provides private pension benefits but
also manages a portion of the public pension scheme (the Employee
Pension Insurance (EPI)). This public pension portion of the EPF is
called the “Substitution Component.” As far as priority rights in the
EPF context, EPFs have priority claims over employer contributions,
the Pension Fund Association (the guarantee scheme for EPFs
described below) has a priority claim over the Substitution
Component, and EPFs have a non-priority claim for uncollected
contributions due. If an EPF converts into one of the defined benefit
plans mentioned above, it loses these priority rights.
As far as a pension guarantee scheme, there is only a guarantee for
EPFs. When the employer sponsoring an EPF goes bankrupt, the
pensions of the employees are protected by the Pension Fund
Association (PFA), which administers a compulsory insolvency
insurance scheme. EPFs make contributions to this insurance scheme
in an amount that varies according to the statistical likelihood of
insolvency and the unfunded liability if the plan were to be wound up.
The PFA guarantee does not apply to other forms of occupational
pension arrangements in Japan. It is unclear whether the PFA is
subrogated to the claims of the EPF in insolvency.

351. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [CIV. C.] arts. 306, 308, available at
http://archive.org/stream/cu31924025028303/cu31924025028303_djvu.txt;
SARRA,
supra note 37; Stewart, supra note 3; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Guide for
Replacement Payment of Unpaid Wages, JAPAN LABOUR HEALTH & WELFARE
ORG.,
http://www.rofuku.go.jp/Portals/0/data0/kinrosyashien/pdf/tatekae_seido_
english.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
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Other Employee Benefits
Japan grants a wage preference to employee claims arising during
insolvency. These claims are on a priority basis over unsecured
claims and, in certain cases, over secured claims. A claim of an
employee is treated as a statutory lien (Sakidori Tokken) according to
Article 306 and Article 308 of the Japanese Civil Code. Claims for
wages arising during the three months prior to the beginning of the
bankruptcy procedure are treated as super-priority claims.
Japan has a wage guarantee scheme called the Replacement
Payment of Unpaid Wages. Contributions to the fund are paid by
employers as part of the premiums for Labour Injured Insurance.
Unpaid wages subject to replacement payment are the unpaid regular
wages and retirement allowance which were due during the period
between the day six months prior to the date of retirement and the
day preceding the date of filing a claim for replacement payment.
The actual replacement payment amount is eighty percent of the total
amount of unpaid wages, up to a statutory maximum. These wage
payments include vacation pay. However, severance and termination
pay are considered retirement payments.
The guarantee scheme becomes subrogated to the rights that the
employee would have had in the insolvency proceeding.
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18. Korea, Republic of352

Pensions
There is no legislation in Korea that provides for the priority of
retirement pension claims under the Retirement Pension Plan. This
lack of legislation is because the occupational pension fund is not
established inside the company structure but instead by financial
institutions outside the company, which means there is little to no risk
of retirement pensions not being paid due to the employer’s
bankruptcy. To the extent that claims do exist, unfunded or underfunded pension liabilities are treated as general unsecured liabilities
in insolvency.
Although there is no pension guarantee scheme, there is
guaranteed insurance for pension claims during insolvency. On June
6, 2009, the Korean Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC)
expanded its jurisdiction by introducing a protection system for the
payment of pensions. Under this insurance scheme, if a pension fund
company which manages employee pension funds becomes insolvent,
employees will be protected in their pensions up to a capped amount
of KRW 50 million (about $47,000 USD). This system works much
like depositor insurance for banks, but it is not a traditional pension
guarantee fund for employees.

Other Employee Benefits
Article 37 of the Labour Standards Act of Korea (LSAK) provides
for preferential treatment of employee wage claims. These claims
enjoy a super-priority in the sense that wages from the three months
prior to insolvency are entitled to preference over secured claims by
pledges or mortgages, taxes/public charges, and other claims. These
claims are limited in the amount paid.
Additionally, as far as the insolvency process, there is priority given
to severance pay for amounts of up to three months’ salary, but these

352. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Wage Claim Guarantee Act of Korea (WCGAK),
Act No. 5513, Feb. 20, 1998, translation available at http://www.koilaf.org/
KFeng/engLaborlaw/laborlaw/WAGECLAIMGUARANTEEACT.pdf;
Labor
Standards Act of Korea (LSAK), Act No. 5309, Mar. 13, 1997, art. 37, translation
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/WEBTEXT/46401/65062/
available
at
E97KOR01.htm; SARRA, supra note 37; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Stewart,
supra note 3.
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severance pay claims only receive a preferred claim status. Only
retirement allowances for the last three years are entitled to superpriority status. On the other hand, there is no priority for vacation
pay, termination pay, or traveling and other expenses.
The Wage Claim Guarantee Act of Korea (WCGAK) guarantees
payment of employees’ wage claims covered as preferential claims in
the insolvency process. Only wages of the last three months, accident
compensation allowance, and retirement allowance (severance pay)
for the last three years (amounts equal to an average wage of ninety
days) are guaranteed by the fund. There is a cap on the guaranteed
amount in terms of the type of wages and the age of the worker.
Under the current cap, the maximum amount guaranteed is
10,200,000 Korean Won (about $6500 USD). This fund is financed by
recovered amounts by the exercise of a subrogation right by the
Minister of Labour for employee insolvency claims, charges from
employers, borrowings from financial institutions, and profits
accruing from the management and operation of the fund.
As far as the retirement allowance, this is not a pension, but a
separate legal entitlement that requires employers to pay a retirement
allowance equal in amount to at least thirty days of average wages to
employees who have worked for a period of one full year.
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19. Luxembourg 353

Pensions
Retirement pensions (pensions de retraite) are entirely paid by the
government to retired employees. As their former employers are not
liable for the payment of pensions, there is no priority for this type of
employee claim in insolvency proceeding.
If the employer sets up a separate occupational pension plan, they
can be internally financed by the employer (book reserves) or
externally financed through an insurance company or pension fund.
If internally financed, such commitments must be backed by the
employers’ purchase of insolvency insurance.
With external
financing, no such arrangements are required and if the employer
goes bankrupt, the pension amount remains outside the bankruptcy
estate.
Because occupational pensions are subject to these insurance
requirements regardless of their funding, there is no pension
guarantee fund set up in Luxembourg.

Other Employee Benefits
Under Article 2101 of the Luxembourg Civil Code and Article 545
of the Luxembourg Commercial Code, wage claims (including
vacation pay, severance pay, termination pay, and traveling and other
expenses) benefit from (i) a super-priority together with (ii) a general
privilege for the remainder of claims that are not covered by the
super-priority. Wage claims are limited to the last six months of work
before the insolvency filing, as well as employees’ claims relating to
amounts of any nature whatsoever arising from the termination of an
employment contract, up to a maximum amount that is equal to six
times the social reference minimum salary as of March 2008 (EUR
9657.18). Beyond that amount, a general preference applies.
Wage claims (including vacation pay, severance pay, termination
pay, and traveling and other expenses) are guaranteed by the
Employment Fund (Fonds pour l’Emploi) within certain limits. The
353. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Luxembourg Civil Code, art. 2101; Luxembourg
Commercial Code, art. 545; EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; SARRA, supra note
37; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Restructuring and Insolvency in Luxembourg:
Overview, PRACTICAL L., http://us.practicallaw.com/6-501-9478 (last visited Mar. 9,
2014).
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Fund is sourced through employer contributions and various forms of
taxes. It guarantees wages and other amounts owed for the last six
months of work arising from the termination of the employment
contract. The same cap exists on these amounts as discussed for the
super-priority for wage claims in insolvency proceedings. After
paying the guaranteed amount, the Fund is subrogated to the claims
of employees in the insolvency proceedings at the same priority level
as the employee’s original claim.
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20. Mexico 354

Pensions
Mexican occupational pensions are exempt from the bankruptcy
estate because they are part of a mandatory private pension fund,
separate and apart from the employer. Thus, pensions are generally
not considered during bankruptcy proceedings. However, there is
one line of thinking that employee claims to pension funds may be
regarded as an indemnity in favor of the workforce and thus, may be
treated like other wage claims with a super-priority.
To the extent that the insolvent employer has failed to make all
pension contributions to the pension fund at the time of the
bankruptcy, however, the employees’ claims for such amounts are
treated as non-preferred claims. Additionally, unfunded or underfunded pension liabilities are treated as non-preferred claims in
insolvency.
There is also no pension guarantee fund in Mexico.

Other Employee Benefits
Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution provides a constitutional
preference or super-priority for workers regarding unpaid salaries
during insolvency, up to three months of salary. Additionally,
“seniority” payments are mandatory, and accrue after fifteen years of
service under Article 162 of the Federal Labour Law. Workers are
entitled to receive twelve days’ salary per year of employment for this
seniority bonus. These seniority payments receive a similar superpriority. Seniority payments and wages receive a super-priority for
those amounts that have accrued in the two years of employment
prior to the insolvency. There is also a priority for severance pay up
to a maximum of three months’ salary. There is no priority for
vacation pay outstanding.
Mexico also has no wage protection fund or guaranteed insurance
for wage claims during insolvency.

354. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos [C.P.], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917, art.
123; Ley Federal del Trabajo [LFT] [Federal Labor Law], Diario Oficial de la
Federación, art. 162; SARRA, supra note 37; Industry Canada, supra note 335.
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21. Netherlands355

Pensions
Under Dutch law, occupational pension schemes are administered
and managed by a pension fund or by an insurance company. The
majority of these schemes are DB plans (only about five percent are
DC plans). Company and pensions funds must be kept strictly
separated, and pension funds are legally and financially independent
from the companies. Pension funds are therefore not directly affected
if the company becomes insolvent, except to the extent that the
employer owes outstanding contributions to the pension funds.
Moreover, the supervising authorities, including the Dutch Central
Bank and Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets, constantly
monitor whether the fund is still able to meet its future obligations
and enforce measures on the fund (including cutting pension benefits)
if this is not the case. In the case where an employer fails to pay the
pension contributions due to the pension fund because of insolvency,
those contributions due for last twelve months (maximum) are paid
by the unemployment benefit fund directly to the pension fund (see
discussion of the Uwv below).
Pensions deriving from the
employment contract that fell due before the bankruptcy was filed
have a general preference.
The Netherlands does not operate a pension insurance scheme.
The funding rules alluded to above provide the main protection
measure for pension beneficiaries in the Netherlands.

355. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Faillissementswet [Fw] art. 40 (Dutch Bankruptcy
Code),
translation
available
at
http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/legislation/
bankruptcyact022.htm; DUTCH ASS’N OF INDUS.-WIDE PENSION FUNDS & DUTCH
ASS’N OF CO. PENSION FUNDS, THE DUTCH PENSION SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
KEY ASPECTS, available at http://www.pensioenfederatie.nl/Document/Publicaties/
English%20publications/Nederlandse_pensioensysteem_Engelstalige_versie.pdf (last
visited Feb. 9, 2014); EUROPEAN FOUNDATION, supra note 336; FRESHFIELDS
BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 262; Norma Cohen & Matthew Steinglass,
Yawning Deficits Force Dutch Pension Funds to Cut Payouts, FINANCIAL TIMES
(May
27,
2013),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ae66abba-9e07-11e2-9ccc00144feabdc0.html#axzz2WgZaOnVC; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Stewart,
supra note 3; Email from Frans Penning to Paul M. Secunda (Aug. 12, 2013) (on file
with author); Email from Frans Penning to Paul M. Secunda (June 19, 2013) (on file
with author).
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Other Employee Benefits
Under Article 40 of the Dutch Bankruptcy Act concerning
employment agreements, the wages and premiums relating to the
employment agreement that become indebted as of the day of the
declaration of bankruptcy are estate debts. Estate debts give the
creditor a preferential claim (estate claim) that must be satisfied first
from the assets of the bankruptcy estate.
Additionally, in the case of employer insolvency, the Dutch
Employee
Insurance
Agency
(Uitvoeringsinstituut
Werknemersverzekeringen, or Uwv) will take over some of the
employer’s financial obligations towards the employees, including: (1)
the payment of salary and benefits over a maximum of thirteen weeks
(including overtime and expenses); and (2) holiday allowance and
pension contributions that have remained unpaid over a maximum of
one year. Pension contributions are not paid to the employee, but
directly to the pension fund. Wage claims in the Netherlands do not
include notice or termination pay, because such statutory payments
do not exist under Dutch law.
The Uwv will have a preferred claim in the bankruptcy process for
the amounts it paid to employees and third parties like a pension
fund.
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22. New Zealand356

Pensions
There is no express protection for pension claims in insolvency.
Most superannuation schemes in New Zealand are registered under
the Superannuation Schemes Act 1989. Registration under that Act
involves compliance with various requirements, such as trust and
reporting requirements that protects employer superannuation
schemes from any employer insolvency.
In 2007, New Zealand introduced a new occupational pension
scheme known as Kiwisaver. The scheme requires employees who
opt-in into the scheme to contribute a certain percentage of their
salary to pension funds. These “approved savings schemes,” which
have varying degrees of expected risk and return, are operated
independently of the employer, so employer insolvency should not
affect an employee’s Kiwisaver claims. Since April 2013, the
minimum contribution rate for employers and employees has
increased from two percent or wages to three percent of gross salary
(employees can also choose to contribute four or eight percent). To
the extent that an insolvent employer fails to make an employer
contribution, these contributions are preferred without cap in
insolvency.
There is no guarantee fund or insurance system for superannuation
schemes, though pension contributions deducted from an employee’s
wages are protected in the same manner as wage claims in insolvency
(as set out below).

Other Employee Benefits
Under Section 312 and Schedule 7 of the New Zealand Companies
Act, employees of an insolvent employer receive the following
preference: (1) wages for the four months preceding liquidation, (2)
holiday pay, (3) redundancy (i.e., severance and terminations)

356. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Section 312 and Schedule 7 of the Companies Act
1993,
available
at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0105/latest/
DLM319570.html;
Superannuation
Schemes
Act
1989,
available
at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1989/0010/latest/DLM143292.html; SARRA,
supra note 37; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Email from Gordon Anderson,
Professor of Law, Victoria Univ. of Wellington, to Paul M. Secunda, Professor of
Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (Sept. 19, 2013) (on file with author).
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entitlements, (4) deductions from wages, and (5) various other
payments, up to an aggregate maximum of NZD $16,420 (as of 2008).
These costs must be paid before other unsecured creditors. More
specifically, these employee claims rank in priority to security
interests over inventory and accounts receivable except for security
interests that are duly perfected purchase money security interests
over inventory or that are perfected security interests arising from the
transfer of an account receivable for new value.
There is no wage protection fund or state insurance for wage claims
in New Zealand.

980

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

23. Norway 357

Pensions
Norway has had a mandatory occupational pension scheme since
2007, whereby employers must contribute at least two percent of
employee salary to a pension fund (OTP). Pension contributions
during employer insolvencies have a super-priority under Section 9-3
of the Norwegian Satisfaction of Claims Act. Pension claims are
limited to a period of up to six months before the insolvency was
filed.
If the assets of the estate are insufficient to cover pensions, Section
1 of the Act Relating to the State Guarantee for Wage Claims in the
Event of Bankruptcy provides a state guarantee for pensions. The
Guarantee is financed by employer contributions. The Guarantee is
limited to an amount equal to two times the “basic amount.” The
“basic amount” is determined annually (as of May 2013, the basic
amount is NOK 85,245 per year).

Other Employee Benefits
Under the Norwegian Satisfaction of Claims Act, Section 9-3,
claims for wages and other remuneration, just like pensions, are
granted a super-priority claim in insolvency. Similarly, wage claims
are limited to a period of up to six months before the insolvency was
filed. Holiday pay earned during the last twenty-four months before
the filing date is treated as a preferred claim.
Under section 1 of Wage Guarantee Scheme, wages and other
remuneration are provided a state guarantee. Wage and pension
claims come under the same state guarantee claim, and the cap of two
times the basic amount applies to both wage and pension claims
combined. The Wage Guarantee Scheme is then subrogated to the
rights of the employees in insolvency, with the same priority that the
employees would have had.

357. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Act Relating to Creditors’ Rights to Satisfaction of
Claims (June 8, 1984) § 9-3, translation available at http://www.ub.uio.no/
ujur/ulovdata/lov-19840608-059-eng.pdf; Act of Dec. 14, 1973 Relating to the State
Guarantee for Wage Claims in the Event of Bankruptcy, § 1, translation available at
http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19731214-061-eng.pdf; EUROPEAN FOUND.,
supra note 336; SARRA, supra note 37; Industry Canada, supra note 335.
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24. Poland358

Pensions
Occupational pension plans are maintained separately from the
employer, and they tend not to be affected by the insolvency of the
employer, unless the employer fails to make required contributions.
Under the Polish system, the employer funds the pension promise
through contributions, and the employee may also make
contributions.
To the extent that the employer fails to make the required
contributions to the pension fund, Polish bankruptcy law gives first
ranking to claims arising from retirement pension contributions. This
is not a super-priority claim. Pension claims receive a priority ranking
similar to the costs of bankruptcy proceedings, ranking first after the
satisfaction of secured claims such as those secured with mortgages,
registered pledges and pledges. This is because under Articles 345–
346 of the Polish Insolvency and Bankruptcy Act, only the excess left
after satisfaction of the secured claims is included in the bankruptcy
estate.
Although there is a guarantee fund (discussed below) that provides
protection for first pillar social security payments, it does not do so
for pension contributions for occupational pension plans.

Other Employee Benefits
Claims arising from employment relationships (wage claims
including vacation, severance, and termination pay) receive a similar
priority to pensions in the insolvency process. Severance pay and
damages related to the termination of the contracts of employment
constitute “costs of bankruptcy proceedings” under Article 230 of the
Bankruptcy Act and, therefore, receive a priority. The preferential

358. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Polish Insolvency and Bankruptcy Act, arts. 230,
345–46, available at http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20091751361
(Polish version only); Employee Claims Protection Act of July 13, 2006 (discussed in
Protection of Employee Claims in Case of Employer Insolvency (15-04-2010),
EUROPEAN LABOUR L. NETWORK, http://www.labourlawnetwork.eu/national_labour_
law_latest_country_reports/national_legislation/legislative_developments/prm/109/v_
_detail/id__954/category__27/index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2014); CONNOR, supra
note 265; EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; SARRA, supra note 37; Industry
Canada, supra note 335.
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treatment of employment-related claims under Polish insolvency law
is not limited as to amount or duration of employment.
A
Guaranteed
Employees’
Claims
Fund
(Fundusz
Gwarantowanych Świadczeń Pracowniczych, FGŚP) has been
established to guarantee wage claims, which includes vacation,
holiday, severance, and termination pay. The Fund is regulated by
the Employee Claims Protection Act. The Fund receives financing
from industry, costs to the system, employer taxes, and general taxes.
Upon the employer’s insolvency, the Fund pays wage claims for up to
three months, as long as the termination did not occur later than nine
months before insolvency. The total amount paid to the employee
may not exceed three times the national average wage from the
previous quarter as announced by the Central Statistical Office (in
2013 approx. PLN 10,500).
The Fund is subrogated to the claims of the employee in the
amount of those paid claims during the insolvency procedure, and it
also maintains the employee’s preferential status.
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25. Portugal 359

Pensions
In Portugal, occupational pension schemes are established through
a pension or insurance contract. As these plans are established
independent of the employer, employer insolvency only has an impact
if these funds become underfunded through unpaid contributions by
employers. Portuguese law grants employees privileges regarding
their labour credits, including for outstanding pension contributions.
If under-funding of pension schemes occurs because the employer
does not pay the contributions needed to meet the minimum sums
required by law, pension fund legislation stipulates that the pension
fund manager is under an obligation to propose that the sponsor
correct the situation and if no suitable funding plan has been drawn
up within one year, the pension fund must be wound up. In that case,
the pension fund assets will be applied to guarantee pension rights in
the following order: fund expenses, individual accounts if applicable,
pensioners, employees retirement age or higher, vested ex-employees,
vested rights of employees, and finally an increase in benefits for
pensioners.
Portugal does not have a national pension benefit guarantee
scheme in cases of employer insolvency.

Other Employee Benefits
Wage claims in insolvency receive priority under the Portuguese
Bankruptcy Code. Wage claims include unpaid wages, seniority
subsidies, compensation for unfair dismissal, and compensation in
respect to employee injuries. Employees who lose their jobs as a
result of their employer’s insolvency are entitled to statutory
compensation equal to one month’s base remuneration (plus seniority
subsidy, if applicable) for each year of service and it may not be less
than three months’ base salary (plus seniority subsidy, if applicable).
Portuguese law grants the employees creditor privileges regarding
these labour payments in insolvency.
The Salary Guarantee Fund (Fundo de Garantia Social) protects
employees in case of insolvency. The fund is run by the state and the

359. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; Industry
Canada, supra note 335; Stewart, supra note 3.
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social partners, and is financed by employers. The fund covers all
amounts due to workers in the six months preceding the company
filing for insolvency. In addition to unpaid wages, the fund also
covers holiday and redundancy pay. The guarantee is limited to a
maximum of four months’ wages and cannot exceed three times the
minimum wage.
The Fund is then subrogated to the claims of employees in the
company insolvency proceeding, with the same priority that
employees would have had.
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26. Slovakia 360

Pensions
Slovakia has external pension funds that administer occupational
pensions called Pension Asset Management Companies (PAMCs).
Indeed, company pension funds are not permitted under Slovakian
law.
Like Germany, Slovakia does not give preferred status to pension
claims. Nevertheless, insolvency should be less of a concern because
occupational pensions are both funded and held separately from the
employer. This means the pension funds should be protected in the
event of insolvency.
Due to the defined contribution nature of this scheme, there is no
guarantee institution behind the scheme and under-funding is
generally not possible.

Other Employee Benefits
The claims of workers for unpaid wages, holiday pay, redundancy
pay, termination pay, and travel costs, are given preferred status in
Slovakia. Wage claims receive priority before floating security
interests, but rank below secured creditors (so not a super-priority).
This preference is for wages accumulated within three months
preceding the declaration of the bankruptcy.
These wage claims are also protected under the Social Insurance
Agency’s Guarantee Insurance Scheme when an employer becomes
insolvent. Employees are entitled to up to three months’ pay based
on the eighteen months of their employment prior to the insolvency
filing. The Social Insurance Agency then recoups these costs from
the bankruptcy trustees (i.e., they are subrogated to these claims).

360. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: CONNOR, supra note 265; EUROPEAN FOUND.,
supra note 336; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Social Insurance System in
Slovakia, supra note 258.
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27. Slovenia 361

Pensions
There is no preference for pension claims under Slovenian law.
Occupational pensions, generally of the voluntary, defined
contribution plan variety, are kept separate and apart from employer
assets. Thus, employer insolvency should have a little impact on the
operation of these external pension funds. Moreover, because
pension management companies are under an obligation to form a
coverage fund, which must be sufficient to cover all guaranteed
returns in any accounting period, under-funding of the schemes is not
possible.
Nevertheless, unpaid contributions by employers to these pension
funds do not receive priority in bankruptcy proceedings and there is
no regulation on late payment of contributions. If there are overdue
and unpaid contributions, employees have the same rights as other
creditors, which is to say they are unsecured.
There is no guarantee institution for pensions in the case of
employer insolvency.

Other Employee Benefits
Slovenia has a type of super-priority claim for wage claims in
insolvency. Under the Law on Compulsory Settlement, Bankruptcy
and Liquidation, Articles 160/2 and 4, the priority is for the basic
wages determined in the collective agreement plus unpaid wages
owed for the period three months prior to the commencement of the
bankruptcy proceeding, with no cap on the amount. As of 2007, these
wages and related compensation (including termination pay) up to
100% are treated as a cost of bankruptcy and given super-priority in
insolvency.
Slovenia also has a Special Fund for the payment of social claims.
This Special Fund provides employees: (1) unpaid wages for last three

361. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: EUROPEAN FOUNDATION, supra note 336;
MIODRAG DORDEVIC, WORLD BANK, COMMERCIAL ENFORCEMENT AND
INSOLVENCY SYSTEM (2003), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/
ConferenceMaterial/20157436/Slovenia%20-%20CR2.pdf);
OECD,
SLOVENIA:
REVIEW OF THE PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM
(2011),
available at
http://www.oecd.org/finance/
private-pensions/49498109.pdf; SARRA, supra note 37.
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months before the termination of employment; (2) unpaid
compensation for wages for paid absence for last three months before
the termination of employment; (3) compensation for wages for
unused leave of absence for last year; and (4) compensation money
under conditions of the labor relations law. These payments are
restricted to maximum amounts relating to the minimum wage. The
system, managed by the Public Guarantee and Maintenance Fund, is
financed by contributions from the employees, the State and the Fund
itself.
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28. Spain362

Pensions
Pensions do not receive any preference under Spanish bankruptcy
law. Pension funds (which exist in the DB plan and DC plan
varieties) must be established separate and apart from the company
and so company insolvency does not generally have an impact on
these pension funds. In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of the
company, insurance policies and pension funds maintain the capital
built up and owned by the workers and guarantee payment of the
pensions generated. Outstanding contributions to these pension
funds do not receive any preference and are uncommon claims in
insolvency proceedings in any event.
There is no pension guarantee fund in Spain.

Other Employee Benefits
According to Article 84.2.1 of the Spanish Bankruptcy Code, a
super-priority is given to wage claims (including vacation, severance,
and termination pay) arising in the last thirty days of employment
before insolvency over all claims. Wage claims outside of this
limitation period are given a general preference over unsecured
claims under Article 91.1. These claims are restricted to amounts no
more than three times the minimum wage.
Spain’s wage guarantee fund is called the Fondo de Garantía
Salarial (FOGASA). FOGASA receives industry funding and is
regulated by the Real Decreto 505/1985 de 6 de marzo sobre
organización y funcionamiento del Fondo de Garantía Salarial. The
fund provides for the payment of wages (together with any
compensation for dismissal), up to 120 days, and for the payment of
severance pay and up to twelve months, limited to three times the
minimum wage. FOGASA is subrogated to employee claims in
insolvency with the same priority.
362. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Spanish Insolvency Act, arts. 84.2.1, 91.1 (B.O.E.
2003, 13813), available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2003/07/10/pdfs/A2690526965.pdf (Spanish version only); Real Decreto 505/1985 de 6 de marzo sobre
organización y funcionamiento del Fondo de Garantía Salarial (B.O.E. 1985, 6029),
available
at
http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Laboral/rd505-1985.html
(Spanish version only); EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; FRESHFIELDS
BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 263; SARRA, supra note 37; Industry
Canada, supra note 335.
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29. Sweden 363

Pensions
Occupational pensions in Sweden can be a direct promise (book
reserves) from the employer or can be held separate and apart from
the company in pension funds or as part of life insurance contracts.
Rules concerning book reserves and pension funds are laid down in
the Securing of Pension Obligations Act. The predominant model for
pension now is that monthly payments are made for each employee to
an insurance company, which undertakes liability to make future
pension payments to the employees. Thus, companies do not
generally carry any pension liability on their balance sheets. Outside
of the FPG guarantee system (discussed below), pension funds
receive preferred status for their claims for outstanding contributions.
Claims relating to direct pension commitments (book reserves)
from six months before the petition for bankruptcy to six months
after the petition have priority. Claims relating to other pension
benefits have priority from three months before the petition for
bankruptcy until one month after the order for bankruptcy and are
limited to ten price base amounts (approximately SEK 425,000 for
2010).
Occupational pensions for white-collar workers in Sweden are
protected by a guarantee fund—the Pension Guarantee Mutual
Insurance Company (FPG). To the extent that the FPG pays out
funds to employees, it generally does not become a preferential
creditor in bankruptcy proceedings, except for a five percent
maximum of the total amount due for pension rights earned three
months before bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the FPG can require
collateral from companies for the privilege of being part of the FPG
system, and to that extent, the FPG becomes a secured creditor in
bankruptcy proceedings.
In the event of the employer’s insolvency, if the employer has to
pay an occupational pension directly to the employee (book
363. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: LÖNEGARANTILAG (Wage Guarantee Act) (Svensk
författningssamling [SFS] 1992:497), available at http://www.government.se/
sb/d/5807/a/104977; 12 § FÖRMÅNSRÄTTSLAG (Rights of Priority Act) (Svensk
författningssamling [SFS] 1970:979) (discussed in Changes in the Rights of Priority
Act, WORLD SERVICES GROUP, http://www.worldservicesgroup.com/publications.asp?
action=article&artid=2849 (last visited Mar. 9, 2014)); EUROPEAN FOUND., supra
note 336; FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 262; SARRA, supra
note 37; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Stewart, supra note 3.
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reserves), the employee’s claim is covered by the wage guarantee to
the same extent as other claims that are covered by the guarantee,
since the Wage Guarantee Act applies to pension claims by virtue of
Section 12(6) of the Rights of Priority Act. If the employer is under
an obligation to pay contributions to an employee’s private pension
insurance, in accordance with a contract between the employer and
the employee, the claim falls within the scope of Section 12(1) of the
Rights of Priority Act instead. This means that a claim related to the
obligation to pay contributions is considered as a claim regarding pay
and, therefore, is also covered by the wage guarantee. Pension
benefits are covered for a maximum of twelve months and are capped
at approximately SEK 170,000 for 2010.
The State, as well as the pension insurance company, may seek to
recover in the insolvency process from the employer the amounts
paid by the state and pensions insurance company to cover
contributions that the employer failed to pay, but such claims do not
receive any priority.

Other Employee Benefits
Wage claims (including holiday pay claims) accruing prior to the
insolvency filing receive preferred status under the Swedish
bankruptcy system.
Employees have ‘salary guarantees’ (statlig lönegaranti), which is
compensation paid by the state if a bankrupt company does not have
sufficient assets to meet their claims. The state guarantee fund covers
wages, which are earned up to three months prior to the petition for
bankruptcy or reorganization, as well as wages for the first month
subsequent to the District Court’s decision to grant a petition for
bankruptcy or reorganization. The amount of payment is capped.
The wage guarantee also covers wages during a notice of termination
period and holiday pay claims that have accrued during the current
and previous holiday year.
If wage payments are covered by the wage guarantee fund, the
state’s claim is not prioritized in the same way as the employee’s
claim would have been in the insolvency.
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30. Switzerland 364

Pensions
Occupational pensions are established independently from
employers by pension insurance institutions. Employers contribute to
these insurance institutions on behalf of their employees. If the
employer does not pay pension contributions and is insolvent, the
insurance institution has a priority claim pursuant to Article 219 of
the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Law. Employees,
however, do not themselves have any claim against either the
employer or against the insurance institution. The entire amounts of
unpaid contributions are entitled to a preference.
To the extent that the insolvency process does not cover the
pension claims, the joint guarantee fund of the supplementary
pension funds (Sicherheitsfonds BVG-LOB Guarantee Fund) is used
to ensure payment capacity, but compensation is also paid from the
guarantee fund to pension funds where the age structure of the
insured is considered unfavorable. The guarantee fund is maintained
through contributions paid by the pension providers. The fund
ensures benefits up to a set maximum limit. When calculating the
compensable benefit, the maximum amount of earnings that are
taken into account is 125,280 Swiss francs in 2011.
This guarantee fund is subrogated to the rights of the employees as
a creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings, but receives no priority.

Other Employee Benefits
Article 219 of the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Law
sets up three different classes of unsecured creditors for the
distribution out of the proceeds of the entire remainder of the

364. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER SCHULDBETREIBUNG UND
KONKURS [Federal Statute on Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy], SYSTEMATISCHE
SAMMLUNG DES BUNDESRECHTS [SR] Apr. 11, 1889, SR 281.1, art. 219, revised as of
Dec. 16, 1994, available at www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/c281_1.html (full text in German,
French or Italian only); BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE OBLIGATORISCHE
ARBEITSLOSENVERSICHERUNG UND DIE INSOLVENZENTSCHÄDIGUNG [Swiss Federal
Act on the Compulsory Unemployment Insurance and the Insolvency
Compensation], SYSTEMATISCHE SAMMLUNG DES BUNDESRECHTS [SR] June 25, 1982,
SR 837.0, arts. 51, 54, available at http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classifiedcompilation/19820159/index.html (full text in German, French, or Italian only);
SARRA, supra note 37; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Stewart, supra note 3.
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bankrupt estate. First class preferred claims include unpaid claims of
employees that arose or became due not more than the six months
prior to the opening of bankruptcy proceedings (including unpaid
wages, termination pay, severance pay, and vacation pay), but not
exceeding (currently) 126,000 Swiss francs.
In addition to the bankruptcy preference for wage and termination
pay, according to Article 51 of the Swiss Unemployed and Insolvency
Insurance Law, employees of an insolvent employer are eligible to
receive from a public insurance fund payment of their past four
months unpaid wages, after termination of their employment
agreement. This fund is sourced through employee and employer
contributions, and employee contributions are deducted from wages.
Employees are not entitled to be paid more than four times 8900
Swiss Francs (current wage amount for these purposes).
Under Article 54 of the Swiss Unemployment and Insolvency
Insurance Law, the public insurance fund is subrogated to the rights
of the employees in insolvency proceedings, with the same priority.

2014]

INSOLVENCY IN OECD COUNTRIES

993

31. Turkey 365

Pensions
As of 2001, Turkey has established a system of fully funded,
voluntary DC plans, which permit individuals to take out contracts
with one or more pension companies. Employers are permitted to
contribute to the personal pension accounts of their employees, but
are not required to do so. There are currently around seventeen
pension companies in the system. As a third pillar system, employers
do not play a large role.
There is no additional second pillar pension scheme available
beyond the PAYG defined-benefit first pillar system, which is
financed by public social security funds. Indeed, the voluntary private
pension system serves as a third pillar, and not as a second pillar,
unlike in many other countries.
Voluntary contributions that employers make to these voluntary
pension plans receive a priority under the bankruptcy code as “other
sums due to employees” under section 206 of the Turkish
Enforcement and Bankruptcy Code. This priority is for contributions
made up to one year prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
With regard to these pension schemes, there is no pension
guarantee fund or insurance scheme.

Other Employee Benefits
As discussed above, under section 206 of the Turkish Enforcement
and Bankruptcy Code, wages and other sums due employees are
granted a priority for the period of one year before the opening of the
bankruptcy.

365. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Code of Civil Enforcement and Bankruptcy, art
206 (on file with author); Labor Act of Turkey, § 33 (enacted May 22, 2003),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/ankara/download/
labouracturkey.pdf; OECD, Pension Country Profile: Turkey, in OECD PRIVATE
PENSIONS OUTLOOK 2008, at 287 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/
finance/private-pensions/42575085.pdf; Stephen Baister & Elif Altınsoy, The
Bankruptcy Law of the Republic of Turkey, (April 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at www.altinsoy.av.tr/doc/bankruptcy.doc; Employment and Employee
Benefits: Turkey, PRACTICAL LAW CO. (Nov. 2013), http://uk.practicallaw.com/8-3831562?service=pensions; Email from Ali Cem Budak, Professor of Law, Istanbul
Univ., Turkey, to Paul M. Secunda, Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch.
(July 25, 2013) (on file with author).
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Section 33 of the Turkish Labor Law establishes a wage guarantee
fund within the Unemployment Insurance Fund, which is funded by
one percent of the employer contributions to the unemployment
compensation system. The fund covers the last three months of salary
of the employees before their employer filed for insolvency. It does
not appear that this fund covers other forms of wages outside salary,
like vacation pay, termination pay, or severance pay. It also does not
appear that that the wage guarantee fund has any subrogation rights
in insolvency if it pays out benefits to employees.
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32. United Kingdom366

Pensions
The United Kingdom has both occupational DB plans and DC
plans. The plans assets are established in trust and are not accessible
to other company creditors. Under auto-enrollment provisions, the
employer must pay minimum contributions into some pension
arrangement, and can choose either NEST (a DC plan described
below) or another scheme.
As far as employee pensions claims under the British bankruptcy
system are concerned, outstanding pension contributions are treated
as preferred (behind secured creditors under Category 4 of the
Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule 6), while unfunded or underfunded
pension liabilities (so-called section 75 debt) are unsecured. Any due
but unpaid contributions to any UK pension plan (DC or DB, trust
based or contract based) become a preferential debt, and thus rank
ahead of everyone except secured creditors. This preference system
is only for one year’s worth of unpaid contributions.
The Pensions Act 2008 introduced new duties on employers to
provide access to a workplace pension scheme for most workers. If
employers choose a defined contribution scheme under the National
Employment Savings Trust (NEST), which went into effect in
October 2012, they need to pay a minimum contribution. If an
insolvent employer is unable to make the promised contributions to

366. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following
primary and secondary materials: Pensions Act, 2008, available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/30/contents; Pensions Act, 2004, available
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/35/contents; Enterprise Act 2002, c.40, §
251, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/contents; Employment
Rights Act 1996, § 184, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/18/
contents; Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, §§ 175, 386, sch. 6, available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/45/contents;
MARC
ABRAMS,
INT’L
INSOLVENCY INST., THE NORTEL EXPERIENCE: TENSIONS IN CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCIES—THE U.K. PENSIONS PERSPECTIVE (2010), available at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/viewdownload/103/3887.html;
CONNOR, supra note 265; EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; FRESHFIELDS
BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 262; SARRA, supra note 37; Industry
Canada, supra note 335; Stewart, supra note 3; Renee Dailey & Mark Dedinger, UK

Supreme Court Throws Out the Nortel and Lehman Pension Baby Claims with the
Bathwater, BRACEWELL & GIULIANI (July 26, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/uk-supreme-court-throws-out-the-nortel-a-22587; Email from Rosalind
Connor to Paul M. Secunda (July 30, 2013) (on file with author); Email from
Rosalind Connor to Paul M. Secunda (July 29, 2013) (on file with author); Email
from Rosalind Connor to Paul M. Secunda (June 26, 2013) (on file with author).
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the NEST scheme, the same preferential priority (for one year prior
to the insolvency) applies that applies to all other unpaid
contributions to any United Kingdom pension plan.
As far as pension guarantee funds, the Pension Act 2004
established the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) for purposes of
providing payment to employees in occupational defined benefit
plans for both unpaid contributions and unfunded liabilities where the
sponsoring employer became insolvent. The PPF is sourced through
annual statutory levies on all occupational defined benefit pension
schemes (it does not guarantee DC plans). Payments are subject to
statutory cap and a limited to only a proportion of their accrued
pension benefits under the PPF. A 100% level of compensation,
however, is available for individuals who have reached the plan’s
normal retirement age when the PPF becomes involved. Ninety
percent of compensation is paid for those who have retired, but have
not yet reached normal retirement age under the pension plan. The
PPF, to the extent it has claims against an insolvent employer because
of the payments it has made to employees, stands in the place of
employees as an unsecured creditor.
The Pension Act 2004 sets up the Pension Regulator. The Pension
Regulator may, among other things, issue Financial Support
Directives against any entity connected with an employer in an
underfunded pension scheme. The Financial Support Direction
requires the targeted entity to provide indication of how it will supply
financial support to eliminate the pension scheme’s funding deficit
(e.g., by making payment into the scheme to ensure that there are
assets to meet the liabilities on the basis of buying them out with an
insurance company (section 75 buy-out debt)). If the recipient of the
Direction fails to provide the financial support to the pension fund,
the Pension Regulator can then issue a Contribution Notice, which
imposes a statutory liability on the entity to pay a specified sum to
cure the pension’s deficit. This issue is important for pension claims
in insolvency because the recent Nortel litigation concerns the
priority of Financial Support Directives under U.K. insolvency law.
At issue is whether these pension instruments have a super-priority as
a cost of administration of the estate that outranks all other creditors,
including secured bank lenders and bondholders. The U.K. Supreme
Court recently held that such Directives should be treated as general
unsecured claims because such claims involve unfunded pension
liability. This decision overturned lower court decisions to the
contrary.
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Other Employee Benefits
Wages (including vacation pay), up to a capped maximum
(currently set at 800 pounds per employee), are considered
preferential debts for the four months prior to the filing of the
insolvency. Unpaid holidays are treated as wages for these purposes
and receive preference for the twelve months before the insolvency
filing. These priorities exist under the Insolvency Act 1986, Section
386 and Schedule 6, as amended by Enterprise Act 2002, Section 251.
Additionally, section 175(2)(a) of the Insolvency Act provides that to
the extent the company is not able to meet the preferential claims in
full, those debts must be paid out of any property comprised in, or
subject to, a floating charge. Accordingly, these preferential wage
debts are payable in priority to claims secured by any floating charge.
Any wage claim that exceeds the capped amount is treated as an
unsecured claim.
As far as wage guarantee schemes, a separate statutory scheme
directs payments to employees of an insolvent employer from the
National Insurance Fund (NIF), under Section 184 of the
Employment Rights Act 1996. The NIF is sourced by costs to the
system, employer taxes, and general taxes. The NIF pays: up to eight
weeks of wages, up to six weeks holiday pay, one weeks’ notice pay
(i.e., severance pay) for each complete year of service up to a
maximum of twelve weeks, a tribunal’s basic award for unfair
dismissal, repayment of apprentice fees, and redundancy pay (i.e.,
termination pay), which is based on length of service in certain age
bands, up to a maximum of thirty weeks of pay. All of these
payments are capped at the statutory limit, which as of 2013 was 450
pounds per week, or up to 13,500 pounds for up to thirty weeks for
unfair dismissal pay.
The NIF then becomes a preferential creditor in the insolvency
proceedings in the group action brought against the employer,
subrogated to the claims of the employees with the same priority that
the employee would have had.

